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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces 
using the economic theory of the firm.  To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an 
organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency.  The bargaining 
power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by 
two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of 
those rights.  These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or 
army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system.  In 
the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay 
in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the 
more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control.  Thus, the dependence on 
coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage 
violence are also empowered to act against the regime.  To minimize this threat, the 
dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at 
the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to 
defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis.  The cycle of repression captures the 
various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed 
forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship.  As such, 
this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military 
relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“No institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no major uprising 
within a state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of the armed 
forces.” (Zoltan 2016, 5) 
 
How do authoritarian regimes gain and maintain civilian control of the military?  
Civilian control can be simply defined as the condition in which “civilian leaders can 
reliably get the military to do what they want it to do.” (Desch 1999, 4) It confers 
responsibility for the state’s strategic decision making in the hands of civilian political 
authorities, rather than the military establishment.  Specifically, civilian authorities have 
control over setting policy (the ends), the decision on the implementation (the means), 
and determining lines of responsibility between ends and means.  The armed forces play 
a critical role in many aspects of state and society as a whole.  While the military is 
considered a part of the state, it often acts as if it were outside—much like a pressure 
group, it marshals considerable resources for its own benefit. (Pion-Berlin 1997, 27) 
Many important topics studied by social scientist such as revolutions, democratization, 
and economic development are greatly impacted by the relationship between the military 
and the state.  Despite the armed forces importance as an institution, scholars have not 
fully defined or conceptualized the variation in civil-military relations, especially in 
authoritarian regimes.  The purpose of this dissertation is to conceptualize the variation in 
civil-military arrangements in authoritarian regimes and examine how these arrangements 
condition the armed forces support of a regime in crisis.  In other words, how do 
authoritarian regimes design civil-military institutions to gain and maintain control of the 
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armed forces?  What are the factors and conditions influencing civil-military institutional 
arrangements?  In what type of arrangement is the armed forces more likely to defend, 
defect, or coup during a regime crisis?   
In June 1989, mass protests erupted in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.  Images of 
students hauling a makeshift lady liberty splashed across television screens around the 
world.  At the time, popular uprisings were also threatening to unseat communist 
governments across Eastern Europe.  Many thought the protests in Tiananmen Square 
would bring about liberal reforms in China.  Yet, this never came to be.  Days later, the 
Chinese authorities unleashed the coercive power of the People’s Liberation Army to 
clear the square.  Shortly thereafter, the communist regime had effectively suppressed the 
movement.  In 2011, the Arab Spring brought another wave of popular uprisings.  What 
had once thought improbable, mass movements had toppled some of the most entrenched 
dictators.  Many policy analysts and area specialists had assumed the armies would stand 
by these regimes as they have done in the past.  Unexpectedly, some militaries had 
refused to fire on protesters and intervene on behalf of the dictators in crisis. Why did the 
Chinese army obey orders to fire upon unarmed protesters in 1989, while Egyptian forces 
defected in 2011, arguably a delayed coup d’état in 2013?  Why do armies that have a 
history of repression, or have previously repressed on behalf of the dictator, later decide 
to defect or coup?  Related to this question is the paradox of authoritarian system 
maintenance—the dilemma of establishing coercive organizations designed to support the 
dictator, while concurrently preventing that organization from turning into a threat. 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Svolik, 2012, 2013; Albrecht 2015a) 
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Several studies have observed that the military is an important component in 
revolutions, rebellions, and regime transitions. (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991; 
Goldstone et al. 1991; Ackerman 1994; Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Goodwin 2001; 
Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) However, many of these studies have not 
specifically studied the military as an institution with distinct interests and preferences 
separate from the regime.  As noted by Barany (2016), “the military, the institution that, 
by definition plays a critical role in revolutions, frequently do not receive sufficient 
attention from experts.” (2) In their study Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found 
statistical evidence that the military’s defection increased the likelihood of a successful 
outcome for nonviolent campaigns by 60 percent. (58)  This statistic raises several 
questions.  How and why do militaries react to crisis events that threaten the ruling elite?  
What factors come in to play when a military decides to intervene on behalf of the 
regime, support the opposition, or take over the government?  We have few answers to 
these questions with real policy implications.  Furthermore, while armies are an important 
institution, the variation in civil-military institutional designs has not been fully 
conceptualized and classified.   
To explain the variation in civil-military institutional arrangements, this 
dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian civilian control of the armed forces using 
the organizational theory of the firm.  The theory of the firm explains the contractual 
relationship between the leader and the armed forces which establishes a master-servant 
relationship, or hierarchy.  I argue that the contractual arrangements are determined by 
the bargaining power of the dictator and the armed forces based on the market value of 
organized violence.  Political actors’ bargaining position are assessed by two dimensions: 
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the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights.  These 
dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, 
cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system.  Moreover, this 
typology captures the bargaining environment which informs the military’s decision to 
defend, defect, or coup when a regime is in crisis.   
 
Conceptualizing Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements and Civil Control 
 
The military is defined as the state’s coercive apparatus formally mandated to 
defend against foreign threats; however, they may also be responsible for internal 
security missions and participate in state-led repression. (Brooks 2019, 2) Civil-military 
institutions are rules and organizational arrangements which implement military security 
policy.  According to Huntington (1957), military security policy is the program of 
activities designed to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by 
physical threats (state and non-state armed forces), typically outside the state’s 
institutional and territorial confines. (1) Conceptually, these rules, or institutional 
arrangements, guide civilian leadership (ruling elite) and the armed forces relationship in 
enacting security policy.  Civil–military relations comprise several different 
relationships—between the military institution and broader society, between the military 
and other government bureaucracies, and between political leaders and the military elite 
(Nielsen and Snider 2009, 3) However, the primary focus within political science, and 
this project, is the relationship between civilian leaders and the military elite.  As used in 
this project, military leadership, military elite, top brass, or military establishment come 
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from the senior ranks of the officer corps and hold high-levels of command authority 
within the military organization.  The relationship between regime rulers and the military 
elite can take on various institutional configurations.  
Traditionally, scholars exploring civil-military institutions have focused on the 
civil-military problematique: “who will guard the guardians?” (Feaver 1996) This concise 
question encapsulates the predicament: “How do civilian political actors manage to 
subordinate the military to their authority?” (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982, 779) In 
civil-military arrangements, there is always a concern over compliance—will the armed 
forces obey civil authorities, or will the military use its coercive power to resist 
compliance and pursue its own interests?  The underpinning of the civil-military 
relationship, in any political order, involves the principal-agent problem, where the 
principal can never be certain the agent is carrying out the principal’s wishes.  While the 
principal creates the rules, he or she must delegate authority to an agent to carry out the 
rules.  Conforming to rules requires both implementation and enforcement by an agent.  
How do the civilian authorities solve the civil-military problematique or effectively 
control the army?  Scholars generally define the presence or absence of civilian control 
according to whether or not civilian leader’s preferences prevail over the military’s 
preferences across the state’s policy domains, including those that bear on the military 
itself.  (Desch 1999; Feaver 1996, 2003a) In the presence of civilian control of the 
military, civilian leaders are also able to allocate institutional prerogatives and choose 
when to delegate authority to the military. (Croissant et al. 2010, Feaver 2003a)   
Scholars have approached the conceptualization of civil-military relations into 
two groupings—relations within a democratic constitutional order and everywhere else.  
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As a result of this bifurcation, the study of civilian control has primarily been in the 
domain of democratic control. (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Feaver 2003b) 
Encumbering our understanding of civil-military institutions and the means to achieve 
civilian control in authoritarian systems is the normative paradigm of civilian supremacy.  
Leading this strain of literature is Huntington’s (1957) The Soldier and the State which 
prescribed the best means in achieving civilian control of the military.  According to 
Huntington (1957), objective control of the military was the best means to establish 
civilian supremacy.  Objective control entails the enhancement of institutional autonomy 
and “professionalization” of the military.  Specifically, objective control requires a strict 
separation of authority and spheres of responsibility between the military and the political 
domain.  In contrast, subjective control “politicizes” the military by mobilizing the armed 
forces against domestic political opposition. (Brooks 2019, 8) Needless to say, 
Huntington’s normative prescription for achieving civilian supremacy is difficult to apply 
to authoritarian systems because of the necessity to use violence to limit political 
contestation.  Since authoritarian regimes typically narrow political participation through 
repression, the military is often drawn into politics to support the maintenance of the 
regime.  Consequently, the dichotomy between a “professional” and “politicized” 
military often obscures the variations of civil-military relations in authoritarian systems.   
In conceptualizing civil control in authoritarian systems, it has often been viewed 
as the absence of military intervention in politics—in other words, the lack of military 
coups and praetorian rule, or the low risk for such events. (Croissant et al. 2010, 954) The 
problem with this negative definition of civilian control is that it does not capture other 
nuanced forms of military influence that may be toxic to civilian rule. (Croissant 2011, 3) 
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As Desch (1999) points out, “Most people think about civil-military relations strictly in 
terms of coups: if there are coups, then civil-military relations are bad, and if not, they are 
good.” (3) However, the absence of military intervention in politics inadequately 
measures positive civilian control.  The armed forces may concurrently refrain from 
provocative actions to dismantle institutional norms, while not fully accepting their 
subordination to civilian authority.  As Pion Berlin (1997) noted, “[Civilian] control is a 
demanding term that connotes much more than legal adherence…[it] depends on 
conviction—the notion that a professional soldier submits to a higher, political 
authority.” (219)  
Presuming the absence of positive civilian control, early studies of civil-military 
institutions in authoritarian systems focused primarily on the behavior of praetorian 
armies.  Defining the concept of the praetorian state or praetorian army, Perlmutter 
(1969) described it as “one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could 
dominate the political system.” (383) He also introduced a taxonomy of civil-military 
relations in developing polities identifying two types of praetorian armies: the “arbitrator 
army” which seeks to influence politics from behind the scenes and the “ruler army” 
which exercises military rule for long periods.  Furthermore, in examining the praetorian 
tendencies of militaries in developing countries, scholars have asked two questions: why 
do militaries intervene in politics and how do they govern? (Perlmutter 1969; Nordlinger 
1977; Finer 1962; and Decalo 1990; Geddes 1999) More narrowly, earlier works 
identified the origin of military intervention in politics based on professionalization or 
lack thereof (Huntington 1957), sociological setting (Janowitz 1960), political culture 
(Finer 1962), military corporate interests (Nordlinger 1977), and individual ambitions of 
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officers. (Decalo 1990) Unfortunately, the praetorian predilections of non-western 
militaries led early scholars to understudy the mechanism for civilian control in 
authoritarian systems and the variation of civil-military institutional designs.   
In the succeeding years, however, several scholars have advanced our 
understanding of civil-military institutions in authoritarian states.  Regional scholars, 
specifically African and Middle East specialists, brought advances in identifying and 
defining variations in civilian control and the design of civil-military institutions.  First, 
Kamrava (2000) identified three types of civil-military intuitional arrangements in the 
Middle East: 1) “autocratic officer-politician,” these are regimes led by former officers 
turned civilian politicians, 2) “tribally independent monarchies,” in which their armies 
are drawn mainly from tribal lines and pays allegiance to the monarchy, and 3) “dual 
militaries,” these regimes enlist parallel military forces based on ideology in addition to 
the regular army.  Rather than an explanatory typology, as the labels suggested, 
Kamrava’s typology was descriptive in nature combining the type of ruler and a 
particular coup-proofing strategy.  Next, drawing on the Middle East and North African 
experience, Bellin (2004) introduced the concept of “institutionalized military” and 
“patrimonial military.”  As defined by Bellin, institutionalized militaries are ruled bound 
and governed by clear sets of rules, established career paths, promotion based on merit, 
and strong links with society.  In contrast, patrimonial militaries are not ruled bound, 
have no established career paths, promotion based on ideological, tribal and political 
allegiance, and weak links to society.  Much like Huntington’s objective and subjective 
control, Bellin’s “institutionalized-patrimonial” dichotomy exposed itself to misuse by 
scholars who equated institutionalization with professionalism and patrimonialism with 
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politicization.  Finally, Cook (2007) introduced the term military-dominated state based 
on the civil-military dynamics in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey.  Unlike a military 
dictatorship, the military enclave in these three countries oversee the development of a 
political system which allows for the appearance of pluralism (elected “civilian” 
leadership) but also incorporates key mechanisms for military oversight and political 
control. (15)  His term, military-dominated state, while providing an important reference 
point, only captured a single type of civil-military institutional arrangement.   
Scholars have inconsistently conceptualized, operationalized, and measured the 
variations in civil-military institutions and their impact on civil control.  None of these 
classifications, taxonomies, and typologies allowed for a systematic and cumulative 
comparison of civil-military institutions. Multiple definitions and types have been 
introduced and applied.  Some define the relationship through the lens of regime type 
focusing only on the ruler.  Others evaluate the characteristics of the military such as the 
level of professionalization, institutionalization, and patrimony.  Moreover, the criteria to 
evaluate these characteristics are difficult to measure as they are inadequately 
operationalized.  Finally, the various military typologies and taxonomies drew on region-
specific factors which may not translate to other locations.  Without clearly defining, 
conceptualizing, and operationalizing the various civil-military institutional types, 
comparison across time, countries and regions is haphazard at best limiting the 
accumulation of knowledge.  The typology introduced in this project aims to address 
these shortcomings in defining and conceptualizing the various types of civil-military 
institutional arrangements in authoritarian systems. 
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The Civil-Military Problematique in Authoritarian Systems 
 
In terms of authoritarian system maintenance, the civil-military problematique 
translates into the paradox of establishing coercive organizations designed to support the 
incumbent, while preventing that organization from turning into a threat. (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2005; Svolik 2012, 2013; Albrecht 2015)   In further refining the elements 
of this paradox, Brooks (2019) described four competing imperatives the dictator 
confronts in civil-military relations:  
The first is a coup-prevention imperative, which involves ensuring that the 
military abstains from conspiracies against the regime. The second is a repression 
imperative, or guaranteeing that the military will use force against societal groups 
to protect the regime when required. The third imperative involves safeguarding 
military effectiveness, or ensuring the military performs well in armed conflict. 
The fourth might be termed a governance imperative. It relates to civilian or 
political control, but it represents a broader challenge: Autocrats seek not only to 
retain the authority to make decisions but also to ensure that the military does not 
compromise their preferred policy and resource-allocation outcomes. (12) 
 
According to Brooks (2019), a dictator’s main challenge is to balance all four 
imperatives; inevitably, there will be trade-offs in meeting the requirements of coup-
prevention, repression, military effectiveness, and civil control. 
The preponderance of the early literature on civil-military relations in 
authoritarian systems focused on military coup d’états.  By definition, a coup d’état 
“consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus and its 
use in order to displace the government from control of the remainder.” (Luttwak 1969, 
11) The aim of a coup is to substitute one ruling group for another.  The coup literature 
sought to identify the rationale and propensity for military intervention examining factors 
such as economic crises to military corporate grievances. (Luttwak 1969; Finer 1962; 
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Nordlinger 1977; Decalo 1990).  Scholars, such as Svolik (2012), have started to explore 
the coup puzzle—given coups are costly to both the dictator and the military why do they 
even occur?  Brooks (2019) suggested the application of the bargaining model of war 
might provide a framework to explain the coup puzzle. (5)   
Going hand-in-hand with the coup literature, scholars also explored the coup-
proofing imperative.  (Quinlivan 1999; Kamrava 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005; 
Cook 2007; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2012; Albrecht 2015a, 2015b) To 
minimize the inherent risk of overreliance on coercive violence, dictators generally 
employed coup-proofing strategies.  As noted by Albrecht (2015a), some coup-proofing 
measures are designed to bind officers closer to the incumbent while others are designed 
to keep them out of the political sphere.  Coup-proofing entails the altering of 
institutional arrangements between the dictator and the armed forces:  
includes the establishment of loyalties between officers and incumbents through 
ethnic, religious, and personal bonds; the recruitment of military personnel from 
among privileged minorities and mercenary soldiers; the counterbalancing of 
divided security apparatuses; the frequent rotation of officers to avoid the 
emergence of alternative power centers; and buying off the officer corps through 
economic privileges and opportunities for self-enrichment.  The crafting of 
alliances with international powers, including the stationing of foreign troops, also 
helps to avoid coups since plotters would have to assume that status quo oriented 
foreign powers would stand by their allies. (Albrecht 2015a, 661)     
 
Brooks (2019) observed recent scholarship treats coup-prevention tactics largely as a 
menu of interchangeable options from which dictators can choose. (5) Accordingly, the 
different composition of coup strategies may vary—some may aim to marginalize the 
military politically or alternatively, some may bestow the military with organizational 
benefits in a grand bargain (McLauchlin 2010; Brooks 2013, 2017, 2019) As a byproduct 
of the variation in coup-proofing strategies, the institutional arrangements between the 
  12 
dictator and military also varies.  For example, replacing political power incentives with 
economic incentives often keeps the armed forces out of politics but also increases the 
military’s autonomy. (Albrecht 2015a, 41) While the coup-proofing literature provides 
insights into the relationship between the dictator and the armed forces, it only gives us 
one aspect of the dictator’s civil-military imperative, narrowly defining the variation in 
civil-military configurations as strategies to limit the military threat. 
Giving equal treatment to democratic and authoritarian civil-military relations, 
Desch (1999) explored the imperative of civil control employing a structural argument.  
He hypothesized that the international and domestic threat environment explains the 
degree of civilian control—it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face 
primarily international threats and hardest when they face primarily domestic threats. (6) 
In other words, civilian control of the military is better when confronted with external 
threats and worse under internal threats to the state.  With a high external threat, civilian 
leaders are more attentive to national security and civilian institutions are more cohesive 
because of the “rally ‘round the flag” effect. (14)  Alternatively, internal threats weaken 
civilian institutions making direct military intervention in politics more likely which 
subsequently impacts military cohesion and factionalization.1 (15) While providing novel 
links between civilian control and threat environment, his structural explanation on why 
internal threats would be detrimental to civilian control were often contradictory.  On one 
hand, he suggested that factionalization leads to more coup attempts, but on the other 
                                               
1 Desch (1999) suggested that it is easier to form a consensus among military members on matters of “high 
politics” and more difficult in matters of “low politics.” Examples of “high politics” includes the protection 
of the institution and its core values; “low politics” includes economic development strategies and the 
nature of the political regime. (15) 
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hand, he noted military cohesion and coups success were highly correlated.  Although a 
significant launching point in our understanding of civil control, his assumptions on 
military consensus building, military cohesion, and coups proclivity requires further 
investigation. 
More recently, Svolik (2012) examined the prospects of civil control of the 
military and the origins of military intervention in authoritarian systems.  The crux of the 
political problem involves the central role of the military in employing repression in 
authoritarian regimes.  Once the military becomes indispensable in repression, they gain 
greater autonomy and resources, positioning it to intervene.  According to Svolik (2012), 
“The military exploits this pivotal position by demanding greater institutional autonomy 
as well as a say in policy, and it threatens to intervene if the civilian leadership departs 
from a subsequent compromise on these issues.” (765)  Moreover, only under favorable 
conditions can regimes subordinate the military to political control—that is they do not 
depend on them for repression.  He asserted coup-proofing measures are only effective 
when they are put in place before the military’s political ascendency. (132) While 
providing insight to costly brinkmanship bargaining that leads to military coups and 
military dictatorship, Svolik (2012) omits the possibility of a reversal of dependency on 
the military.  Authoritarian leaders often employ counter-balancing strategies, whereby 
they form or empower alternative security forces as leverage against the praetorian 
impulses of the military.  Rather than just positing a situation where there are only 
competitors to the dictator for political power, his theory should also include competitors 
to the military.  The addition of competitors will affect the bargaining position of the 
civilian leader vis-a-vis the military.   
  14 
Brooks (2019) described four competing imperatives the dictator confronts in 
civil-military relations: coup-prevention, repression, military effectiveness, and civil 
control.  One means to integrating these phenomena are to view the design of the civil-
military institutions as a negotiation between political and military actors. The few 
studies on civilian control have not fully explored the balance of power between the 
dictator and the military nor explained the shifts in bargaining position due to structural 
and institutional changes.  On one hand, structural changes can be the result of the 
transformation of the global system, the advent of new technologies, or large-scale social 
revolutions.  On the other hand, institutional changes entail the strategic bargaining that 
occurs between the dictator and the military.  This dissertation project aims to provide a 
coherent analytical framework to explain shifts in bargaining power and the impact on 
civil-military institutional designs. 
 
To Defend, Defect, or Coup: Military Behavior during Regime Crisis 
 
On the question of military institutional behavior during regime crisis, the 
literature on revolutions and resistance campaigns provides some cursory insights. 
(Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991; Goldstone et al. 1991; Ackerman 1994; Ackerman and 
DuVall 2000; Goodwin 2001; Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) While these 
works noted the importance of military behavior in the outcome of revolutions, 
rebellions, and popular movements, they do not specifically explore the determinants of 
military strategic calculus to remain loyal, defect, or coup.  Skocpol’s (1979) classic 
study, States and Social Revolutions, is an insightful comparative analysis of the armed 
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forces of the old regimes during the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions.  She 
observed that there is no institution more important for a regime’s survival than its armed 
forces and, therefore, maintaining the loyalty of those forces should be a priority for the 
ruling elite.   
Chenoweth’s and Stephan’s (2011) recent book on violent and nonviolent 
campaigns, Why Civil Resistance Works, recognized the role of the military in 
determining campaign success.  One factor in the success of nonviolent campaigns is that 
they induced a loyalty shift within the regime, specifically the military. Interestingly, 
through rigorous modeling and statistical analysis, they found that campaigns are most 
successful when they produce security force defections—increasingly the likelihood of 
success by nearly 60 percent. (58)  In theory, nonviolent campaigns effectively use 
fraternization to win over the military which leads to defections.2  While their work noted 
the importance of military defections, they do not specifically explore the determinants of 
military strategic calculus to remain loyal or defect.  Their work focused on the strategies 
and tactics of the campaigns and the impact on success. 
In his book, Defect or Defend, Terence Lee (2014) examined how and under what 
conditions the armed forces will defect from autocratic rule when popular protests erupt 
leveraging cases from Asia—China, Burma, The Philippines, and Indonesia. (5)  
Underpinning his argument is the variation of authoritarian institutions which leads to 
regime stability or fragility when popular protests surface.  According to Lee (2014), 
authoritarian regimes draw on different segments of society for political support leading 
                                               
2 The term defection typically refers “to the decision by senior military leaders to abstain from using force 
to disperse mass unarmed protests that threaten a regime.” (Brooks 2019, 6) 
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to different decision making procedures—one which is either highly personalistic or one 
which accommodates “rule by sharing.”  Highly personalistic authoritarian regimes 
causes disaffection within the armed forces and are more likely to defect.  In contrast, the 
military is less likely to defect in nonpersonalistic authoritarian regimes with “rule by 
sharing.”  In power-sharing arrangements, the armed forces have a stake in decision 
making and are more committed to joint rule. (Lee 2014, 5-6) While Lee’s work is 
steeped in the authoritarian power-sharing and credibility literature, he does not connect 
his findings to the broader civil-military literature on coup-prevention, repression, and 
civil control.  Moreover, Lee’s study overlooked the variation in strategies for civil 
control which may have conditioned the military’s strategic calculus in supporting the 
ruling regime.  Interestingly, the literature from the Arab Spring uprising would come to 
different conclusions regarding the cause of military defection. 
The Arab Spring inspired several scholars to investigate the surprising number of 
military defections during the mass wave of resistance campaigns. (Albrecht 2015a, 
2015b; Albrecht and Ohl 2016; Barany 2011, 2013, 2016; Brooks 2013, 2017; Frisch 
2013; Kandil 2014; Lutterbeck 2013) Surveying the Arab Spring literature, scholars 
analyzed an array of causal variables to explain defection from the characteristics of the 
military to regime coup-proofing measures.  For example, Lutterbeck (2013) noted that 
while the armed forces have been key actors in the Arab uprisings, they have responded 
quite differently to the prodemocracy movement—“ranging from openness to protest 
movements, to internal fracturing, to firm support for the regime in power.” (28) 
Reprising Bellin’s (2004) “institutionalized-patrimonial” dichotomy, he claimed that the 
degree of institutionalization of the armed forces and their relationship to society at large 
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can account for the divergent responses to pro-reform movements. (28) As such, armies 
that are more institutionalized (not patrimonial) and have closer ties with society 
(conscription) were more apt to support the opposition movement.  He suggested that the 
distinction between armies based on mandatory conscription as oppose to volunteers 
explains military loyalty and defection during uprisings.  Although Lutterbeck intended 
to demonstrate that the levels of institutionalization (and conscription) of the armed 
forces encouraged defection, case selection was problematic. As the highly 
institutionalized militaries (Tunisia and Egypt) did not confront an extreme sectarian or 
tribal divide within the population as compared to the patrimonial militaries selected in 
the study (Bahrain and Libya).  Moreover, because of the troublesome demographics and 
sectarian nature of political contestation some countries are more likely to use 
conscription while others will not.  The regimes choice to conscript or not conscript 
based on the country demographics complicates the causal direction of his findings.  Next 
example, Albrecht (2015a) leveraged coup-proofing theories to understand the variation 
in response to the Arab uprisings.  He distinguished between two rationales underlying 
coup-proofing: measures designed to bind officers closer to incumbents (integration) and 
measures to move the officer corps out of the political arena (segregation).  He assumed 
that during times of systemic regime crisis, such as the Arab Spring, integration coup-
proofing is more effective than segregation in maintaining the loyalty of officers.  
“Repression of uprisings is risky and potentially costly; and the loyalty of military 
officers is guaranteed only if coup-proofing measures have been designed to tie them to 
the incumbent.” (41) While making links to coup-proofing and the resulting civil-military 
institutional arrangements, his explanation does not consider the reputational and 
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credibility cost incurred by the dictator in employing coup-prevention strategies.  While 
these studies have provided initial insight into military behavior during the Arab Spring, 
they lacked a common conceptual framework to reconcile the numerous findings. 
Finally, Barany’s (2014) took a positive step in answering the question “how and 
why do militaries respond the way they do to popular upheavals challenging regime 
survival?” (5)  He examined the military’s response to what the top brass may perceive as 
a threat to the stability and survival of the regime. (7) He enumerated a number of factors 
that may go into a general’s reaction to any revolution and compared these factors across 
countries swept up in a popular uprising (Iran in 1979, Burma in 1988 and 2007, China 
and Eastern Europe in 1989, and finally the Arab Spring countries in 2011).  This 
checklist of factors encompassed four spheres: the military, the state, the society, and 
external environment.  Although these factors delivered a strong forecasting tool to 
predict military behavior, the study offered no explanation into the trajectory of regime or 
changes to the civil-military institutional arrangements following the crisis.  Barany 
limited the scope of his study to forecasting military behavior at the initiation of an 
uprising. 
Lee (2014), Lutterbeck (2013), Albrecht (2015a) and Barany (2014) illuminated 
and highlighted potential causal mechanisms involved in the army’s decisions to defend 
or defect.  However, none of these authors considered defection within a larger 
framework of bargaining and competing civil-military imperatives for the dictator.  
Although these studies suggested the link between the regime and the armed forces is 
critical in the decision to defend, their conceptualization of the civil-military relationship, 
rendered it difficult to draw comparisons.   
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Surveying the existing body of work on civil control, repression, and defection, 
few works have comprehensively conceptualized the complexities of authoritarian civil–
military relations.  Brooks (2019) identified the unwarranted divide across the civil-
military relations subfield which treat the four competing imperative as distinct 
phenomenon: 
Presently, defections, coups, and civilian control are analyzed as largely separate 
phenomena—as distinct problems that must be resolved by political leaders. Yet, 
that approach misrepresents the multidimensionality of autocratic civil–military 
relations. Political leaders do not choose which of these problems to address; they 
must deal with them all, simultaneously. (12) 
 
As a result of this divide, the civil-military relations subfield has not found a means of 
integrating and synthesizing the multiple disparate finding for each of the competing 
imperatives.  Also limiting our understanding, scholars have not fully identified the 
broader strategic logic that underpins the political bargain between the civilian leader and 
the armed forces.  Arguably, the existing power differential between civilian and military 
elites impact the design of civil-military institutional arrangements.  Moreover, the field 
has not agreed upon a common definition, conceptualization, or classification of the 
various civil-military institutional arrangements in authoritarian systems—making 
comparisons across time, countries and regions difficult.  Consequently, the study of 
civil-military relations has suffered from the lack of knowledge accumulation.  This 
project aims to solves some of these shortcomings by developing conceptual tools and a 
framework to integrate these competing imperatives. 
 
Theory and Methodology 
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The underwhelming knowledge accumulation in this research area is due in part 
to insufficient concept development regarding institutional variations of civil-military 
relations around the world. As Sartori (1970) lamented on concept development “the 
wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to 
travel.  It is equally clear that the pre-1950 vocabulary of politics was not devised for 
worldwide, cross-area travelling.” (1034) Consequently, Sartori (1970) challenged 
scholars to devote careful attention to concepts because they yield the basic “data 
containers” employed in research. (1052) For the most part, the social science community 
has undertaken the challenge to provide conceptual tools for many institutions that make 
up political life.  However, the study of civil-military institutions has lagged behind.  As 
such this project will first define, conceptualize, and operationalize the various civil-
military institutional configurations within authoritarian systems.   
The theory of the firm explains the contractual relationship between the 
authoritarian incumbent and the armed forces which establishes a master-servant 
relationship, or hierarchy.  Based on the economic literature of the firm (hierarchical 
governance), I develop a civil-military institutional typology.  The firm literature is 
steeped in the new institutional economics (NIE) which focused on the social norms, 
legal norms, and institutions (rules) that underlie economic transactions. (Williamson 
1979, 1981, 1996) In part, NIE leverages rational choice tools.   
Additionally, I employ a typology to capture the dimension of the civil-military 
institutional framework.  A well-established analytic tool in the social sciences, a 
typology is defined as an organized system of types for analyzing data. (Collier et al. 
2012, 217) The analytical advantages of using a typology are threefold: 1) the ability to 
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form and refine concepts drawing out underlying dimensions, 2) the creation of 
categories for classification and measurement, and 3) tracking change.  In this study, the 
typology of civil-military relations denotes the configuration of civil-military institutions 
and captures the bargaining power of civilian and political actors.  This configuration and 
bargaining position, informs the military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during a 
crisis event.  However, there is the potential danger in reification when capturing the 
theory in an explanatory typology and labeling the cells.  “In the context of an 
explanatory typology, reification occurs when a case is ‘explained’ because one attaches 
a name to it, not because a theory that one has deemed valid is seen as being applicable to 
it.” (Elman 2005, 317) As Elman (2005) warned “labeling runs the risk of the cells 
ceasing to be regarded as ‘containers’ of predictions made by the underlying 
theory…labels become freestanding ‘explanations’…rather than the theory from which 
the property space was derived.” (317)  
Next, I define the cycle of repression which captures the various stages in the life-
cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces.  The cycle of 
repression provides insights into changes in the civil-military institutional configuration 
before and after a crisis event.  The value of the cycle of repression is that it integrates the 
phenomena of defections, coups, and mechanisms of civilian control into a coherent 
framework.  In conjunction with the cycle of repression, I also develop a military 
decision model, or decision matrix, which amplifies the bargaining process, and 
alternatively failures of repression. 
Finally, I apply the typology, cycle of repression, and decision model to a small-n 
intraregional study.  Since the aims of this dissertation is theory generation rather than 
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theory testing, case studies provide an analytical narrative to go with the typology and 
theoretical model.  When employing rational-choice models and game theoretic models, 
analytical narratives assist in extracting empirically testable, general hypotheses from 
particular cases to explain strategic decision making. (Bates et al. 1998) In short, through 
a small-n case study, I apply empirical evidence to illustrate the validity of the cycle of 
repression.  I also leverage process tracing to demonstrate shifts in bargaining power of 
the various political actors and the impact to institutional configurations.   
I’ve selected four cases studies from Asia—China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Burma—to provide an analytical narrative to evaluate my theory (Table 1).  Facilitating 
comparison, these contemporary Asian cases showed variation in civil-military 
arrangements, experienced notable crisis events resulting in different military behavior 
and outcomes.  In addition to being in the same region, all four countries have similar 
histories of imperial or colonial control, military experience fighting Japanese occupiers 
during WWII, and finally receiving statehood shortly after the war.  Each country 
experienced an abbreviated history of post-independence state-building with their civilian 
and military elites confronting similar challenges in forming stable governments, 
addressing political instability, and eliminating threats to the state.  Moreover, these cases 
are interesting to compare because they illustrate the different trajectories in the 
development of standing armies and their relationship with civilian political leaders.  
Therefore, these cases lend themselves to testing whether the existing power differential 
between civilian and military elites and the threat environment following independence 
have an impact on the design of civil-military institutional arrangements.  Finally, each 
case represents an army type developed in this project (cadre, patron, entrepreneur, and 
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cartel armies).  Because I am introducing a new typology, I selected these cases since 
they clearly illustrated the different types as well as the change in bargaining power 
between civil and military elites over the period examined. 
 
Table 1. Case Studies 
 
Country Army Type Crisis Event Decision 
China  Cadre 1989 Tiananmen Square Protest Defend 
The Philippines  Patron 1986 People Power Movement Defect 
Indonesia  Entrepreneur 1965 The 30 September Movement Coup 
Burma  Cartel 2007 Saffron Revolution Defend 
 
One of my research questions centers on military behavior during regime crisis 
and discovering the factors conditioning a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup.  
In each case selected, the ruling regime confronted a crisis event (popular uprisings, civil 
wars, insurrections, insurgencies, and the like) requiring military repression to support the 
maintenance of the regime.  In the Philippines, the military defected from the Marcos 
regime refusing to fire on protestors and mutineers during the 1986 People Power 
Movement; in China and Burma, the armed forces remained loyal and quelled protesters 
during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protest and 2007 Saffron Revolution, respectively; 
and finally, instead of supporting Sukarno during escalating student protests following 
the 1965 failed coup attempt, the army decided to take over the government.  These 
variations of outcome allow for the evaluation of the typology and the cycle of 
repression. 
In testing the cycle of repression, there is an inherent selection bias related to 
limiting the cases to those with dramatic crisis events requiring the application of military 
repression.  While opportunistic behavior at the margins may gradually alter institutions, 
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these changes are often imperceptible.  Crisis often spurs dramatic departures in policy 
which have been characterized by stasis or incrementalism in the past.  As a consequence, 
the effects of punctuated equilibrium are often easier to observe and measure.3  In the 
cycle of repression, a crisis event provides actors an opportunity to dramatically 
restructure the governing arrangements of the civil-military pact.  However, the 
application of military repression for regime maintenance often favors the military vis-à-
vis civilian leaders.  Alternatively, this would suggest that gradual shifts in civil-military 
institutional arrangements that may favor civilian leaders would take longer to register as 
change and would therefore be understudied as a phenomenon.   
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
Following this introduction and review of the applicable civil-military literature, 
chapter 2 expands on the dissertation’s theoretical argument. To this end, I review the 
literature on the economics of firms which establishes the theoretical underpinning for 
understanding political actors’ use of hierarchical governance in the design of public 
institutions and organizations.  The basis for hierarchical governance is due in part to the 
incompleteness of contracts which makes political actors vulnerable to opportunism.  
Hierarchical governance allows actors to mutually invest in the contractual relationship, 
                                               
3 Punctuated-equilibrium theory seeks to explain why political processes are generally characterized by 
stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they produce large-scale departures from the past. Stasis, 
rather than crisis, typically characterizes most policy areas, but crises do occur. (Baumgartner et al. 2014, 
59)  
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thereby enhancing credible commitment.  I next discuss the difference between economic 
and political transactions—exploring political property rights, political uncertainty, third 
party enforcement, and credible commitment.  These differences shape the design of 
political institutions that govern transactions as actors seek to limit their exposure to 
political uncertainty.  Based on these design considerations, I subsequently develop a 
typology for civil-military institutions.  Finally, I introduce the cycle of repression which 
explores the shift in civil-military institutional designs during and after a crisis event. 
Chapters 3 through 6 examine the four case studies which illustrate the typology 
of civil-military relations and the cycle of repression.  Chapter 3 introduces the cadre 
army examining the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through the events surrounding the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protests.  In a cadre army configuration, the military is most likely to remain loyal 
to civilian masters because there are credible guarantees of the political bargain.  Next, 
Chapter 4 introduces the patron army.  A quintessential patron army, I selected President 
Ferdinand Marcos and his relationship with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  
Specifically, I trace the events leading up to the 1986 People Power Movement.  Since 
patron army configurations do not have institutions which credibly secure political 
transactions, opportunism and the lack of credibility of civilian leaders can lead to 
military defections.  Chapter 5 introduces the entrepreneur army.  For this army type, I 
explore the relationship between President Sukarno and the Indonesian Armed Forces.  
The opportunistic behavior of both actors is one factor leading to the military coup in 
1965.  Because the military had gained significant political power through repression, it 
eventually transitioned to a cartel army when General Suharto and his generals removed 
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Sukarno from office.  Finally, chapter 6 introduces the cartel army.  In this chapter, I 
examine the multiple cycles of repression experienced in Burma since independence 
which resulted in a dominant military.  My analysis specifically focuses on the 2007 
Saffron Revolution which later prompted the Burma Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) to begin 
reforms and return to “civilian” rule.  However, because of military supremacy, to this 
day, the Tatmadaw continues to control the structure and pace of liberal reforms. 
Finally, in my concluding chapter, I summarize my findings, explore the 
generalizability of my theory, and offer some thoughts on the explanatory power of the 
cycle of repression and the impact on civilian control of the military.  Moreover, I 
examine the implications of civil-military institutional arrangements on the political 
trajectory of a regime.  When institutional arrangements favor the military, civilian elites 
will have trouble reasserting control.  Consequently, military supremacy, or the lack of 
civil control of the military, is the largest obstacle to liberalization and democratization.  
In short, I expand on the central role military actors have on regime maintenance, 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL FIRMS AND CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 
Theory of the Firm 
 
In 1914, the daily wage at Ford Motor Company was roughly $2.34. Ford was in 
the process of replacing a large number of skilled craftsmen with unskilled 
assembly line workers. These workers had low morale and low commitment to the 
firm. In that year, Ford announced that wages would go up to $5 a day. This was 
a huge gamble on Ford’s part, since the resulting increase in labor costs would 
eat up half the firm’s expected profits in the coming year. The explicit reason for 
taking this gamble was to increase the authority of Ford Motor Company to 
enforce higher productivity standards on individual work, without simply 
increasing turnover. (Miller 1992, 68) 
 
When Henry Ford innovated the auto industry by going from individually skilled 
craftsman to unskilled assembly line of workers, he also transformed the labor market 
from one that was competitive and voluntaristic to one in which employment at Ford 
Motor Company meant a long-term commitment to a hierarchical system of political 
authority. (Miller 1992, 11) The classic form of hierarchy is established “when actor A 
agrees to allow actor B to direct his behavior within rather broad limits, B agrees to 
compensated him, and both agree to a set of rules governing their future interaction.” 
(Moe 1995, 119) Upon signing an employment contract with Ford, employees found 
themselves in a political institution. The $5 wage contract between Ford Motor Company 
and labor created a monopoly over the labor market rendering exit costly for the 
employee.  
As Henry Ford recognized voluntaristic labor markets no longer fit innovations of 
mass production, the king also needed to adapt to changes in warfare. How do you get 
“men” to loyally pay the ultimate sacrifice? “In times of war, indeed, the managers of 
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full-fledged states often commissioned, privateers, hired sometimes bandits to raid their 
enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty.” (Tilly 1985, 173) As warfare 
became more lethal and technologically advanced, contracting mercenaries with 
questionable commitment was a liability on the battlefield.  An effective military 
organization required a specialized workforce with high morale and commitment.  Kings 
could no longer rely on inefficient practices of contracting individual soldiers and nobles 
to successfully fight wars.  The solution—kings created mass armies, a hierarchical 
organization, to gain economies of scale and comparative advantage.  Long-term 
contracts would encourage professional soldiers to commit to the goals of the 
organization and invest in specializing in all-aspects of warfare.  A contractual agreement 
of negotiated property rights and various incentive structures would facilitate compliance 
and lower the monitoring cost for the king.  Much like the political authority Ford created 
by the $5 wage contract, states and armies entered into a long-term contract to establish 
this hierarchal order where the king, enjoyed the privileged position of authority over 
soldiers.  
The literature on organization theory, specifically the economics of firms, is 
useful in understanding the contractual relationship between the state and the army.  In 
his seminal work, Coase (1937) contended, the essence of the firm is structuring long-
term contractual relations which establishes a “master-servant,” hierarchical relationship.  
Coase first posed the question: why are some activities directed by market forces while 
others by firms?  He speculated that entrepreneurs will organize as firms when the 
transaction cost of doing so is lower than the cost of using the market.  In other words, 
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firms partake of “political” authority to impose solutions without the inefficiencies of 
constant bargaining among participants, thereby lowering transaction costs.  
If actors can impose political authority on other actors, thereby lowering 
inefficiencies, why not govern all transactions within a firm?  Williamson (1975, 1985, 
1996, 2002) further elaborated on the boundaries of the firm—exploring why some 
transactions take place within firms while others in the marketplace.  According to 
Williamson, the choice of governance structure—market, firm or somewhere in 
between—is based on the attributes of the transaction.  The critical attributes being 
frequency of the transaction, uncertainty, and asset specificity.  In the science of 
contracts, as Williamson (2002) argued, “all complex contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete.” (174) Because of uncertainty and incompleteness of the original contract, 
parties will confront the need to adapt to unanticipated disturbance that may arise.  This 
uncertainty poses adaptive needs.  
As Williamson (1996) speculated, “incomplete contracting in its entirety” 
implicates both ex ante incentive alignment and ex post administration, or governance. 
(26)  Additionally, asset specificity, the degree to which an asset can be used across 
multiple situations and purposes, generates what Williamson (2002) described as bilateral 
dependency.  Bilateral dependency occurs when buyers cannot easily turn to alternative 
sources of supply; while suppliers can only redeploy the specialized asset to the next best 
use or buyer without a loss of productive value. (Williamson 2002, 176) An example of 
the relationship between asset specificity and bilateral dependency is explored in the 
following passage:  
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…a worker who becomes highly skilled over time at an idiosyncratic but 
important job.  The worker’s asset specificity makes him more valuable to his 
employer, but also more dependent on him for there is little market on the outside 
for his company-specific skills.  Similarly, the employer becomes more dependent 
on the worker because he cannot turn to the market for an equally valuable 
replacement at the same wage.  As their mutual dependence grows, their 
contractual options narrow.  (Moe 1995, 123)   
 
Bilateral dependency makes actors to the contract vulnerable, as such, they will enter into 
hierarchical governance structures to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain. 
(Williamson 2002) In other words, governance by firm is favored as asset specificity and 
market uncertainty increases. 
Further compounding the trouble of incompleteness of contracts is Williamson’s 
concept of opportunism coupled with bounded rationality. (47) Opportunism refers to 
“the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” (Williamson 1985, 47) This 
self-interesting seeking attribute is variously described as opportunism, moral hazard, and 
agency.  Williamson adhered to Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, acknowledging 
that humans’ cognitive competence is limited: “it’s only because individual human 
beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful 
investment for achievement of human purpose.” (Simon 1957, 199; Williamson 1985, 56) 
Therefore, human beings are only as rational given the information and cognitive ability 
they have available to them.  Williamson contended in a world of bounded rationality and 
opportunism, actors cannot be assumed to keep their promises or fulfill their contractual 
obligations.  “Transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit if 
appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante.” (Williamson 1985, 48) As a 
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consequence, the task of economic organization is to “organize transactions so as to 
economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against the 
hazards of opportunism.” (Williamson 1985, 32) Going hand-in-hand with opportunism 
is the need to safeguard the contractual obligation in the form of credible commitments.  
Credible commitments involve reciprocal acts designed to protect a relationship in the 
“form of irreversible specialized investments undertaken in support of alliances and to 
promote exchange.” (Williamson 1985, 167) When dealing with specialized assets the 
post-contractual opportunistic behavior problem is more prevalent so there is more need 
for vertical integration, or hierarchical governance. 
Exploring the boundaries of the firm, some economist viewed the firm as a set of 
property rights. (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1988; Hart and Moore 1988; Miller 
1999) Building on the work of Coase and Williamson on transaction costs and 
incompleteness of contracts, these scholars explored the ownership of assets and the 
impact on vertical integration.  Grossman and Hart (1986) defined the firm in terms of 
ownership of assets and the determinants of resource allocation.  To establish clearly 
delineated hierarchies, the firm develops formal and informal rules for defining property 
rights which determines resource allocations within the organization.  These institutional 
arrangements, or rules, determines who gets what, when, and how.  In short, those with 
the preponderance of property rights, or ownership, impacts who gets to decide.  
Recognizing the impossibility of writing a comprehensive, long-term contract to govern 
all terms and asset usage in a relationship, they concluded asset ownership and ex post 
residual rights matter.  When aspects of usage of assets are not specified, the right to 
decide lies with the owner of the asset.  An important implication of residuals ownership 
  32 
is the ability to exclude people from the use of assets.  For example, highly specialized 
workers cannot do their job without access to specialized equipment.  The upshot, this 
control over assets translated into authority over people. (Hart and Moore 1990) They 
also concluded, ex post residual rights of control not only influenced asset usage but the 
division of ex post surplus and ultimately ex post bargaining power in the relationship.   
Moreover, Miller (1999) examined principal-agent relations as a contractual 
agreement of negotiated property rights and various incentive structures that would 
facilitate compliance and lower the monitoring cost for owners.  He found that firms are 
more efficient and profitable when it can guarantee employees a secure property right 
binding the long-term mutual commitment.  
Security in these property rights can give employees reason to make investments 
of time, energy, and social relationships that produce economic growth. 
Moreover, hierarchies, unlike markets, institutionalize long-term mutual 
commitments that make it easy to trade off social acceptance and esteem against 
wealth. (Miller 1999, 9)  
 
Firms that are most successful at encouraging higher levels of commitment and non-
monitored effort from subordinates have effectively reallocated to employees some of the 
property rights to the assets owned by the firm, creating a sense of what is significantly 
called employee ownership.  Thus, organizations where the owner can inspire 
subordinates to transcend short-term self-interests will have a competitive advantage. 
Bringing these concepts back to civil-military institutional arrangements and the 
need for vertical integration, the high degree of uncertainty in political conflict, asset 
specificity, and adaptive needs required binding the long-term mutual commitment 
between the king and the military.  As Clausewitz famously penned, war is a continuation 
of politics through other means.  The answer to advances in warfare required the state to 
  33 
gain full ownership and control over all aspects of the production of violence.  If the king 
did not vertically integrate the suppliers of violence, he would fail to monopolize the 
legitimate use of force.  As Tilly (1985) suggested the activity of producing and 
controlling violence favored monopoly because competition within that domain generally 
raised costs, instead of lowering them. (175) Moreover, innovations in warfare favored 
vertical integration because investing in both physical and human assets created a 
bilateral dependency between the state and the military.  The king needs the military to 
establish a monopoly of force over a fixed, defined territorial boundary, while the 
military needs the resources of the state to train, organize, and equip.  The king depends 
on the expertise of the military to manage and operate highly specialized assets, while the 
military needs access and usage of specialized assets.  As Williamson would concede, 
this bilateral dependency increases the threat of opportunistic behavior from both parties.  
Consequently, over time the king and the army agreed to enter into a contractual 
agreement establishing hierarchical governance to limit the vulnerability of bilateral 
dependency.  Armies willingly submitted to this political authority because they realized 
they were better off in an organization that had the power to impose a hierarchy over the 
entire group.  
 
The Nature of Political Transactions 
 
Individuals have to make choices about where to invest and make the best use of 
their property, and their choices are shaped by transaction costs, uncertainty, and 
asset specificity.  But suppose their property rights were not guaranteed.  
Suppose, in particular, that the struggle for economic advantage were to take 
place within a framework in which some actors occasionally succeeded in 
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usurping the property rights of others.  Economic actors would be concern with 
more than simply making efficient choice about the use and disposition of the 
property.  They would also be concerned with taking action to protect their rights 
from usurpation—and with making current choices and adjust for the possibility 
that other actors might seize their rights to the property in the future.  (Moe 1995, 
123)  
 
The prevailing economic explanation for the emergence of firms is that 
establishing vertical integration or hierarchy reduces transaction costs and therefore is 
more efficient than the market.  Actors voluntarily negotiate the rules for governing 
relationships among them to constrain and coordinate their behavior with organizational 
efficiency in mind.  While reducing transaction costs maybe a beneficial effect, political 
organizations, however, are not necessarily structured for efficiency.  Why is this the 
case?  First and foremost, political transactions occur under a pre-existing hierarchy, or 
sovereign, that attaches public authority to certain political roles. (Moe 1995, 120) Under 
this existing hierarchy, the sovereign acts as the de facto final enforcer of specific sets of 
rights-claims within its purview. (Salter 2015c, 2) One implication is that political actors, 
to include the sovereign, often engage in transactions that impose obligations on third 
parties to which they may not consent. (Salter 2015c, 5) In other words, those wielding 
public authority have the power to impose obligations on society.  As Moe concluded, 
“politics is the struggle to control how this public authority will be exercised.” (Moe 
1995, 121) A byproduct of this political struggle is the bargaining among political actors 
on the rules structuring public organizations, or political firms.  As such, political firms 
are not designed with efficiency in mind, but with the intent to safeguard office holders 
and interest groups’ continued access to public authority.  Deploying economic theory to 
understanding political organizations is therefore not a straightforward application.  To 
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borrow from the work of Coase, Williamson, and others, requires identifying the 
difference between economic and political transactions effecting actors’ decisions and the 
impact on organizational and institutional design outcomes.  The features differentiating 
economic and political transactions are twofold: 1) the nature of political property rights 
and the corresponding political uncertainty attached to public authority; and 2) the 
absence of third-party enforcement and the impact on credible commitments.  
 
Political Property Rights and Uncertainty 
Economic transactions require actors to own the assets in the exchange.  
Furthermore, economic organizations arise out of voluntary contractual agreements 
among individuals whose property rights to engage in such transactions are guaranteed.  
As traditionally conceptualized, property rights are the privileges conferred by owning 
specific assets which are usually guaranteed through the legal system. As defined by 
Libecap (1989):   
Property rights are social institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges 
granted to specific assets, such as land or water.  Private ownership of the assets 
may involve a variety of rights, including the right to exclude nonowners from 
access, the right to appropriate the stream of rents from use of and investment in 
the resource, and the right to sell or otherwise transfer the resource to others.  
Property rights institutions range from an arrangement, including constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and judicial rules, to informal conventions and customs 
regarding the allocation and use of property. (1) 
 
Political transactions, on the other hand, involve actors whose property rights, or political 
property rights, are not cast-iron.  Salter (2015c) defined political property rights as that 
which allots “an individual, or group of individuals, the right to participate in political 
decision making, and any claim to the revenues generated therefrom.”  In other words, 
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political property right gives the owner the right to exercise public authority which are 
conditionally bestowed upon those holding formal and informal political roles.  As 
further conceptualized by Moe (1995): 
The right to exercise public authority can be thought of as a property right of 
sorts.  These rights are used, formally by politicians and informally by interest 
groups that influence them, to make choices about policy and the structure of 
government.  No set of individuals, however, has a perpetual claim on these 
rights. (124)  
 
Political leaders, who wield public authority have unique and valuable political property 
rights by virtue of their position within the government. While they are the holders of 
these political property rights, they are granted the entitlement to impose decisions on 
society and access to governance rents.  Unlike economic property rights, as we usually 
conceptualize them, political property rights are largely informal, are often inadequately 
defined and delineated.  They cannot be traded or sold and they can be dispossessed once 
the holder leaves public office.  Because of the ephemeral nature and inherently fluid 
boundary of these ill-defined, poorly delineated political property rights, political 
transactions take place under a high degree of political uncertainty. 
 
Third Party Enforcement and Credible Commitment 
The political uncertainty of securing political property rights weighs heavily on 
the decision calculus of political actors.  In binding, enforcing, and monitoring political 
bargains, political actors confront several obstacles.  First, as discussed earlier those 
holding political property rights are not guaranteed access to these rights in the future.  
Complicating the entitlement, proprietors of political property rights often find their 
privileges and claims to the attached governance rents are in conflict with other actors.  
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When the actual holder of political property rights becomes unclear, agents are also less 
likely to uphold contractual obligations.  Therefore, ex post opportunistic behavior is 
more likely when political property rights are contested.  Second, political transactions 
lack third-party enforcement.  Economic organizations have the luxury of focusing on 
transaction costs and asset specificity because there is an inherent assumption that a third-
party enforcer, the sovereign, will provide a legal framework to guarantee property rights 
and enforce contracts.  With a legal framework in place, individual actors can then focus 
their efforts on employing their property and assets on the most efficient uses.  Political 
transactions lack such a foundation.  Furthermore, political transactions occur under a 
pre-existing hierarchy, a sovereign, which acts as final enforcer of political bargains.  
Since one party to the political bargain may be the sovereign, there is no neutral third-
party to enforce promises and guarantee rights.  As a consequence, the sovereign cannot 
credibly commit to following through on agreements.  Where property rights and rights 
claims cannot be guaranteed the classic economic question rises.  How do you tie the 
king’s hands?  Root (1989) depicts the credibility shortfall of the Monarch of France’s 
Old Regime: 
Because the king claimed full discretion, he had less real power.  Claiming to be 
above the law in fiscal matters made it more difficult for the king to find partners 
for trade.  Creditors took into account the king’s reputation for repudiating debts 
and therefore demanded higher interest rates than otherwise would have been 
needed to elicit loans. (259) 
 
This political reality is further intensified in authoritarian regimes, where there is 
weak rule of law and a lack of institutional checks and balances such as judicial 
independence.  Like the French Monarch, a dictator faces the political problem of 
committing to actions contrary to his or her self-interest. Without a reliable third-party 
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enforcer to provide a legal framework to secure contracts and property rights, 
opportunistic behavior becomes more prevalent.  Under these precarious conditions, 
political contracts must be must be self-enforcing; in other words, the agreement must be 
in each actor’s self-interest to uphold.  In short, parties to political transactions must 
obtain mutually binding agreements to ensure credible commitment.  A self-enforcing 
agreement is one in which if “one party violates the terms the only recourse of the other 
is to terminate the agreement.” (Williamson 1985, 168) Salter (2015a) provided an 
example of institutional designs to curb the king’s opportunism in the taxation of 
subjects: 
The king’s ideal strategy would be to convince his subjects that taxes will be low 
and stable, to incentivize a high level of production.  But this would change the 
king’s strategy after his subjects have produced many goods and services; 
predation, in the form of a higher-than-promised tax rate, is now preferable.  
Subjects recognize the king’s promise is incredible, and so produce at near-
subsistence, leaving little to nothing for the king to tax. This sets up the possibility 
of a mutually-beneficial exchange in authority between the king and his council. 
Initially, the council’s role is purely advisory, with no formal power.  But the king 
can bargain with the council to grant them the right of veto to the king’s tax plan.  
The increased political power is obviously desirable to the council, as a protection 
against arbitrary taxation by the king.  The decreased political power too is 
beneficial for the king, since it allows him to credibly commit to lower and more 
predictable tax rates.  Subjects respond by producing more, which benefits the 
king, because he is getting more revenue at the lower and predictable rate, since 
the expansion of the tax base more than makes up for the lower tax rate.  All 
parties are better off under this scenario, even though subjects had no say in the 
bargain, to which only the king and nobles were party. (11) 
 
In the above scenario describing the rise of Western liberal democracy from the feudal 
order, the king instituted rules to share public authority by giving the council veto power 
over the king’s taxation plan.  By constructing reciprocal acts, these new institutional 
arrangements credibly tied the hands of the king.  In short, ex ante institutional designs 
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created mutually binding incentives for political actors to counteract ex post 
vulnerabilities to opportunism.  
 
Designing Civil-Military Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
As discussed earlier, a monopoly of violence is best obtained through hierarchical 
governance and vertically integrating the management and operation of violence under 
the sovereign.  Given the need for vertical integration, how do civilian and military actors 
negotiate the institutional arrangements of their relationship?  What is each actor’s goal 
and incentives to make and keep their agreements?  The only way to be able to make the 
“rules of the game” and design institutions that protect your interests is to be an owner of 
political property rights—to be a decision-maker with the ability to wield public 
authority.  As Grossman and Hart (1990) suggested in mergers of firms, the actor with 
the preponderance of assets, or ownership, will be at the top of the hierarchy.  They will 
control the decision making and the institutional rules.  This is especially true in the 
design of civil-military institutional arrangements.  Depending upon which political actor, 
civilian or military, has the majority of ownership rights, that actor will be positioned to 
dictate the governance structure of the relationship.  The balance of power between 
civilian authorities and the armed forces determines the contractually agreed upon 
institutional framework and ultimately the level of control gained and maintained by each 
actor.  As a consequence of the balance of power, there exists a variation in civil-military 
relations.  Some militaries are highly autonomous from the dictator while others are less 
so.  Some militaries are influential political actors while others stay in the barracks.  
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While there is a degree of path dependence involved in the relationship, changes in the 
political environment and actor opportunism can shift arrangements over time.  Since 
political property rights can be contested and dispossessed, the right to decide can shift to 
other actors.  These shifts indubitably impact each actor’s bargaining position in the 
contractual relationship.  
The primary objective of political actors negotiating civil-military institutional 
arrangements is the protection of their political property right claims and continued 
access to those claims.  Given the obstacle of securing political property right and 
enforcing those rights each actor will lobby for institutional designs to minimize their 
exposure to political uncertainty.  The more uncertainty the holders of political rights 
perceive, the more they consciously impose structures that undermine a political 
organizations performance.  As Moe (1995) suggested “the most fundamental task for 
political actors is to create governance structures that protect their public organization 
from control by opponents.” (125) Moreover, once a public organization is created, that 
agency’s officials become political actors in their own right—they become new players 
whose interests and resources alter the political game. (143) Moe (1995) describes the 
“selfish” ends that bureaucrats may pursue which may be incongruent with their formal 
mission.  To this “self-interesting seeking end,” bureaucrats act to shield themselves from 
political uncertainty through negotiation or insulation. (144) While both civilian and 
military political actors will seek to insulate themselves from political uncertainty, each 
actor, differs in their design preferences to achieve this objective.  Civilian leaders design 
institutions to increase their likelihood of maintaining office and their continued ability to 
wield public authority.  For instance, they may seek to limit contestation by designing 
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favorable electoral rules or through direct repression.  Military political actors, on the 
other hand, tailor institutions to increase their autonomy from civilian authorities.  In 
essence, the generals want to operate in the same fashion no matter who’s holding office.   
 Because authoritarian systems lack an independent authority to enforce political 
property rights and compliance, the final arbiter of political conflict is violence.  
Authoritarian regimes reliance on coercive violence makes it near impossible for the 
armed forces to completely insulate itself from politics.  Instead, the military seeks to 
minimize the impact of political uncertainty through negotiated expansion of its 
professional autonomy and management over the security domain.  The expansion of 
autonomy translates to more political authority or an increase in specific political 
property rights attached to the security domain.  However, the more the dictator relies on 
the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property 
obtained by the military with political authority going beyond the security sphere.  As 
Svolik (2012) observed, this dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the 
dictator since the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act 
against the regime.  Recognizing the threat military elites pose due to their increased 
ownership and entitlement to decision making, dictators may employ new rules in the 
form of coup-proofing strategies to chip away at the military’s advantage.   
 
Typology of Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
The level of political property right ownership and the guarantee of those right 
claims impact the bargaining power of civilian and political actors and the outcome of 
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institutional designs governing the relationship.  Considering all complex contracts are 
incomplete, it is cost prohibitive for parties to enter into long-term contracts that precisely 
specify current and future actions for every possible eventuality.  As a consequence, 
contracts will be subject to renegotiation. (Hart and Moore 1990, 1122) As Hart and 
Moore (1990) argued in defining the level of integration and the boundaries of the firm, 
actions taken today by agents translates to productive value tomorrow (actual or 
perceived) with implications for future contract negotiations.  On one hand, the future 
return on an agent’s current action will depend on his or her future “marketability” or 
bargaining position.  On the other hand, the existence of assets specificity means that an 
agent’s “marketability” will depend on the assets (property rights), he or she has access 
to, or ownership.  In negotiating the civil-military arrangements, the bargaining 
environment impacts the “marketability” of the military establishment.  The bargaining 
environment is influenced by previously held political property rights of the actors and 
the credible safeguard of those negotiated political property rights.  In short, the 
institutional arrangements are derived by two dimensions: 1) the credible guarantee of 
political property rights and 2) the negotiated political property rights.  These dimensions 
outline four civil-military institutional arrangements in an authoritarian system—cartel, 
cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies—influencing the degree of subordination of the 
military establishment to civilian control (Figure 1). This typology also classifies the 
variation of bargaining power between civilian and the military elites in renegotiating 
subsequent institutional arrangements. 
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Figure 1. Typology of Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Guarantee of Political Property Rights  
The horizontal dimension of the typology is the guarantee of political property 
rights.  This dimension measures the degree political property rights will be secured ex 
post and consists of two components:  1) the level of contestation of political property 
rights and 2) the level of credible commitment to the agreement by the actors in the 
exchange.  Credible political actors must own the political property rights in the exchange 
and are able to commit to obligations of the contractual agreement.  Do the actors 
actually own the rights in the exchange?  Are these rights contested?  Can the actors in 
the transaction be trusted to follow through based on past reputation?  In short, can the 
parties credibly commit to contractual obligations in the future (ex post).   
First, the level of contestation of political property rights is a factor in bargaining. 
The presence of competitors impacts the bargaining position of the military in two ways: 
lowering the exit costs of the military and potentially increasing the dictator’s 
dependence on coercive violence to maintain office.  Potential competitors to the 




























Weak                                        Strong
Vertical dimension of the political bargain:  Negotiated political property rights 
consist of two types of political property rights: 1) “owner” rights and 2) 
“manager” rights. 
Horizontal dimension of the political bargain:  Guarantee of political property 
rights consists of two components:  1) credible commitment to the agreement, 
and 2) level of contestation of political property rights.
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incumbent varies based on the openness of the political systems.  In closed regimes, there 
is in effect a dominant political actor that retains strong rights to public authority.  This 
actor can be an individual dictator, a party, or the military.  In more open regimes, 
competitors can be other political elites such as wealthy landowners, business leaders, 
and/or the military.  The opposition can also come from an emerging civil society such as 
political parties, associations, unions, and/or the church.  Civil society is defined as the 
“arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively 
autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests.” (Cook 2007, 6) In essence, political competitors 
translate to alternative buyers on the market lowering the exit cost of defecting.  More 
buyers, thereby, increases the marketability of the military and lowers the risk of asset 
specificity.  Contested political property rights may also increase the dictator’s 
dependence on the military.  With the presence of potential rivals, the dictator may be 
more reliant on the military to remain in power.  As a consequence of the dictator’s 
reliance on repression, the army is able to levy greater political concessions from the 
dictator.  The more the regime relies on the military to maintain the status quo, the more 
bargaining power the military gains in negotiating a larger share of ownership.   
Next, will the dictator credibly commit to following through on the new 
contractual agreement?  As stated before, it’s difficult for political actors in dictatorship 
to show credible commitment.  Because rights can easily be taken away, dictator faces 
the political problem of committing to actions contrary to his or her self-interest.  Thus, 
the dictator’s past reliability and reputation must be factored.  When the army asks the 
incumbent, “Why should we believe you will not cheat us?” The credible answer is 
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“because if I were not committed to organizational efficiency more than my own self-
interest, I would be unable to protect our borders, I would lose legitimacy, and an 
opposition force could take my office.”  While organizational efficiency should keep the 
dictator from cheating, this is not enough incentive to mutually bind the long-term 
relationship.  In further evaluating the guarantee of political property rights, did ex ante 
civil-military institutions create reciprocal acts between the dictator and military to 
counteract ex post vulnerabilities to opportunism?   
 
Negotiated Political Property Rights 
The vertical dimension of the typology is negotiated political property rights of 
the armed forces. This dimension delineates the institutional arrangements, or agreed 
upon political property rights, negotiated by the dictator and the armed forces.  As 
Grossman and Hart (1986) found, the degree of vertical integration within a firm can be 
defined in terms of ownership of assets.  Translating political property rights to civil-
military institutional arrangements, negotiated political property rights consist of two 
types of political authority: 1) “owner” rights and 2) “manager” rights (Table 2).  The 
strength or weakness of these two types of rights are dependent upon the level of control 
and decision points the political actor possesses. 
 
Table 2. Political Property Rights 
 
Owner Rights Manager Rights 
- Controls usage of assets (state, regional, or 
local)  
- Decides who has access to assets and 
governance rents through political 
- Decides on production activities related to 
military operations 
- Advises on security policy 
- Decides on internal structure of the security 
organization 
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appointments and post (top military 
appointments) 
- Controls distribution, appropriation and 
allocation of surplus generated from assets 
and governance rents (military budget) 
- Decides on economic, social, security policy 
- Creates new rules for society (creation of 
laws and public institutions) 
- Imposes decisions on the entire society 
(enforcement and monitoring) 
- Decides on arms production and 
procurement 
- Decides on intelligence gathering 
 
- Implements military personnel system  
- Determines military education and doctrine  
- Decides on operational distribution of the 
military budget 
- Advises on arms production and 
procurement 
- Advises on intelligence gathering 
 
 
Owner political property rights confer public authority upon the holder to impose 
decisions on the entire society and access to governance rents—typically reserved to 
holders of political office.  As Hart and Moore (1990) suggested, ownership rights permit 
the holder of authority to decide on the usage of assets, the division of the surplus 
generated by the assets, and the right to exclude others use of the asset. In short, those 
possessing owner rights are granted the right to impose decisions on the entire society, 
make decisions on governance structures, and access to governance rents.  This type of 
right entails the authority to make decisions and policies that go beyond the scope of 
military affairs to include social and economic policy.  In short, those with owner rights 
get to make the rules and impose those rules on others.  
In the context of the military, manager political property rights entail control and 
authority over production activities, specifically related to the production of violence.  
The role and scope of responsibility for military managers is limited to military affairs 
and national security.  manager rights, thereby, guarantees policy input in areas that 
pertain to the armed forces core interests—preserving military corporate identity and 
increasing asset specificity all of which requires a certain level of professional autonomy.  
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Professional autonomy, as used in this study, refers to the decision making authority over 
the military’s natural sphere of influence.  In his study of Latin American armed forces, 
Pion-Berlin (1992) identified several decision sites in determining the level of military 
autonomy: personnel decisions, military education and doctrine, military reform, military 
budgets, arms production and procurement, defense organization, and intelligence 
gathering. (87-90) The more the civil authorities decide on these points the less military 
autonomy, and vice versa, the more the military leaders control these decisions the more 
autonomy.   
 
Army Types and Institutional Change 
 
These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements in an 
authoritarian system—cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies—influencing the 
degree of subordination of the military establishment to civilian control. This typology 
also classifies the variation of bargaining power between civilian and the military elites in 
renegotiating subsequent institutional arrangements.  Civilian control and the levels of 
control is defined below: 
• Civilian control of the military confers responsibility for the state’s strategic 
decision making in the hands of civilian political authorities, rather than the 
military establishment. Civilian authorities have control over setting policy (the 
ends), the decision on the implementation (the means), and determining lines of 
responsibility between ends and means.  
 
• Civilian supremacy is the degree of control by the civilian authority over the 
military that effectively renders the military subordinate and incapable of 
challenging civilian preferences. Civilian authorities have complete control over 
the ends, means, and drawing the lines of responsibility.  
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• Civilian superiority is the degree of control by the civilian authority over the 
military that renders the military subordinate although military preferences are 
considered. Civilian authorities have a favorable position in determining the ends 
and means, however, the lines of responsibility are not clearly delineated. 
 
• Military supremacy is the degree of control by the military establishment over the 
governing of the state that effectively renders civilian political elites subordinate 
and incapable of challenging military preferences. Military officers have complete 
control over the ends, means, and drawing the lines of responsibility.  
 
• Military superiority is the degree of control by the military establishment over 
policy priorities subordinating the policy preferences of civilian governing 
authorities. While the preferences of other groups are considered, military officers 
have a favorable position in determining the ends and means effectively blurring 
the lines of responsibility between civilian and military authorities. 
 
 
Cadre army (civilian supremacy).  In cadre army arrangements, civil-military 
institutional arrangements are centered on the primacy of the party.  Because of the near-
monopolistic ownership of political property rights of the dominant party and the party’s 
ability to secure the rights of its members, political transactions are negotiated with less 
political uncertainty.  The party controls strategic-level decisions, or owner rights, on top-
level aspects of military affairs from budget, general officer promotions and 
appointments, and political indoctrination.  Alternatively, the generals typically retain 
significant manager rights to determine operational and tactical level military decisions.  
Moreover, the armed forces’ politically property rights are institutionally guaranteed to 
the same or greater degree as other eligible party members, or cadre.  As a party member 
achieves seniority in the party hierarchy, he or she realizes the rewards of that 
membership.  As a consequence, party members and military officers are invested in the 
longevity of the party system.  This creates a situation in which military and civilian party 
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members’ preferences converge.  Consequently, subordination and control of the military 
is the most reliable and least costly of the four civil-military arrangements.   
Patron army (civilian superiority).  In patron army arrangements, the civil-military 
contractual obligation is often sustained by direct transfer, or clientelistic exchange 
between dictator and the armed forces.  The dictator (patron) offers the officer corps 
(client) a “valuable” political property right, in exchange for support.  A “valuable” 
political property right includes, but are not limited to, political appointments and 
administrative posts with high potential rents.  This creates a situation in which there is 
civilian superiority of the military—as the civilian authority has the preponderance of 
owner rights.  However, political property rights in the exchange with the dictator are 
contingent and can be easily removed.  Because property rights are not credibly 
guaranteed by the dictator, the military establishment may not be invested in the 
perpetuation of the incumbent.  Moreover, the military brass may seek to insulate the 
organization from the volatility of the dictator by increasing the military’s manager 
rights.  Thus, there is often an ongoing struggle between the dictator who seeks to wrest 
autonomy from military, and the military establishment who seek to retain their 
autonomy.  Since civilian and military elites’ preferences do not necessary converge, 
civilian leaders cannot reliably get the military to do what they want.   
 Entrepreneur army (military superiority).  In entrepreneur army arrangements, 
overreliance on coercion has led to the military elite expecting a share of owner political 
property rights.  In political environments that are deeply polarized, co-optation via party 
or patronage systems may be difficult to employ or ineffective and political authority is 
highly contested, sometimes violently.  Due in part to the internal threat environment and 
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high political uncertainty, the armed forces have a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
civilian political leader.  Like other political entrepreneurs (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011, 
552), the military elite seeks to structure civil-military relations to exploit opportunities to 
profit from the political system.  Extending this definition, an entrepreneur army may 
design the political order to exercise control and access to governance rents through 
civilian intermediaries.  As a result, generals have an inordinate amount of input over 
administrative aspects of the state beyond the purview of the military.  Moreover, the 
military elite have secured their manager rights controlling all aspects of military affairs 
from budget, promotions, appointments, and military indoctrination.  Consequently, 
civilian authorities have minimal say in security activities and often rely on military 
support or acquiescence to govern the state.  This creates a situation in which there is 
military superiority making it difficult for civilian leaders to control the military.   
 Cartel army (military supremacy).  In cartel army arrangements, the military 
establishment has a monopoly of political property rights and guarantees those rights 
through coercion.  As a consequence, any opposition to praetorian rule is effectively 
repressed and silenced.  Because of the overwhelming coercive power of the regime, 
there is no bargaining space to negotiate or contest political property rights.  Similar to an 
economic cartel, the military establishment seeks to maximize and protect their collective 
interests by restricting political competition.  Extending this definition, a cartel army 
exercises unprecedented ownership and control over the institutions of the state.  Military 
men hold the highest state offices, thereby, controlling critical appointments to executive, 
legislative, and bureaucratic positions at all levels of government.  Accordingly, civilian 
politicians and other political groups have minimal input in governing the state.  This 
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creates a situation in which civilian preferences are generally subordinate to the 
preferences of the military; thereby, the armed forces have achieved military supremacy.  
Institutional Change.  Civil-military institutions are not static, but evolve as 
circumstances and actors change.  The primary objective of political actors negotiating 
the design of civil-military institutional arrangements is the protection of their political 
property right claims and continued access to those claims.  The military may seek to 
increase its autonomy from the dictator by enlarging its political property rights to be 
beyond the reach of civilian control or oversight.  While the dictator may curtail the 
military threat by incrementally limiting and reversing the gains of the military by 
employing coup-proofing measures.  Given the distribution of political property rights 
among the actors, I would expect transitions in civil-military arrangements to 
theoretically flow in a logical pattern.   
As civilian actors gain the advantage in political property rights, civil-military 
institutional designs could transition from cartel to entrepreneur, from entrepreneur to 
patron, and finally patron to cadre army arrangements.  Additionally, as civilian actors 
gain more political authority and the attached political property rights, they also shift 
their strategies to limit the contestation of political authority, moving from direct 
repression to co-optation strategies—transitioning from a patronage system to a party 
system. 
• When civilian elites gain political property rights: 
o a cartel army transitions to an entrepreneur army, 
o an entrepreneur army transitions to a patron army, and 
o a patron army transitions to a cadre army. 
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As military actors gain the advantage in political property rights, civil-military 
institutional designs could transition from cadre to any number of configurations (patron, 
entrepreneur, or cartel), from patron to entrepreneur, and finally entrepreneur to cartel 
army.  Because military elites are motivated to remove themselves from the dependence 
on a civilian incumbent, they first lobby to increase their manager rights, then request a 
share of owner rights, and finally move to achieve full ownership.  Theoretical, when a 
party system breaks down military and civilian elites are peers as party members.  As a 
consequence, the transition in civil-military institutional designs can take various avenues 
following the demise of the party system based on power of institutions and individual 
actors.  If civilian actors take control of the transition the relationship could transition to a 
patron army arrangement.  If civilian and military actors form an alliance during the 
transition, the civil-military designs may fall within the entrepreneur army category.  
Finally, if the military is the strongest institution remaining, it could launch a takeover, 
forming a cartel army arrangement. 
• When military elites gain political property rights: 
o a cadre army transitions to a patron, entrepreneur, or cartel army, 
o a patron army transitions to an entrepreneur army, and 
o an entrepreneur army transitions to a cartel army. 
While opportunistic behavior can alter institutions at the margins, it is often 
imperceptible until long after the change has occurred.  The political actors in a political 
exchange may not even recognize the change in the balance of power until it is too late to 
act.  However, a crisis event requiring the application of military repression provides 
actors an opportunity to dramatically restructure the governing arrangements of the civil-
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military pact.  The cycle of repression provides insights into changes to civil-military 
institutional arrangements before and after a crisis event.   
 
Cycle of Repression 
Figure 2. Cycle of Repression    
 
The cycle of repression provides insights into civil-military institutional 
arrangements before and after a crisis event.  A crisis events requiring the application of 
military repression provides each actor an opportunity to reevaluate and restructure the 
governing arrangements of the contractual relationship. The balance of power between 
civilian authorities and the armed forces determines the contractually agreed upon 
institutional framework and ultimately the level political property rights gained and 
maintained by each actor.  The cycle consists of four stages: regime crisis, negotiation, 
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Phase 1: Regime Crisis 
In this phase, regime crisis entails domestic political instability which threatens 
the survival of the regime.  Domestic political instability can include factional infighting 
over succession, secessionist movements, insurgencies, and popular uprisings.  The most 
observable manifestations of regime crisis are popular uprisings or resistance campaigns.  
In their study of nonviolent conflict and civil resistance, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) 
defined resistance campaigns as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass 
tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective.” (3)  Depending on the size, duration, 
and tactics employed in a campaign, a regular police force may be incapable of handling 
the crisis.  In these types of campaigns, the armed forces advantage “lies in its size, labor-
intensive nature, and proficiency in the deployment of large-scale violence.”  (Svolik 
2012, 125) 
 
Phase 2: Negotiation of Political Property Rights 
In this phase, a crisis events requiring the application of military repression gives 
political actors an opportunity to renegotiate the governing arrangements of the 
contractual relationship.  When the dictator requests support from the armed forces to 
pacify a campaign or suppress an uprising, the two actors enter into negotiations over 
distribution of political property rights.  As the original contract may not have included 
costly acts such as overt mass repression of unarmed citizens, the unanticipated 
disturbance, “crisis event,” necessitates the adaptation of the bargain.  Because civilian 
and military political actors seek to limit their exposure to political uncertainty, each 
actor will negotiate for new rules to achieve that objective.  Crisis events allots each actor 
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an opportunity to reevaluate and restructure the governing arrangements of the 
contractual relationship.  Given the obstacle of securing political property rights and 
enforcing those rights, each actor will be motivated to insulate themselves from political 
uncertainty.  Civilian actors will want to reinforce their owner rights and political 
authority over the military.  The military, on the other hand, will want to expand their 
professional autonomy by pursuing measures to increase their manager political property 
rights; if need be, they will broker for owner rights to secure freedom of action.  Ideally, 
an equilibrium in the contractual relationship would advance both actors’ goals by 
reinforcing institutional guarantees of each actor’s political property rights— owner and 
manager.  If the two actors have found past governance structures were not enough to 
consistently bind the agreement, they may decide to alter the institutional arrangements to 
increase the incentives to commit and promote compliance.   
Ownership of political property rights and the guarantee of those rights impacts 
the bargaining power of civilian and military actors and the outcome of institutional 
designs governing their relationship.  The amount of political property rights the military 
obtains in the contractual arrangement is dependent upon its current level of secured 
rights.  If the military has weak manager rights it will want to secure more manager 
rights.  If the military has already secured its manager rights, it will negotiate for owner 
rights—thereby gaining decision making political authority.  Since entrepreneur and 
cartel armies have the preponderance of owner rights and civilian actors have less 
political property rights, the bargaining range is narrower.  As a consequence, civilian 
actors will have less bargaining power in these types of civil-military relationships.  As 
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for cadre and patron armies, the bargaining range is wider since civilian actors have 
significant political property rights to offer the military.  
 
Phase 3: Military’s action to defend, defect, or coup 
In this phase, the military makes the decision to defend, defect, or coup. The 
military weighs several factors in its decision: (1) the regime’s reputation, (2) the 
regime’s future credibility, and (3) the opposition’s future credibility (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Military Decision Tree:  Defend, Defect, or Coup 
  
 
Decision point (1). The first consideration is the dictator’s reputation in fulfilling 
previous contractual obligations (see discussion in phase 4).  Did the dictator follow-
though on the contractual commitment?  Or did the dictator cheat the military of 
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in the past, the military will next consider the future credibility of the regime, decision 
point (2).  If the dictator has cheated in the past, the military will advance to decision 
point (3) and consider the future credibility of the opposition. 
 
Decision point (2). The second consideration is the regimes credibility in fulfilling 
contractual obligations following the crisis.  Credible political actors own the political 
property rights in the exchange and are able to commit to obligations of the contractual 
agreement.  The military will consider the probability that the dictator will remain in 
office and reliably commit to the political bargain.  Is the dictator ailing?  Will his or her 
successor reliably secure the military’s property right claims?  Is the regime supported by 
a foreign patron state and will it continue to be supported?  If the incumbent is found to 
be credible following the crisis, the military will decide to defend the regime.  If the 
military determines the regime will not or cannot credibly commit to the agreement, it 
will next consider the future credibility of the opposition, decision point (3).   
 
Decision point (3). The third consideration is the future credibility of the opposition.  In 
order for the political opposition to be credible, it must be perceived as legitimately 
holding political office and the right to wield political authority once the crisis event is 
over.  Again, credible political actors own the political property rights in the exchange 
and are able to commit to the agreement.  In determining the credibility of the opposition, 
the military may contemplate several questions.  Is the opposition supported by a wide 
segment of society?  Will the opposition leader hold a majority of the political property 
rights, owner rights?  Is the opposition’s political authority contested by other groups?  
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Will the opposition be recognized internationally as the legitimate government?  Finally, 
and most importantly, will the opposition credibly secure the military’s political property 
rights?  Is the opposition ideologically compatible with the military establishment?  If the 
military finds the opposition a credible partner, it will decide to defect.  If the opposition 
is not a credible partner, the military will decide to coup.   
 
Action point (4).  The military has gone through the decision tree and evaluated the 
credibility of the various political actors to credibly secure the military’s political 
property rights.  The military then takes action to either defend the regime, defect from 
the regime, or coup d’état.   
 
Phase 4: Regime’s action to commit or cheat on the contractual arrangements 
In this phase, the regime takes actions to commit to, or cheat in, the renegotiated 
civil-military contract.  As Phase 2 describes, prior to the military committing to defend 
the regime during a crisis event, the political actors renegotiate their share of political 
property rights, thereby, restructuring the relationship.  As a consequence of the cycle, 
the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to maintain the regime, the more 
negotiated political property rights the military obtains.  The repetition of the cycle and 
the overreliance on the military eventually results in the military obtaining significant 
owner rights.  The more owner rights obtained by the military, the increased likelihood 
the relationship transitions to one dominated by the military—entrepreneur or cartel army 
arrangements.  
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This dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox—the agents empowered 
to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 2005; Svolik, 2012, 2013; Albrecht 2015a, 2015b) How can an authoritarian regime, 
which relies on agents of organized violence to stay in power, avoid being overtaken by 
those agents?  Due to the incompleteness of the civil-military contract, it is subject to 
opportunism by the dictator and the military when ex post institutional safeguards are not 
devised.  As Williamson (1985) asserted, the trouble of incompleteness of contracts is 
opportunism…in a world of bounded rationality and opportunism, actors cannot be 
assumed to keep their promises or fulfill their contractual obligations.  Opportunism on 
the part of the dictator would seek to decrease the military’s political property rights.  
While opportunism on the part of military would seek to increase its political property 
rights.  The incompleteness of the civil-military contracts is subject to ex post 
opportunism when institutional safeguards, in the form of credible commitments, are not 
devised ex ante.  Credible commitments come in the form of reciprocal acts that mutually 
benefit the actors to the transaction. As stated before, it’s difficult for political actors in 
authoritarian systems to demonstrate credible commitment through reciprocal acts.  
Because property rights can be easily taken away, both dictators and agents of violence 
encounter the political problem of committing to actions contrary to their self-interest. 
Without knowing the actor’s reputation, entering a political transaction is a leap of faith. 
This is why political actors, especially in authoritarian systems, often prefer to make 
political bargains with actors with tribal, clan, or familial ties.   
For the dictator, military intervention in politics is a double-edged sword.  The 
dictator needs the military to intervene on his or her behalf, but also desires the military 
  60 
to stay out of politics. To minimize the inherent risk, dictators will therefore act to limit 
the military’s threat to the regime by restructuring the relationship.  Once the military 
gains supremacy or majority ownership vis-à-vis the civilian incumbent, it is a difficult 
process to reverse.  To counter the impending problem, dictators will attempt to reverse 
the process while he or she still has the political authority, or owner rights to make 
organizational changes and/or create new competing institutions.  This reversal process is 
examined in the coup-proofing literature.  Quinlivan (1999) defined coup-proofing “as 
the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup.”  (133) Various scholars 
(Quinlivan 1999; Kamrava, 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003, 2005; Cook 2007; Pilster and 
Böhmelt 2011; Powell, 2012; Albrecht 2015a, 2015b) have described coup-proofing 
tactics such as establishing strong personal loyalty between officers and incumbents 
through ethnic, religious and personal bonds; dividing security apparatuses with 
overlapping jurisdiction, creating parallel armed forces to balance the regular military; 
fostering and financing expertness in the regular military; frequently rotating officers to 
avoid the emergence of alternative power centers; and granting the officer corps 
economic privileges and opportunities for self-enrichment.   
Recognizing the threat from the military establishment, dictators employ new 
rules in the form of coup-proofing strategies (Figure 4).  As noted by Albrecht (2015a), 
some coup-proofing measures are designed to bind officers closer to the incumbent 
(integration), while others are designed to keep them out of the political arena 
(segregation) (Table 3).   
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Table 3. Albrecht’s (2015a) Coup-Proofing Measures in Authoritarian Regimes 
 




… of officers in the public realm … of officer in war-making 
Military organization Targeted recruitment of soldiers; 
establishment of militias; 
counter-balancing of divided 
militaries 
General conscription; 




Reshuffling of officer corps only 
at critical junctures 
Frequent and regular rotation of 
officers 
Economic                   
coup-proofing 
Individual opportunities of self-
enrichment; often illicit activities 
Establishment of military 
enclaves; autonomous sources of 
income 
Social composition Kinship recruitment from among 
privileged minorities; ethnic 
coherence of officer corps 
Social heterogeneity; expansion 
of social basis of officer corps 
 
 
Integration coup-proofing strategies brings the military brass closer to daily politics and 
compromises the military’s professional autonomy.  In contravention of the military’s 
objective to minimize the impact of political uncertainty, integration tactics 
systematically undermines its manager rights.  On the other hand, segregation coup-
proofing strategies create barriers to the officer corps intervening in politics by enhancing 
their professional autonomy.  Unlike integration tactics, segregation measures align 
closely with the military’s goal of securing manager rights, increasing professional 
expertise, and insulating the organization from daily politics.  The military brass is then 
able to concentrate on war-making and invest in asset specificity.  Of the two, the 
military would, therefore, prefer the regime implement segregation coup-proofing 
strategies.   
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Figure 4. Regime’s Actions to Commit or Cheat in the Civil-Military Contract 
 
 
If the military has obtained significant owner rights, the dictator may not have the 
political authority to alter the military’s manager rights.  Unable to limit the military’s 
autonomy or make significant changes to the armed forces organizational force structure, 
dictators may choose to pursue a counterbalancing strategy to redistribute owner political 
property rights.  Counterbalancing is a coup-proofing tactic employed by leaders to 
proliferate rivalrous units within the military and security sector to prevent coups. (Belkin 
and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012; Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; Brooks 2019) Expanding 
upon this definition, counterbalancing also includes the creation or strengthening of 
competing civilian institutions to provide checks and balances to existing institutions.  
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Opportunistic coup-proofing by the dictator can be risky.  If the military 
establishment perceives coup-proofing measures as defaulting on the civil-military 
political bargain, i.e. cheating, the dictator’s reputation and credibility will be suspect in 
future negotiations with the military.  Integration and counterbalancing tactics risk 
alienating the wider subset of the officer corps if those benefiting from special privileges 
and enrichments narrows.  Segregation, on the other hand, risks the military becoming 
completely autonomous from the dictator and, in turn, not invested in the persistence of 
the regime.  During periods of political instability, when the times comes to request the 
military intervene in politics at the behest of the dictator, the armed forces may decide to 
let the partnership lapse.  Thus, opportunistic cheating on the civil-military contract may 
lead to defection or a military coup d’état as phase 3 outlines.  The dangers of 
implementing too much or too few coup-proofing measures is the proverbial “Gordian 




The effectiveness of civil-military institutional designs to safeguard credible 
commitment to political bargain informs the military’s decision to defend, defect, or 
coup.  Credible commitment requires the creation of institutions which facilitate 
reciprocal acts through irreversible specialized investments such as the regime investing 
in military infrastructure and the officer corps investing in specialized expertise.  Because 
authoritarian systems lack an independent authority to enforce compliance with 
institutionalized “rules of the game,” the ultimate arbiter of conflict is violence.  Those 
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that can wield the most violence can make the rules.  The primary objective of political 
actors negotiating civil-military institutional arrangements is the protection of their 
political property right claims and continued access to those claims.  The means to 
achieving this objective is to design institutions and governance structures to minimize 
their exposure to political uncertainty.  However, limiting exposure to political 
uncertainty does not necessarily secure credible commitment to the political bargain.  
Consequently, the incompleteness of the civil-military contract is subject to opportunism 
by the dictator and the military when institutional safeguards are not devised.  The 
military may seek to increase its autonomy from the dictator by enlarging its political 
property rights.  While the dictator may employ coup-proofing measures to curtail the 
military threat, incurring a reputation cost.  In a cycle of repression, dependence on 
coercive violence entails a threat for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage 
violence are increasingly empowered to act against the regime.  Once the military gains 
supremacy or majority owner rights, civilian elites face a difficult reversal process.  
However, reversal is possible if counterbalancing measures are incrementally employed 
or there are structural changes such as economic downturns, losing a war, or shifts in 
geopolitics (i.e. end of the Cold War and a loss of great power support of the regime).  
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CHAPTER 3 
CADRE ARMY: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE PEOPLE’S 
LIBERATION ARMY 
 
Cadre Army (Civilian Supremacy) 
 
In authoritarian regimes, the most effective means in maintaining uncontested 
political property rights is the co-optation of rivals through a party system.  A growing 
body of research finds that dictatorships with a single or a dominant political party are 
especially resilient. (Geddes 2003; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Brownlee 2007) Svolik 
(2012) identified three features of successful authoritarian parties that account for their 
effectiveness as instruments of co-optation, at both the mass and elite levels: hierarchical 
assignment of service and benefits, political control over appointments, and selective 
recruitment and repression. (163) These instruments create an incentive structure 
encouraging sunk political investment by party members effectively exploiting their 
members’ ambition and career aspirations to create a stake in the perpetuation of the 
regime.  Moreover, when the regime assigns costly party service to junior members and 
distributes the benefits of party membership to senior levels of the party hierarchy, the 
party encourages a costly sunk investment. (164) As Svolik (2012) contended, “what 
makes co-optation via party so effective is not the distribution of benefits by itself—those 
could be easily distributed without a party—but rather, it is the conditioning of those 
benefits.” (164) If the regime or leadership changes, those benefits would most likely be 
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lost.  In short, this sunk investment is non-transferable across political coalitions, thereby, 
giving party members a vested interest in the perpetuation of the incumbent regime. (184) 
 
Figure 5.  Cadre Army Type 
 
 
In dominant political party authoritarian systems, civil-military institutional 
designs are typically centered on the primacy of the party.  Because of the near-
monopolistic ownership of political property rights of the dominant party and the party’s 
ability to secure the rights of its members, political transactions are negotiated with less 
political uncertainty.  Under these negotiating conditions, ex post governance is more 
stable.  Consequently, subordination and control of the military is the most reliable of the 
four civil-military arrangements.  As defined by Desch (1999), civilian control means 
“civilian leaders can reliably get the military to do what they want them to do.” (4) Since 
the military elite holds dual roles in the party and the military establishment, this creates a 
situation in which military and civilian party members’ preferences converge.  In a 
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dominant party system, state bureaucrats, civil servants, and military officers are typically 
required to be members of, and pledge allegiance to the party.  Perlmutter and LeoGrande 
(1982) described the mechanism of party control (to include the military): 
The central premise of this ideological structure is, of course, the preeminent role 
of the party. To instill this principle, in both theory and practice, the party 
institutes a whole series of mechanisms that provide it with control over all other 
political institutions. The military is no exception. Such mechanisms may range 
from the extreme of dual command, through nomenclature, to the more 
cooperative system of coopting military commanders into high party posts.  A 
party structure within the armed forces and an elaborate system of political 
education for officers and troops cement the loyalty of the armed forces to the 
party-state system.  Officers who do not share this ideological commitment do not 
reach high positions, or if they do, they do not retain them for long once their 
ideological deviation becomes clear. (786) 
 
The armed forces’ politically property rights are institutionally guaranteed to the same or 
greater degree as other eligible party members, or cadre.  As a party member achieves 
seniority in the party hierarchy, he or she realizes the rewards of that membership.  As a 
consequence, party members and military officers are invested in the longevity of the 
party system.  While political property rights granted to bureaucrats, such as the military 
establishment, are normally limited to manager rights, those rights are normally codified 
and delineated.  The party controls strategic-level decisions, or owner rights, on top-level 
aspects of military affairs from budget, general officer promotions and appointments, and 
political indoctrination.  Alternatively, the generals typically retain manager rights to 
determine operational and tactical level military decisions.  Prominent party systems 
include the communist regimes of eastern Europe and China and later emulated by the 
Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq.  While these party systems were viable, civilian 
authorities were able to maintain civilian supremacy of the military.  
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The Chinese Communist Party and the Peoples’ Liberation Army  
 
Since the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party), the Red 
Army (later converted into the People’s Liberation Army upon the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China) has been the armed wing of the Communist Party.  Founded 
in 1927, for the first two decades the Red Army engaged in fighting the Kuomintang 
(KMT) Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War, with an interlude fighting the Japanese 
during World War II.  Forming enduring bonds among its members, the Red Army and 
communist members, later led by Mao Zedong, survived the yearlong treacherous trek 
over difficult terrain to evade the pursuit of the Nationalist Army during the Long March.  
Mao’s Red Army eventually bested Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army and declared 
victory in October 1949.  Although the Red Army transitioned to the PLA following the 
formation of the People’s Republic of China, it did not transform into a national army, 
continuing its role as the Party’s army.  The history of the PLA is inextricably connected 
to the party.   
Civil-military relations in China demonstrates a unique fusion of military and 
political leadership at the senior levels of the communist party—which is evident by the 
term “party-army relations.”  Civil-military scholars have also described party-army 
relations as a “symbiosis,” “dual-role elite,” and the “the party in uniform.” (Schram 
1969; Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982) This symbiotic relationship has its roots in the 
Long March cadre, who endured great hardship during the revolutionary period and held 
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senior leadership positions at the apex of the Party and the army into the 1990s.4  In this 
symbiosis the underlying assumption is that in order for both the CCP and the PLA to 
survive and maintain their political authority they must retain a strategic partnership 
through interwoven institutional arrangements.  Mao famously observed, “Political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun!”  He also warned: “the party commands the gun, and the 
gun must never be allowed to command the party.” (Johnston 1984, Shambaugh 2003) 
To this day, the Party continues to exercise control over the military as a fundamental 
guarantee of the Communist Party rule.   
Several institutional constructs shape the party’s dominance or control over 
the army: the integration of political and military leadership at the top, the 
implementation of the party control systems, and the professionalization of the 
military.  These control strategies were meant to align the party and army elite 
preferences, inject the party directly into military functions, or keep the military 
separate from politics.  While some of these controls are complementary, others are 
contradictory.  They have been used in varying degrees depending on the paramount 
leader’s (Mao or Deng) preference, the external security threat, the divisiveness of 
factional party politics, and the instability of societal pressures.  Given the various 
combinations of controls, party-army relations were not static.  The most dramatic change 
in institutional arrangements occurred with the succession from Mao Zedong to Deng 
                                               
4 The Long March took the main body of the communist forces from Jiangxi across to Sichuan, then deep 
into the interior of north China, and finally to a new base in the town of Yan’an.  It was a traumatic 
experience and many survivors suffering ailments for the rest of their lives. The CCP differentiated 
between those who participated in the march and those who did not.  The “Long March cadres” enjoyed a 
prestige and camaraderie that set them apart within the ranks of the party.  The Long Marchers have led the 
Chinese communist party from the march into the 1990s. (Lieberthal 1995, 47) 
  70 
Xiaoping.  During the Maoist period, Mao’s dramatic policy swings between revolution 
(destruction of institutions) and stability (state building) led to the concomitant shift in 
strategies of control.  During the Deng era, the emphasis on modernization and institution 
building profoundly altered the structure of party controls.  
 The first source of control was the integration of party and army leaders at the 
uppermost levels of decision making.  The roots of this integration lie in the 
revolutionary period, when the Party and the army performed both political and military 
functions.  After the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, rival hierarchies 
developed within the vast power structure, but at its apex the distinction between the 
roles of the top leaders remained opaque.  This was because their political authority 
continued to be highly personalized and derived not from their institutional role but from 
their individual stature and vast personal networks. (Joffe 1996, 1997) The most 
significant result of this integration was that the nation’s two paramount leaders—Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—were also supreme and active commanders of the PLA. 
Their special standing with the PLA enabled them to use the army as a power base in 
elite politics.  Shambaugh (2003) described this pattern of institutional control, as an 
“interlocking directorate” in which a high ratio of senior military officers and army 
veterans filled senior party posts. (12) Blurring the institutional lines between the Party 
and the PLA leadership, this “interlocking directorate” created overlapping political 
authority and blurred the boundaries of owner and manager rights at the top of the party 
hierarchy.  
Next, the CCP relies on a three-pronged system of party control: the political 
affairs network system, the political commissar system, and the party committee system.  
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These three systems inserted the party directly into military units; in essence, creating a 
dual chain of command—with two distinct missions—one focused on military affairs and 
the other political affairs. (Ji 2006) The party control system acts as a check and balance 
on commanders and ensures the party’s political message is carried out in the PLA.  The 
first prong is the political affairs network system which consists of the political 
departments and personnel that implements the political affairs mission.  The second 
prong is the political commissar.  A unique position found only in communist societies, 
political commissars constitute the concrete form of party leadership in the military (Ji 
2006, 147) The political commissar ensures commanders yield to party control and 
directives, recruits new party members into the rank and file, and implements the political 
works agenda of the unit.  Finally, the party committee system installs party branches, or 
cells, at all levels of command. These party cells provide an institutional foundation for 
commissars to control the political works agenda of the unit.  Additionally, the party’s 
organizational principle dictates that all important matters must be discussed in 
committee meetings, including important matters in the PLA. (Ji 2006, 159) Through 
these party controls, the party puts tremendous emphasis on political and ideological 
education, especially of high-ranking officers, in order to ensure the army at all levels 
will follow orders.  The main theme of this ideological education is the importance of 
upholding party supremacy over the army. (Joffe 1997, 40) 
The last mechanism of control is increasing the military’s professional autonomy 
in order to separate the PLA from politics.  This means of control was greatly dependent 
upon the external and internal threat perception of the senior leaders of the Party, 
specifically the paramount leader.  The PLA experienced most of its professional 
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autonomy during the two waves of military modernization—specifically the mid-1950s 
and the post-Mao years.  During these periods, military modernization served to enforce 
hierarchical governance since it amplified bilateral dependency and credible commitment 
between the party and army through the party’s investment in the military’s infrastructure 
(specialized assets) while simultaneously encouraging the military to increase its asset 
specificity (specialized expertise).  The upshot, as the military gained specialized 
expertise and outwardly focused on the external security mission, it was less likely to 
involve itself in domestic politics. 
 
Cadre Army Institutional Arrangements 
The rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s led to the replacement of Mao’s 
revolutionary agenda with a nation-building project of “four modernizations”— 
modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense.  Due to 
Deng’s reforms, some civil-military scholars observed that the PLA was moving away 
from its traditional communist institutional ethos into a new stage of limited autonomy 
from the ruling party.  Notwithstanding the variation in the degree of institutional 
integration and level of professional autonomy, the PLA elite, as well as the officer rank 
and file, steadfastly recognize the ideological primacy of the Party and its right to rule.  
Although party-army relations have evolved over the decades, the relationship has 
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Figure 6. The CCP’s Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements  
 
Horizontal Dimension.  This dimension measures the degree political property 
rights will be secured ex post and consists of two components:  1) the level of 
contestation of political property rights, and 2) the level of credible commitment to the 
agreement by the actors in the exchange.  
First and foremost, the Party’s right to rule and decide has not been credibly 
contested since the Nationalist Party fled to Taiwan in 1949.  Over the decades, its 
monopoly of power has never been seriously challenged by any other political force.  In 
short, no political interest group has realistically contested the political authority of the 
Party.  To ensure Party ownership and access to political authority, top state officials at 
every level of administration concurrently holds senior Party posts.  The same is true 
within the military establishment.  The generals hold dual roles with rank in both the 
military and Party hierarchy.  Incidentally, the greatest threat to political stability is 
factional competition within the Party representing different sets of policy preferences. 
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While there may be fierce intra-party competition, most factions concede to the primacy 
of the Party to rule.  Finally, one test of the Party’s ability to retain its access to 
uncontested political authority is its ability to manage succession and transitions.  After 
the passing of Mao Zedong, the Party navigated this thorny issue and dampened the 
effects of intra-party infighting by reinforcing the principles of collective leadership and 
consensus building.5    
Next, the Party has demonstrated in the past that it credibly commits to following 
through on contractual obligations with the military establishment and other party 
members.  As Svolik (2012) described, the Party oversees a hierarchical assignment of 
service and benefits, political control over appointments, and selective recruitment. 
Accordingly, officials and party member throughout the Chinese system hold personal 
ranks to include the military elite.  This personal rank determines housing, transportation, 
and other privileges and benefits. (Zhang et al. 2001, 224) While the Party system 
remains intact, the dual rank held by military elites institutionally guarantees their 
politically property rights.  In other words, the CCP represents the PLA’s best “buyer,” as 
it provides the military with privileges and special status that no other political group can 
guarantee.   
Vertical dimension.  This dimension delineates the institutional arrangements, or 
agreed upon political property rights, negotiated by the regime and the armed forces over 
time.  Negotiated political property rights consist of two types of political property rights: 
1) owner rights and 2) manager rights.   
                                               
5 The CCP collective leadership comprises the seven men who hold appointments in the Communist Party’s 
Politburo Standing Committee, each man has a rank, from one to seven, and retain primary responsibility 
for a specific portfolio. (Lawrence and Martin 2013, 5) 
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In the civil-military political bargain, the Communist Party retains the 
preponderance of owner rights.  The PLA has consistently recognized the Party’s 
legitimate right to control the army.  However, complicating the hierarchical relationship 
is the close integration of political and military leaders at the uppermost level of decision 
making.  The “interlocking directorate” often blurred the institutional lines between the 
leadership of the Party and the PLA.  This explains why the military elite always belongs 
to the party and usually holds party rank of some consequence.  This party rank confers 
military leaders a pivotal political role in the Party and owner rights to participate in 
conflicts over ideology, elite composition, and major policy directions.  Therefore, the 
military elite participates in decision making “not as the military per se, but as part of the 
party, the party-in-uniform.” (Shambaugh 2003, 12) Therefore, because of the 
“interlocking directorate,” the highest echelon of the military chain of command have 
significant owner rights.   
As part of the “four modernizations,” Deng Xiaoping implemented military 
reforms to modernize and professionalize the PLA with the net effect of incrementally 
increasing the corporate autonomy and separate identity of the armed forces.  With these 
reforms, Deng sought to increase the military’s functional and technical expertise and 
professional autonomy.  To achieve a modern fighting force, the division of labor was 
necessary to pursue technical expertise and administrative efficiency.  While integration 
at the top of the Party hierarchy continued, at lower levels of the military organization the 
institutional boundaries between the army and the party became clearer by delimiting the 
military’s manager rights.  Deng’s reforms intended to clarify and strengthen the PLA’s 
manager rights improving the officer corps professional autonomy. 
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Entering the Cycle of Repression 
 
During the Mao era, the two superpowers stood as the predominant external 
threat—each posing a danger at different periods.  From the Korean War down to the late 
1950s, Mao had to prioritize national defense, as the United States was the principal 
threat.  Because of the Korean War effort, the American threat, and the need to 
modernize the PLA, Mao permitted military leaders greater professional autonomy and 
the unhampered ability to manage military affairs.  To further the PLA’s specialization, 
the Soviet Union provided considerable military and technical assistance—
supporting the Chinese defense industrial base, research and development (R&D), 
weapons and equipment, and professional officer training.  Incidentally, the PLA based 
its organizational structure on a model imported from the Soviet Union. (Godwin 2001; 
Saunders and Wuthnow 2016) Training in the newly-established Soviet-influenced 
military academies, the peasant-based army leaders transformed into a modern officer 
corps. (Joffe 1996, 304) Moreover, unlike the guerilla warfare experience of the Long 
March cadre, the military leaders that emerged in the mid-1950s consisted of warriors 
whose formative combat experience was the Korean War.  Their experience underscored 
the need for a modern army and military transformation.  Coinciding with the 
modernization effort and change in doctrine, PLA officers increasingly focused their 
attention on combat effectiveness and began to assert professional attitudes regarding the 
need for asset specificity and specialization.  In short, the new generation of military 
leaders got a taste for professional autonomy, preferring to insulate themselves from 
party politics. 
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In 1958, due to China’s abandonment from the Soviet model, there was an 
increase in Sino-Soviet friction—making it evident that the Chinese could no longer rely 
on Soviet assistance.  Mao’s solution was to institute the Great Leap Forward which 
depended on the mass mobilization of peasants in order to leap the normal stages of 
economic development.  In conjunction with the mass mobilization of peasants, Mao 
began a campaign against military professionalism, as the officer corps would view it, 
ratcheting efforts to radicalize the army.  After the disastrous economic effects of the 
Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) became evident, the highest echelon of the PLA began 
to vocalize their discontent with Mao’s radical direction.6  Specifically, Defense Minister 
Peng Dehuai explicitly criticized Mao at the Lushan conference in 1959.  Having a 
chilling effect on senior Party members, Mao had Peng removed from his post replacing 
him with Lin Biao. (Robinson 1982, Lieberthal 1995; Joffe 1996) With Lin Biao at the 
helm, Mao injected greater party controls over the PLA enlarging the system of political 
controls.  The new defense minister, Lin Biao, gradually dismantled Peng’s reforms—
abolishing ranks, re-politicizing the officer corps, re-integrating its role in society, and re-
emphasizing its people’s war origins and practices. (Robinson 1982, 235) While Mao had 
prevailed in his confrontation with Peng, the collapse of the Great Leap Forward had also 
convinced party elites that they should quietly resist Mao’s revolutionary policies.  As 
they discretely maneuvered to clean up the mess left from the Great Leap Forward, the 
Party began to sideline Mao from decision making.  According to Joffe (1997), the party 
                                               
6 From 1960 to 1961, it is estimated that thirty million people starved to death due to Great Leap Forward 
policies. (Lieberthal 1995, 108) 
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elites chose to subtly resist implementation of Mao’s radical agenda—a tactic that fueled 
his anger and culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). (3)   
The Cultural Revolution marked Mao’s return to power, regaining a central role 
in politics after the failures of the Great Leap Forward.  The stated goal of the Cultural 
Revolution was to preserve Chinese Communism by purging remnants of capitalist and 
traditional elements from Chinese society, but the implicit goal was to dismantle the party 
and state institutions.7  Preceding the Cultural Revolution, facing an increasingly 
recalcitrant Party, Mao turned to the PLA to achieve his domestic political agenda.  For 
instance, increasing the army’s role in society, in 1964, Mao called for the population to 
learn from the PLA example, implicitly, instead of the party. (Lieberthal 1995, 111).  He 
also expanded the administrative role of the PLA, establishing alternative political organs 
in many government offices staffed by military officers.  Finally, losing patience with the 
obstinate party by 1966, Mao commenced his Cultural Revolution campaign, unleashing 
the Red Guards groups (formations of Chinese youths) to attack the party and launch a 
reign of terror in the cities.  Radicalized, with a license to destroy, the Red Guards groups 
later formed warring factions sending China into a veritable civil war.  All the while, 
looming in the background was the impending threat of a Soviet invasion.8  Believing he 
                                               
7 Mao’s four broad goals for the Cultural Revolutions—change the succession, discipline the huge 
bureaucracies governing the country, expose China’s youth to a revolutionary experience, and make 
substantive changes to policies to reduce inequality and material incentives.  As of 1965 Mao’s likely 
successor was Liu Shaoqi—deeply distrusted by Mao for his dubious level of commitment to the 
revolution.  The revolution was intended to dislodge Liu and put another successor in his place, probably 
Lin Biao. (Lieberthal, 1995, 111) 
 
8 In 1966, Beijing formally broke party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
The rupture finally culminated in the eruption of border hostilities over an island in the Ussuri River and 
elsewhere in March 1969.  Additionally, Beijing felt threatened by the Brezhnev doctrine, which obliged 
the USSR and its allies to correct countries that strayed from the socialist path.  In August 1968, Soviet-led 
Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. 
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had sufficiently obtained his goals, in a tactical retreat, Mao decided to regain control and 
rebuild the Party in 1968.  To reestablish order, Mao called upon the army to suppress the 
unruly youth groups. (Lieberthal 1995, 115)  
 According to Joffe (1996), when the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution 
ended in 1969, the PLA had become the effective ruler of China’s provinces. (302-303) 
The military’s intervention in politics to stabilize the country at the end of the Cultural 
Revolution destroyed any distinction between the Party and army at the local level.  To 
restore order, the PLA rapidly replaced the shattered Party as the supreme organ of rule, 
either indirectly, by dominating the newly-founded Revolutionary Committees, or 
directly by establishing Military Control Committees.  The army did not withdraw from 
politics with the termination of turmoil, however, fearing the return of the radical left, 
military leaders had decided they were best positioned to secure order.  As Joffe (1996) 
concluded “military commanders harbored a deep hostility towards the radical left, and 
hence did not budge from their political positions as long as the possibility of a radical 
comeback existed.” (308) Consequently, after Party leaders decreed that local Party 
committees should be resurrected to take power back from the PLA, military 
commanders made sure that they retained control.  In short, the military elite did not trust 
the radical wing of the party, which had not yet been ruled out as Mao’s successors, to 
secure the political property rights of the PLA.  Only after the complete downfall of the 
radical left and the appointment of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader did the PLA 
return to the barracks and transfer political authority back to the Party. 
The attack on Party institutions from 1966 to 1969 made the PLA the only 
political actor able to decide succession.  Several factions contested the right to rule 
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China, the radical “Gang of Four” led by Mao’s Wife, Jiang Qing, and the moderates led 
by the terminally ill Zhou Enlai, who incidentally rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping.  
Complicating succession, before his death, Mao had designated Hua Guofang his 
successor.  Within a month of Mao’s death, military leaders cooperated with Party 
leaders to arrest the Gang of Four, ending a decade of radical politics.  The diverse views 
of the military establishment regarding policy and the distribution of political property 
rights could not be ignored by post-Mao leaders.  At the end of the 1970s, Hua and Deng 
made bids to secure PLA support by stressing policies that appealed to different groups 
within the military. (Johnston 1984, 1012) Hua focused on maintaining the PLA’s 
traditional roles as the guardians and purveyors of Mao Thought and Party ideology.  
Deng, alternatively, appealed to PLA modernizers, stressing the benefits of stable 
economic growth and defense modernization. (Johnston 1984, 1012-1013) Deng’s 
reputation among his military peers and modernization appeals won over PLA leaders as 
they supported his succession.9  
After Deng assumed power, he resumed military modernization and downgraded 
the PLA’s role in politics.  During its pivotal role in the Cultural Revolution, the PLA 
had grown politically stronger than the party and Deng needed to curtail those effects.  
While the PLA was a key political actor, its extensive involvement in Mao’s radical 
domestic campaigns had atrophied its military effectiveness in prosecuting war.  Deng 
                                               
9 Deng’s PLA years gave him the necessary credentials to qualify as a military leader and to obtain 
permanent entry into the inner councils of the military hierarchy.  This bond accounts for the protection he 
received from PLA commanders when he was hunted by Red Guards in the mid-1960s; for the backing he 
got from PLA commanders when he made his bid for power in the late 1970s; and for their reluctant 
readiness to intervene in the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 and to fire on the demonstrators. It also accounts for 
the steady support of PLA leaders for Deng’s reforms, which he could take for granted as an invaluable 
asset in his unyielding efforts to implement new policies. (Joffe 1997 27)  
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“critically observed in the summer of 1975, the PLA had degenerated into an aging, 
overstaffed, obsolescent, arrogant giant incapable of conducting modern warfare.” 
(Godwin 2001, 16) The poor performance of the PLA during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese 
war confirmed Deng’s critique.  During the sixteen-day border war, the PLA’s largest 
military operation since the Korean War, Chinese forces had sustained heavy casualties 
against a numerically inferior Vietnamese force. (Goodwin 2001, 16) As Deng rebuilt 
the Party and the state, he also intended to transform the PLA, reinforcing the 
hierarchical relationship between the party and military—in essence, reaffirming the 
master-servant relationship through reciprocal acts between owner and manager.  Deng 
employed a wide range of strategies to restructure party-army relations—such as 
permitting the PLA off-budget sources of funding to invest in military modernization, 
reinvigorating the party control systems, and increasing overall professional autonomy. 
From the owner side, a regime typically demonstrates commitment to the 
hierarchal relationship through investment in military modernization and infrastructure.  
Even though Deng placed military upgrades as one of the nation’s “four modernizations,” 
it came last in prioritization.  The Four Modernizations—agriculture, industry, science 
and technology and the military—encapsulated the objectives of Deng’s reforms.  Deng 
persuaded PLA leadership that other areas needed immediate attention, and once the 
economy was stabilized, military modernization would move to a higher priority. 
(Robinson 1982; Mulvenon 2006, 2012) Because of the stagnation of the Chinese 
economy from the Great Leap Forward through the Cultural Revolution, the government 
could not meet both the budgetary needs of the PLA while simultaneously bankrolling 
the capital investment necessary for economic reforms.  Consequently, the military 
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budget was more or less stagnate during the 1980s, and declined by about 10 percent as a 
share of national expenditure. (Mulvenon 2006, 217) To placate the military, he brokered 
a deal with the PLA to allow the military to run commercial operations to supplement its 
budget.  The importance of the PLA’s internal economy grew over time as shrinking 
defense budgets forced the military to become increasingly reliant on the rising extra-
budgetary revenue from its commercial enterprises.10 (Mulvenon 2012, 218) Although 
there were periodic complaints about the low level of military financing, PLA leaders did 
not threaten to weaken Deng’s government, trusting he would eventually follow through 
on the promise of military upgrades. (Robinson 1982; Joffe 1997) 
From the manager side, Deng installed institutional measures to encourage the 
officer corps to invest in technical proficiency to increase asset specificity.  For instance, 
he focused on military doctrine, education and specialization.  Doctrine, strategy, and 
tactics were revised under the rubric of “people’s war under modern conditions.” 
(Johnston 1984) Additionally, reforms in education and training emphasized improving 
military skills and raising the educational level of troops conducting combined arms 
operations.  Deng also established new rules governing the personnel systems—
upgrading the quality of PLA recruits and officer candidates, reestablishing rules for 
retirements and promotions to encourage upward mobility in the PLA and create a 
predictable career path.  To this end, he replaced the top generals with younger 
                                               
10 “Between 1984 and 1989, the military-business complex experienced its most intensive period of growth, 
by some estimates doubling the number of enterprises. Profits reportedly grew by 700 percent as the PLA 
moved from primarily agricultural production to manufacture of light consumer goods, such as pianos, 
refrigerators, TV sets, washing machines, baby carriages, and hunting rifles. By 1989, the sales of goods 
made by PLA factories had reached RMB20 billion in the Chinese market, and more than RMB140 million 
in export revenue. The PLA economy had grown to over 20,000 enterprises, employing several million 
workers and generating significant profits.” (Mulvenon 2006, 219) 
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generations amendable to his modernization and reform agenda. (Robinson 1982; 
Johnston 1984) He retired “first generation” commanders, in favor of “second” (and 
“third”) generation commanders.  These younger commanders entered the army during 
the earlier stages of the revolution, but much of their formative military experience came 
in the latter stages of the Chinese civil war and the Korean War, when the Red Army’s 
military doctrine were changing from guerrilla strategies to larger-scale regularized 
operations. (Johnston 1984, 1015) Finally, reforming the promotion system and 
enhancing the career mobility of better trained, younger officers, he reinstituted the 1955 
Military Service Law and further promulgated a new service law in May 1984 which set 
time limits for promotion and age limits for active service. (Johnston 1984, 1023) 
Promotion reforms also had the salubrious effect of ferreting out politically unreliable 
and technically unqualified officers. (Johnston 1984, 1022-1023) 
In addition to making changes to the personnel system, Deng’s reforms focused 
on officer specialization in their national security role in an effort to insulate the PLA 
from domestic politics.  Accordingly, Deng took concrete measures to decrease the 
PLA’s domestic role and internal security responsibility.  Ideological and doctrinally, 
Deng and his PLA political officers emphasized the inappropriateness of military 
intervention in nonmilitary issues through various political works campaigns.  In more 
practical terms, twelve years after its abolition, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) was 
revived in 1978.  During the PAP’s dissolution during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA 
had performed policing and security duties. (Johnston 1984, 1019) By codifying the 
requirements for advancement and deemphasizing their role in domestic politics, these 
measures gave officers reason to invest in asset specificity. 
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While bolstering the military’s manager rights and professional autonomy, Deng 
also reinforced his particular brand of party politics by revitalizing party controls that 
were dismantled during the Cultural Revolution. (Ji 2006) Sending out political works 
teams to dispatch at all levels of the PLA, the ideological study of Deng’s “truth from 
facts,” and “open door” to the West approach.  He aimed to undermine the remaining 
remnants of the Maoist camp within the ranks and eliminate “leftist” opposition to his 
reforms. (Robinson 1982; Johnston 1984) He also revitalized the party committee system 
and reinstalled party branches at all levels.  The upshot, the PLA at all levels were under 
the control of Dengist political officers and like-minded military commanders. (Johnston 
1984, 1028) Finally, he limited the percentage of officers that could join the party to 
increase the effectiveness of the Party’s one-way penetration.  For example, in 1980, he 
restricted party membership to graduates of military academies ensuring these officers 
had gone through pro-Deng military educational systems. (Johnston 1984, 1031) By 
reducing the size of the Party in the PLA and revitalizing the party control systems, Deng 
hoped to strengthen his political authority over the military and ensure their ideological 
orientation aligned with his preferences.   
 
1989 Tiananmen Square Movement 
 
The 1989 Tiananmen Movement was a nationwide nonviolent citizens’ movement 
calling for reforms in China. The decade prior to the movement was a period of rapid 
economic and social change within a political system that, at its highest levels, was 
fundamentally averse to any change that might threaten the existing order.  Sparked by 
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the April 15, 1989, death of Hu Yaobang, the former general secretary of the CCP whose 
reformist views distinguished him from the hardliners in the Party.  One of Deng’s 
protégés, Hu Yaobang oversaw reforms until his dismissal from the post of Party general 
secretary in 1987 for failure to oppose “bourgeoisie liberalization energetically enough.” 
(Zhang et al. 2001, 481) Aware of Hu’s liberal reputation, students felt especially 
connected with him, but had done nothing to support him when he fell from grace.  With 
reform programs in retreat, students saw an opportunity to promote political change by 
commemorating Hu’s memory.  On April 19, students began a sit-in at the front entrance 
to Zhongnanhai, the seat of the central government, demanding a dialogue with the 
Chinese leadership.  Tensions mounted as officials rejected a dialogue.  Dejected and 
humiliated, students then declared a campus strike and began occupying Tiananmen 
Square prior to Hu Yaobang’s funeral on April 22. (He 2017) The student movement 
ended on June 4, when the PLA deployed over 200,000 soldiers, equipped with tanks and 
machine guns, to crackdown on what the regime called a “counterrevolutionary riot.”  In 
the immediate aftermath, twenty-two divisions of thirteen different PLA Group Armies 
drawn from all across China, remained on a state of high alert in the capital until martial 
law was lifted in January 1990. (Shambaugh 2003, 22)   
Arguably the student movement was a proxy for the ongoing intra-party conflict 
between hardliners and softliners over the direction and speed of reforms.  Disagreements 
about how to respond to the movement accelerated the fracture within Party leadership 
and forced out the Party general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, considered a softliner.  When 
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Zhao Ziyang hesitated in ordering a crackdown, Party Elders11 dismissed him and put 
him under house arrest until his death in 2005. (He 2017) Hardliners in the Party, 
persuaded Deng, the student movement was a threat to the Party system and political 
stability.12  Party leaders feared if the protests gained enough momentum, the movement, 
or “turmoil, could have the destructive power reminiscent of youth groups during the 
Cultural Revolution.13  Convinced of the danger, Deng Xiaoping sided with the hardliners 
and in consultation with the Party Elders, Deng declared martial law and eventually 
ordered the army to clear the Square by force.  (Lawrence and Martin 2013, 13)  
 
Defend, Defect, or Coup:  Decision to Defend 
 
In making the determination to support the Party and suppress the student 
movement, the PLA weighed the regime’s reputation and future credibility in securing 
                                               
11 Deng Xiaoping’s power was not absolute.  Before his word was final, Deng sought consensus among the 
Elders. The Elders that caucused with Deng included six men (Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, 
Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo) and one woman (Deng Yingchao, the widow of late premier Zhou Enlai) 
with long, distinguished service to the Party. The Elders met four times and made four big decisions: to 
declare martial law, to dismiss Zhao Ziyang, to appoint Jiang Zemin Secretary General, and to employ 
troops to clear Tiananmen Square. Notably excluded, or self-excluded, from the meeting to decide on 
martial law and the deployment of PLA troops were the two surviving marshals of the Chinese military, Xu 
Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen.  The Elders had no previous history of meeting together before or after the 
Tiananmen events.  (Zhang et al. 2001, xxx) 
 
12 On April 23, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang departed for a scheduled visit to North Korea. In his 
absence, hardliners Premier Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun met with Deng Xiaoping on April 24 
and convinced him that the student protests posed a significant danger to the regime. (He 2017) 
 
13 In an editorial published in the April 26 edition of the People’s Daily, Deng is quoted as labeling the 
movement “turmoil” (dongluan) and stating it had to be decisively denounced. Another translation is “riot” 
with its implications of intentionality and violence.  The editorial was aimed at setting boundaries warning 
the majority of loyal students not to be misled by a small group of radicals.  However, the term “turmoil” 
proved to be inflammatory.  The word had an especially negative connotation in China because it had often 
been used in reference to the upheavals of the years of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969.  
(Zhang et al. 2001, xxxvi) 
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the military’s political property rights, see Figure 7, decision point (1) and decision point 
(2).  Finding the Party a credible partner before and after the crisis, the PLA decided to 
defend the regime.  It complied with orders to deploy martial law troops into Beijing and 
later cleared the student demonstrators from Tiananmen Square. 
 
Figure 7. PLA Decision Tree 
 
 
Decision point (1): CCP’s Reputation in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
Despite the mass student movement upturning everyday life in Beijing and across 
100 other cities around the country, the Party’s hegemony was never in doubt.  
Throughout the 1980s, there was no question that the party Central Military Commission 
(CMC) remained the locus of decision making for the PLA.14  Although Deng had retired 
                                               
14 While Zhao Ziyang held the position of Party general secretary, he had not been appointed head of the 
CMC and therefore remained outside the PLA chain of command. 
* Credible political actors own the political property rights in the exchange and are able to commit to 
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from the Party’s Politburo and Standing Committee, he retained his position as party 
CMC chairman. (Miller 2006) While he held his commander-in-chief position, Deng’s 
informal and personal influence remained substantial and his formal institutional posts 
were not necessarily a prerequisite to wield political authority.  Deng, for instance, held 
the position of CMC chair from 1981 to 1989, even though he did not hold the position of 
the CCP general secretary from 1981 to 1987 or any formal party or state portfolio 
between 1987 and 1989. (Miller 2006) Deng’s command of the military was based 
largely on his revolutionary and military credentials, as well as his status and prestige as 
one of the founders of the People’s Republic of China and the PLA.  Moreover, prior to 
Tiananmen, Deng had championed military modernization and the professionalization of 
the officer corps.  In short, he was highly regarded amongst the military brass who had 
benefitted from his military reforms.  To save the Party, Deng willing used all his 
political capital and staked his reputation to get the military establishment on board.  
When the order came to deploy martial law troops and later clear the square, Deng had 
proven his credibility to secure the interests of both the Party and the military.  
 
Decision point (2): CCP’s Future Credibility in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
 Party succession was a concern in assessing the ex post credibility of the regime.  
Deng Xiaoping was reasonably concerned with the center holding when he was gone.  He 
emphasized that any collective leadership needed a core for the stability of the party 
system. 15  At a CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee meeting on June 16, Deng 
                                               
 
15 The first-generation core was Mao Zedong; the second-generation core was Deng Xiaoping; and the 
third-generation core was Jiang Zemin.   
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stated, “Our Party now has to build its third generation of collective leadership…Our 
having a core is the reason we’ve been able to go through two leadership transitions 
smoothly, without adverse effect on the continuity of Party rule.” (Zhang et al. 2001, 426-
427) With the fall of Zhao Ziyang as Party general secretary and the advanced years of 
Deng Xiaoping, he was 85 at the time, the military brass would be concerned with 
succession and the Party’s ability to guarantee its political property rights.  Therefore, 
Party Elders acted quickly to remove Zhao Ziyang, hoping to create a united front and put 
to rest any question on the line of succession.16  Party Elders met on May 27 and decided 
to endorse Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zemin at the next Party general secretary.  At 
the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee held in June 23-24, the Party 
formally elected Jiang Zemin general secretary.  In short, the Party found a credible 
successor to reassure the military brass that the ex ante agreement would be reliably 
fulfilled ex post. 
 
Action point (4):  Defend  
During the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement, the Party was firmly in power.  
No visible elite divisions manifested within the Party during the popular uprising.  
Moreover, the student protestors remained weak with little financial, organizational, or 
moral backing from domestic or international sources.  Finding the CCP credible before 
and after the crisis, the PLA decided to defend the status quo.  Despite easily quelling the 
                                               
 
16 The eight Elders met on May 27 to replace Zhao Ziyang. They wanted to find a successor who could win 
public support—thus, reasonable detached from the decision and implementation of martial law.  The 
group came to a consensus in favor of Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zemin. (Zhang et al. 2001, 297) 
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disturbance, the possibility of future uprisings and once again being called to use violence 
against unarmed protestors was an alarming prospect.  The movement served as a 
warning signal for the Party to commit to organizational changes to strengthen the party 
hierarchy as well reorganize the state’s internal security apparatus to better handle the 
suppression of the population. 
 
Continuing the Cycle of Repression Under Third Generation Leadership 
 
In 1989, China’s Communist Party faced the challenge of large-scale protests in 
Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and in more than 100 other cities around the country.  When 
the Party ordered tanks into the streets of Beijing to enforce martial law and clear 
protestors from Tiananmen Square, the PLA proved its willingness to put the Communist 
Party’s interests first.  Despite hesitation, misgivings and some individual cases of 
disobedience, the PLA executed the Party’s order to suppress the demonstrators, killing 
hundreds of protestors in the process—no authoritative death toll has ever been released. 
(Lawrence and Martin 2013, 6) The military also served the Party by enforcing seven 
months of martial law in the capital after clearing the Square.  The PLA’s actions against 
Chinese citizen irreparably damaged its image within China and around the world—
consequently, it would expect the Party to return the favor.   
Corresponding with the cycle of repression, when a regime relies on the military 
establishment to uphold its claims to political property rights and continued access to 
public authority, the crisis event provides an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement.  Depending on the regime’s level of reliance on the military for repression, 
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the military can gain the upper hand in negotiating for additional political property rights. 
Because civilian and military political actors seek to limit their exposure to political 
uncertainty, each actor will negotiate for new rules to achieve that objective.  The 
Tiananmen crisis gave the civilian and military political elites reason and opportunity to 
restructure the Chinese civil-military arrangement.  Arguably, the crisis added the fuel to 
complete Deng’s reforms of the Party and the PLA.  On one hand, the crisis exposed the 
Party’s tenuous control of the PLA which was based on interpersonal relationships of 
first- and second-generation leaders.  Party leaders would have to clarify the lines of 
ownership.  On the other hand, the PLA elite detested the idea of sending troops into 
Beijing to pacify the student protestors.17  As such, they sought to expand their 
professional autonomy to insulate themselves from the vicissitudes of domestic and Party 
politics.  The Party and PLA, therefore, advanced their goals by reinforcing institutional 
guarantees of their political property rights—owner and manager. Securing these rights 
had the dual effect of expanding bilateral dependency and increasing each actor’s mutual 
gain from ex post hierarchical governance.   
Before genuine reforms could start, the first order of business was to enforce 
discipline over the military.  Signaling it still held a preponderance of owner rights, the 
                                               
17 Prior to the decision to establish martial law, Party Central was in consultation with high-ranking military 
leaders to include the two surviving marshals of the Chinese military, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen.  
Only ten officers in the history of the PLA had ever risen to the rank of marshal.  As the sole survivors of 
this group, Xu and Nie had considerable influence among the military and the general public.  When they 
were briefed about the martial law decision, Xu at first said nothing but later issued a statement: “Lets us 
hope it is never directed at the students.”  Nie’s response was, “Under no circumstances should there be 
shedding of blood.”  For the remaining military brass not included in prior notification, the announcement 
of martial law came as an unpleasant surprise.  Eight generals and admirals signed a one-sentence letter 
addressed to Deng Xiaoping and the Central Military Commission (CMC), stating, “We request that troops 
not enter the city and that martial law not be carried out in Beijing.” (Zhang et al. 2001, 264-265)   
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Party immediately acted to reward loyalty through valuable appointments and punish 
defectors through exclusion.  Those who had distinguished themselves or had 
demonstrated loyalty during the 1989 crackdown were promoted.  Employing a typical 
integration coup-proofing maneuver, the CCP reshuffled senior military leaders at a critical 
juncture.  Over the next year following Tiananmen, widespread personnel changes took 
place in the upper reaches of the armed forces.  Between February and June 1990, a 
nationwide shuffle of military district commanders and political commissars, including 
both the PLA and the PAP, led to a shift in the posture of the entire military.  Six of the 
seven military region commanders and commissars were replaced or rotated. 
(Shambaugh 2003, 25) Next, the CCP and PLA moved swiftly to clear the ranks of 
insubordination.  To this day, the extent of military insubordination remains unclear.18  In 
a well-publicized case of insubordination, the commander of the 38th Group Army,19 
General Xu Qinxian, was immediately stripped of his command when he refused to enter 
Beijing.  General Xu Qinxian later met a court martial, received a five-year prison 
sentence, and expulsion from the CCP. (Brook 1992, 39-40) 
The next order of business was to clarify owner rights by creating explicit rules of 
who was at the top of the military chain of command.  In short, making it unequivocally 
clear to both civilian and military actors who had the political authority to control the 
                                               
18 General Yang Baibing, Head of the General Political Department (GPD), responsible for post-Tiananmen 
vetting in the PLA, allegedly briefed at the All-Army Political Work Conference in December 1989 that 
111 officers had “breached discipline in a serious way,” and that 1,400 soldiers “shed their weapons and 
ran away.” (Shambaugh 2003, 24)   
 
19 The 38th Army is one of the units located in the vicinity of the city belonging to the Beijing Military 
Region.  The 38th Army has close ties with student protestors, many of whom served in the unit before 
attending Beijing University or participate in summer training as army reservists. (Trainor 1989); Of note, 
the majority of troops carrying out martial law in the capital came from rural and mountainous areas. 
(Zhang et al. 2001, 351) 
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PLA.  While the CMC remains unquestionably the CCP organ that controls the PLA, 
there was ambiguity about the role of the CMC chairman and his appointment.  The Party 
sought to align the political authority of the Party secretary general and CMC chair, as 
well as clarify the line of succession for the CMC chair.  At the time of the Tiananmen 
crisis, the position of Party secretary general (the designated head of the Party) and CMC 
chair (the commander and chief of the PLA) was held by two different people—Zhao 
Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, respectively.  Furthermore, concerned over the stability of 
the Party after he departed the political scene, Deng took steps to institutionalize a path 
for the upcoming third- and fourth-generation leaders to succeed him as the preeminent 
leader of the Party and CMC chair.  Before he left the political arena, Deng Xiaoping 
ensured Jiang Zemin consolidated his leadership of the Party and the PLA.  To this end, 
in November 1989, Deng transferred his CMC chair to the sitting Party secretary general, 
Jiang Zemin—formally removing himself from the PLA chain of command.  By these 
actions, Deng established the norm that the head of the Party should also be the head of 
the CMC.  These institutional measures clearly delineated the political property rights 
conferred on specific political roles within the Party.  Incidentally, these rules of 
succession and political authority endured after Jiang Zemin’s tenure—all his successors 
have simultaneously held general secretary and CMC chair appointments.  In short, 
aligning owner rights to specific public offices created explicit rules of who had the 
political authority to command and control the military. 
The next task at hand, the Party sought to clarify the PLA’s manager rights by 
drafting clearer rules on the military’s roles and responsibilities.  The increasing 
sophistication of the military bureaucracy and highly technical nature of modern warfare 
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made the ambiguous boundaries between political and military affairs unsustainable. The 
upper-echelon of the military and high-ranking Party members drafted new rules to better 
define the boundaries between owner and manager rights.  Once the dust settled on 
efforts to ensure “absolute loyalty”—purges, personnel shuffling, and heavy 
indoctrination—the PLA began to push back to reconstitute its corporate identity. 
According Shambaugh (2003), since the mid-1990s, the military sought greater autonomy 
over affairs it considered to be fully within its corporate domain such as training, 
doctrine, force structure, personnel appointments, military education, and protection of 
national security. (18) Signaling a fundamental change in the rules of the game, for the 
first time, the Chinese government codified in several laws, documents, and regulations 
the military’s primary functions and roles.20 (Shambaugh 2003, 47) Taken all together, 
the codification of the PLA roles and functions purposefully delimited the military’s 
political property rights and strengthened their guarantees.   
Finally, the regime sought to redefine the civil-military arrangement by boosting 
bilateral dependency between the Party and army—recommitting to a hierarchical 
governance.  The regime achieved these ends by increasing the military’s modernization 
budget, divesting the military’s commercial endeavors, promoting the military’s technical 
proficiency, and expanding internal security institutions.  Accordingly, Beijing sharply 
increased the PLA’s budget every year since 1989.  Earlier in his tenure, Deng had 
                                               
20 The National People’s Congress passed twelve laws and regulations, including the National Defense 
Law, Military Service Law, Military Facilities Protection Law, Civil Air Defense Law, Reserve Officers’ 
Law, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Garrison Law, Military Service Regulations, and Military 
Officers’ Ranks and Regulations.  Moreover, the State Council and CMC jointly adopted forty-odd 
administrative laws and regulations, and the CMC implemented seventy-odd on its own, while individual 
PLA departments, service arms, and Military Regions added more than one thousand military rules and 
regulations. (Shambaugh 2003, 47) 
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appealed to the PLA leadership to exercise patience and wait their turn in his “four 
modernizations” agenda.  The Tiananmen crisis provided the military an opportunity to 
jockey for the reprioritization of resources to achieve the “fourth modernization.” 
Reversing priorities, Beijing increased the PLA’s budget, no doubt as political payback 
for its loyalty during the Tiananmen crisis and support of Jiang Zemin’s succession to 
CMC chair.  Unlike Deng, having never spent a day in the military, Jiang embarked on 
efforts to consolidate and institutionalize his political authority over the PLA.  According 
to Shambaugh (2003), Jiang Zemin and the PLA brass struck an implicit bargain that as 
long as he supported PLA budgets and professionalization goals, they would defer to his 
leadership. (47) Finally, once government funding could entirely support the functioning 
of the PLA, Jiang Zemin began his next initiative to increase his, as well as his civilian 
successors, control of the military—by eliminating off-budget sources of funding and 
completely controlling the military’s budget. (Li 2010) Deng had previously permitted 
the PLA to engage in commercial enterprises to supplement the military budget.  On July 
22, 1998, at an enlarged session of the CMC, Jiang Zemin publicly called for the 
dissolution of the military-business complex. (Mulvenon 2006, 223)  
Next, Jiang Zemin aimed to confine the PLA to military-technical tasks and 
increase the organization’s asset specificity.  Jiang endorsed several initiatives to prompt 
the PLA to invest in technical training and proficiency.  First and foremost, military 
promotions reflected organizational priorities.  For example, the refocus on technical 
competency and professionalization of the officer corps led to promotion of officers with 
command experience instead of political commissars. (Shambaugh 2003, 32) Moreover, 
Jiang prompted the PLA to prepare for “local war under high-tech conditions” and 
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transform a manpower-intensive force to a technology-based one. (Li 2010, 12) He later 
introduced the concept of “leapfrogging development” to narrow the technological gap 
with the more advanced militaries of the world.21  These technology-centric policies led 
to the decisions to downsize the PLA by five hundred thousand billets in 1997 and 
another two hundred thousand in 2002.  Without a doubt, decreasing the number of billets 
reduced budgetary pressures and the reliance on commercial enterprise to fund the PLA. 
Also contributing to asset specificity, the divestiture of the PLA’s business holdings 
starting in 1998, significantly reduced its domestic role allowing it to focus singularly on 
military-technical tasks.  A byproduct of the emphasis on technology-centric warfare and 
technical expertise was the creation of institutional barriers to the PLA intervening in 
domestic politics.  For instance, it became more difficult to employ technology-intensive 
services, such as the Navy, the Air Force, and Second Artillery, in domestic pacification 
operations. (Li 2010, 12) 
With the creation of institutional barriers, the party shifted the responsibility of 
domestic security to other security organization.  One lesson of the Tiananmen crisis was 
the need for more flexible paramilitary capability for riot control.  Incidentally, starting in 
the 1990s, internal security organizations such as the People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
became the first line of defense against domestic unrest and received significant 
government attention and resources.  According to Lawrence and Martin (2013), the 
heavy investment in domestic security has grown exponentially since 1989.  As of 2010, 
domestic security apparatus at the state level included over 2 million personnel compared 
                                               
21 Leapfrogging shifted the emphasis of military modernization from mechanization (adding new hardware 
platforms) to informatization (developing information technologies–based network and software). (Li 2010, 
12)   
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to the PLA’s force of 2.25 million troops.  Moreover, since 2010, China’s funding of 
internal security agencies such as the police, the PAP, the courts, and the prison system 
had outpaced its funding of the armed forces.22 (Lawrence and Martin 2013,13-14) 
Developing more robust internal security apparatus relieved the PLA from these 
operations allowing it to focus on military modernization and external security.  Although 
the PAP retains the primary role for domestic security, the 1997 National Defense Law 
(Article 22) reiterated The PLA’s continued responsibility for internal security: “The 
standing army, when necessary, may assist in maintaining public order in accordance 




The fall of the Soviet Union and the resilience of the People’s Republic of China 
demonstrates the importance of credibly securing political property rights before and 
after a crisis to maintain the loyalty of party members, especially the military 
establishment.  Solnick (1996) came to the same conclusion in his examination of the 
breakdown of hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China.  Due to political reforms in the 
Soviet Union, Solnick (1996) argued property rights became ambiguous, weakening the 
Party’s ability to monitor and coerce.  Decentralization led to the perception that the party 
could no longer control its resources.  Therefore, party members no longer had an 
incentive to comply, but steal rents today, lest they lose out later.  He equated the 
                                               
22 The 2013 national budget contained planned spending of $123.7 billion on internal security (not 
including the PLA), compared to $119 billion on defense. (Lawrence and Martin 2013, 13-14)   
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phenomenon to the run on the bank—when cheating is not punished, others are 
encouraged to defect in larger numbers to include the armed forces.  The fall of the 
Soviet Union demonstrated the weakness of the Soviet Union’s party system to credibly 
guarantee long-term solvency of membership benefits.  
On the other hand, during reforms in China, Solnick (1996) suggested, property 
rights became clearer.  Unlike the Soviet Union, political reforms did not take place 
alongside with economic reforms in China.  While China’s economic reforms included 
the devolution of power to local governments, the Party never lost the right to appoint 
local officials. (Solnick 1996, 233) The party still controlled the most important resources 
of the state and could guarantee members’ political property rights.  To take part in the 
economic boom, you had to be a member of the Party and the Party controlled the 
allocation of property rights; thereby, reinforcing party discipline.  The Party was, 
therefore, able to choose winners in the economic boom.  The Chinese Communist Party 
reinforced party discipline and retained the power to coerce at all levels of the hierarchy. 
Consequently, there was little incentive to defect, but more incentive to support the 
maintenance of the regime.  The regimes ability to secure political property rights 
explains why the PLA remained loyal to the Chinese Communist Party during the 
Tiananmen Square crisis.  
The CCP and PLA clearly have common interests. The CCP continues to 
represent the PLA’s most credible partner in politics, providing the military with the kind 
of privilege and special status that no other political force possesses.  Benefitting from 
the CCP’s monopoly of power, the PLA decided to defend the political order during the 
Tiananmen “turmoil.” The crisis, however, revealed the weakness of the party-army 
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relationship and provided an opportunity for each actor to negotiate for new rules 
governing the relationship. Following the crisis, the Party and PLA aimed to purposely 
clarify and delimit the owner and manager political property rights.  Each actor found the 
need to bifurcate the convoluted and sometimes overlapping owner and manager rights 
that developed with the revolutionary generation.  In the restructuring, the Party gained 
significant owner rights through budgetary control and investment in military 
infrastructure, while the PLA gained additional manager rights through professional 
autonomy and investment in asset specificity.  Finally, both actors sought to reinforce the 
hierarchical relationship by encouraging mutual dependence—although bilateral 
dependency made each actor vulnerable to opportunism, it ultimately encouraged the 
building of hierarchical governance structures to promote ex post mutual gain.  
Notwithstanding these changes, China’s civil-military institutional arrangements still fall 
within the cadre army typology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PATRON ARMY: MARCOS AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Patron Army (Civilian Superiority) 
 
In some authoritarian systems, such as “personalistic” or “sultanistic” regimes, 
incumbents maintain political authority through personal patronage networks rather than 
ideology, charisma, or impersonal law. (Linz and Stepan 1978, Linz 1985, Chehabi and 
Linz 1998, Geddes 1999, Magaloni 2008, Weeks 2008) Patronage systems involve large 
networks of people bounded together in hierarchical patron-client formations at different 
levels. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 7) As Snyder (1998) suggested, “The central role 
of patronage in these regimes creates an authority structure that is radial in nature, with 
the dictator occupying a central hub that is linked via patronage spokes to clients both 
within the state and in civil society.” (53) The problem both patrons and clients confront 
in a clientelistic political transactions is that these exchanges are usually not 
simultaneous, taking place over time, and are not mutually binding.  As such, each actor 
faces a dilemma due to information asymmetry, the ruler can’t be sure if the agents will 
obey, and the agents can’t be sure if the ruler will not renege.  This raises the specter of 
opportunistic defection, in which either the patron or client can default on the deal.  In an 
iterative game, the reputation of the dictator matters most in clientelistic exchanges.  
Moreover, political actors face a large degree of political uncertainty because of the 
highly contested nature of political property rights in patron-client exchanges.  
Dictatorships that rely on a personal patronage system to co-opt elites and gain mass 
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support are highly vulnerable to public office turn-over when resources are not readily 
available to sustain the system.  For instance, the dictator’s political authority becomes 
highly contested in periods of economic slowdown or a reduction of foreign aid.   
 




In authoritarian regimes, the subordination of the military to civilian authorities is 
perhaps most ambiguous with patron army institutional arrangements.  In patron army 
arrangements, the civil-military contractual obligation is often sustained by direct 
transfer, or clientelistic exchange between dictator and the armed forces.  The dictator 
(patron) offers the officer corps (client) a “valuable” political property right, in exchange 
for support.  A “valuable” political property right includes, but are not limited to, political 
appointments and administrative posts with high potential rents.  Thus, the largest lever 
of control for the dictator is the power of appointments—the ability to reward loyalist and 
exclude spoilers.  This creates a situation in which there is civilian superiority of the 
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military—as the civilian authority has the preponderance of owner rights.   
The degree to which the patronage network radiating from the dictator penetrates 
the military is often uneven and can fluctuate over time.  Thus, there is often an ongoing 
struggle between the dictator who seeks to wrest autonomy from military, and the 
military brass who seek to retain their autonomy.  The dictator wants to gain the support 
of the military with the least amount of ownership rights exchanged, while the military 
wants to gain more ownership with the least amount of effort.  The dictator often aims to 
restrict the military’s autonomy through the control of most aspects of military affairs 
from budget, promotions, appointments, and military indoctrination.  Snyder (1998) 
suggested, the degree of military autonomy can be determined by whether: 
the armed forces have control over the supply of their materiel, the ability of 
officers to predict their career paths and to communicate discontent with one 
another, how completely the officer corps is divided along ethnic or regional 
lines, and the dictator’s capacity to purge elements of the armed forces whose 
loyalty he questions. (54)  
 
Because property rights are not credibly guaranteed by the dictator, the military 
establishment may not be invested in the perpetuation of the incumbent and work to 
insulate the organization from the volatility of the dictator by increasing pockets of 
military autonomy.  Moreover, since civilian and military elites’ preferences do not 
necessary converge, civilian leaders cannot reliably get the military to do what they want.   
Political property rights in the exchange with the dictator are not institutionalized, 
contingent, and can be removed.  The hierarchical order and institutional arrangements of 
the armed forces are, therefore, vulnerable to the quixotic manipulation of the dictator.  
Established political property rights are not credibly guaranteed by the dictator because 
personnel actions are often politicized and precarious.  Dictators relying on personal face-
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to-face connections with senior military officers to maintain loyalty are prone to 
compromise the organizational health and military cohesion of the armed forces.  
Consequently, a patron army can be organizationally weakened and demoralized over 
time as political property rights, especially manager rights, are incrementally dismantled.  
Like the cautionary tale of Icarus flying too close to the sun, military commanders find 
they are promoted, rotated to inferior posts, periodically purged, publicly humiliated and 
dismissed, then politically resurrected and reappointed. (Svolik 2012, 79) These 
capricious practices publicly signal the dictator’s independence, but also undermine his or 
her reputation and credibility to securing property rights.   
 
The Marcos Regime and the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
 
After gaining its independence 1946, the Philippines stood out as a “showcase of 
democracy” in Southeast Asia. (Lim 2011, 3) The Philippines had inherited a democratic 
constitutional government from its American benefactors including the ideals of civilian 
control of the military.  In fact, modeled after America’s West Point, the Philippine 
Military Academy (PMA) socialized and indoctrinated cadets with western ideals of 
professionalism and civil supremacy. (McCoy 1999, 25) From the 1940s to the 1970s the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was not considered a power broker in Philippine 
society as Filipino political and economic elites showed little interests in a military 
career.  Since the Filipino elites did not send their sons to service academies, McCoy 
(1999) noted, the country’s regular officers were drawn primarily from the lower to 
middle class, “fostering a social cleavage between senior officers and other Filipino 
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elites.” (25) In the two decades following independence, unlike many of its regional 
counterparts, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma, the AFP generally succeeded in 
avoiding politicization and never initiated coups against the civilian government.  
However, with the ascendancy of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the role of the AFP drastically 
changed.   
Prior to Marcos’s election as president, at the center of Philippine politics was the 
rivalry between oligarchic families jockeying for power at the local and national level.  
During this early period, the Philippines had two major parties, the Liberals and the 
Nacionalistas which regularly alternated in power.  Ideologically identical, these two 
major parties comprised of the same elite social composition.  Because the two parties’ 
platforms were virtually indistinguishable, party switching was a common practice 
including presidential candidates changing sides.  Accordingly, Thompson (1998) 
concluded elections were largely competitions between the two parties’ patronage 
networks, making them among the most expensive in the world. (208) By taking turns in 
power, neither party could monopolize political authority and state resources indefinitely.  
The informal rule of alternating power between the Liberals and the Nacionalistas came 
to an end when Marcos’s decided he would not give up office.   
On September 21, 1972, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 1081, 
declaring a state of martial law throughout the nation until it was lifted on January 17, 
1981.  Martial law expanded the military’s political role and social status in Filipino 
society.  Marcos’s military loyalist became local officials, civil servants, judges, and 
corporate moguls.  His regime would be marked by harsh political repression, vast human 
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rights violations, and crony capitalism.23  Backed by his generals, Marcos dismantled all 
opposition and institutional checks to his power—sidelining political competitors, 
silencing the Catholic Church, closing congress, and confiscating corporations.  
Consequently, only two political institutions were able to develop during his authoritarian 
rule—the office of the presidency and the armed forces.  While martial law and 
repression bolstered Marcos’s presidency—it also sowed the seeds of his eventual 
demise.  
 
Patron Army Institutional Arrangements 
During his tenure, Marcos initiated a cycle of repression that would transform a 
constitutionally-controlled army into a patron army.  He effectively restructured the civil-
military relationship to one in which the military’s political property rights were no 
longer institutionally guaranteed but singularly dependent on the patronage of Marcos.  In 
short, the military’s political property rights were weakly guaranteed and Marcos 






                                               
23 “Crony capitalism” or “cronyism” under Marcos was a kind of subcontracting of corruption that relied on 
state power to provide monopolies for private accumulation.  Prominent industries included sugar, 
coconuts, logging, cargo shipping, tobacco, automobile parts industry, banana, and pharmaceuticals. 
(Thompson 1998, 219) 
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Figure 9. Marcos’s Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements 
 
Horizontal Dimension.  This dimension measures the degree political property 
rights will be secured ex post and consists of two components:  1) the level of 
contestation of political property rights, and 2) the level of credible commitment to the 
agreement by the actors in the exchange.  
 Firstly, to what degree is Marcos’s political authority contested?  After coming to 
power in 1965, Marcos broke the informal rules of election politics and later changed the 
game altogether.  To remake the “rules of the game,” Marcos garnered the support of the 
military to subdue the other sources of power in society—from oligarchic families to the 
Catholic Church.  Marcos entered into a bargain with the AFP to exclude traditional elites 
from power, denying them access to political authority and the attached political property 
rights.  The military partnership allowed Marcos to artificially suppress the contestation 
of his political authority for a time.  Marcos’s overstay in office was not an equilibrium, 
as such, the application of violence had to be continuously applied.  If the military 
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stopped enforcing the “new” rules, Marcos’s political authority would be vulnerable to 
dispossession.  As long as the Marcos and the AFP upheld their end of the political 
bargain, Marcos’s claim to the highest office was secure.   
Next, does Marcos credibly guarantee political property rights?  Did Marcos 
credibly commit to following through on his agreement with the military?  As stated 
before, it’s difficult for political actors in dictatorships to show credible commitment 
because rights can be easily taken away.  Marcos systematically undermined any type of 
rule-based protection of political property rights for civilian and military political actors.  
Following the establishment of martial law, any constraint on Marcos’s dictatorial powers 
were effectively neutralized—he canceled elections, censored the press, curtailed judicial 
independence, and abolished Congress.  For example, before martial law, military 
officers needed congressional confirmation for top-level appointments and promotions. 
After disbanding Congress, Marcos effectively made himself the sole benefactor of all 
appointments and promotions. (Thompson 1998; Lee 2011) This kept military 
subordinates dependent on his magnanimity.  Because Marcos bestowed political 
property rights as a test of loyalty, political transactions with Marcos were subject to 
change.  In short, Marcos’s regime did not credibly secure political property rights.  He 
made the rules, broke the rules, and remade the rules at his own discretion.   
Vertical dimension.  This dimension delineates the institutional arrangements, or 
agreed upon political property rights, negotiated by the regime and the armed forces over 
time.  Negotiated political property rights consist of two types of political property rights: 
1) owner rights and 2) manager rights.   
Firstly, did Marcos retain the preponderance of owner rights?  After his election 
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to the presidency, Marcos moved quickly to gain personal control over the military 
hierarchy.  His initial act was to appoint himself as defense secretary for his first thirteen 
months in power while he undertook the largest reorganization of the military in history. 
(McCoy 1999; Hernandez 1995; Thompson 1998) He retired many top officers, replacing 
them with loyalist from his own Ilocos region and junior officers who had supported him 
during his presidential campaign.  He deliberately bestowed patronage on the armed 
forces and carefully nurtured the military’s loyalty and dependency on him.  Marcos also 
centralized security functions under his authority, bringing the police forces and the 
constabulary under the AFP chain of command.24  The Philippine Constabulary (PC), 
which handled internal security and law enforcement, reported directly through the AFP 
chain of command which was filled by Marcos loyalists—thereby, ensuring his men were 
the command authority for all military and internal security units. (McCoy 1999; 
Hernandez 1998; Hernandez and Ubarra 1999; Lim 2011) This reorganization had the 
effect of removing control of internal security functions from local bosses and directly 
under the control of Marcos as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.  Moreover, after the 
imposition of martial law, Marcos no longer shared owner rights with the Congress—he 
became the single point of control for all military matters, administering the military’s 
budget, promotions, and appointments. (Thompson 1998; Lee 2011) In the end, Marcos’s 
maneuverings concentrated all owner rights under the office of the president. 
                                               
24 In 1976, the Integrated National Police (INP) were formally merged with the Philippine Constabulary 
(PC).  The PC at the time was one of the major service commands of the AFP.  Marcos sought to centralize 
control of all armed units of the government by integrating the police forces and putting them 
organizationally under the chief of the PC.  Prior to the merger, local chief executives in the cities, 
municipalities, and provinces exercised control and supervision over the police forces. (Hernandez and 
Ubarra 1999, 9) 
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During his tenure, Marcos maintained owner rights and curtailed the manager 
rights of the AFP.  Marcos restricted professional autonomy weakening the military’s 
manager rights.  Initially, when Marcos’s worked to curry the favor of the military to 
support his ambitions and the enforcement of martial law, he increased its size and the 
budget.  Moreover, with the imposition of martial law, the military acquired a wider 
sphere of responsibility, transcending normal military responsibility.  As a consequence, 
military men assumed “civilian” roles expanding their political authority, gaining 
significant political property rights.  Although the military filled the vacuum by accepting 
more political authority, Marcos maintained his control by being the central hub of the 
patronage network.  The expansion of the military’s political authority was surgically 
applied to Marcos loyalist and not uniformly applied across the organization.  Disbanding 
any constitutional control of the military and fearing his own generals, Marcos 
continuously compromised the military’s manager rights.  Marcos did not allow the 
military’s top brass to work independently or grant them the authority to make 
organizational decisions.  He effectively restricted the institutionalization of the 
military’s manager rights by reserving political property rights to cronies, sycophants, 
and incompetents.   
 
Entering the Cycle of Repression  
 
 From the onset of his presidency, Marcos flaunted the rules of democracy and 
positioned himself to gain absolute control of the government through violent means.  
After serving his first term, Marcos looked to expand his power.  His aspirations required 
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the assistance and partnership of the armed forces.  After packing top-level military 
positions with loyalist, Marcos found a political organization amendable to a deal—if the 
AFP supported his agenda, they would reap the rewards.25  With this political pact, 
Marcos and the AFP entered into a cycle of repression.  
To justify martial law, Marcos exploited mounting political polarization and 
violence within the country—the rise of an Islamic secessionist movement in the south, 
an armed communist insurgency, and a string of bombings in Manila linked to the 
Communist Party.  Hours after an alleged assassination attempt on Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile on September 21, 1972, Marcos declared martial law suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus and the 1935 Constitution.  With his new powers, Marcos systematically 
crushed opponents and dismantled civilian institutions that could check his power. He 
later dissolved Congress and assumed both legislative and executive powers.   
Under martial law, the military also assumed unlimited powers to search, arrest, 
and detain civilians.  With these unchecked powers, officers and soldiers committed 
routine torture of political prisoners and other human rights abuses. (Hernandez 1985; 
Hernandez and Ubarra 1999; McCoy 1999; Lim 2011) It is estimated that 60,000 
Philippine civilians were arrested between 1972 and 1982. (Lim 2011, 5) Due to the 
constitutional grant of emergency powers, the military also assumed various kinds of 
responsibilities beyond the maintenance of law and order.  Hernandez (1985) described 
                                               
25 “Right after declaring martial law, he promoted officers one grade, increased their salaries 150 percent, 
raised benefits, and set up a company to help them invest their new wealth.  In return for their loyalty, he 
tolerated corruption among top officers, which undermine professionalism and increased inequality within 
the military.  Officers controlled or extorted payment from the black market for dollars; they controlled car-
theft rings, marijuana syndicates, illegal logging, gambling, prostitution, fishing, mining, gun-running, and 
robbery.  Smaller racketeers were principally the province of junior-ranking officers and enlisted men 
whose basic pay and living conditions had not significantly improved.” (Thompson 1998, 216) 
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these new roles and responsibilities: 
The military soon found itself not only keeping law and order, and maintaining 
internal security, but also managing military-related industries, public 
corporations and even diplomatic posts, and dispensing justice as well as political 
patronage. The latter was the consequence of the proscription of political parties 
and political activities, the disbanding of the legislature, and the imprisonment of 
many leading politicians soon after the imposition of martial law. The role of 
dispensing political patronage naturally devolved upon the military as the officers 
were perceived by the people to have replaced traditional politicians in the 
political field. (908) 
 
The AFP was no longer the servant of the state, but a spoke within Marcos’s patronage 
network and the bastion of his authoritarian regime.  As compensation for the AFP’s 
support, Marcos increased its size and the amount of resources available to it relative to 
other institutions.  In the first four years of martial law, the armed forces budget increased 
by 500 percent and its strength double to 113,000 troops. (McCoy 1999, 192). The 
administration of repression had a profound impact upon the military.  It inserted the 
military into every aspect of Philippine life through their new roles, legal and extralegal, 
politicizing the organization. 
Before martial law, the military was not considered a significant power broker in 
Philippine politics.  However, the cycle of repression had the effect of injecting the 
officer corps into the power structure of society.  After taking office, Marcos appointed 
military officers from his home province of Ilocos Norte to key commands, a process 
commonly dubbed “Ilocanization” of the AFP. (Lee 2014, 81) He appointed three 
Ilocanos into prominent positions in the AFP hierarchy—his cousin, General Fidel 
Ramos, chief of the constabulary; another cousin, General Fabian Ver, commander of the 
Presidential Security Command (PSC); and a civilian protégé, Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile.  With civilian political opponents silenced, Marcos began to focus his 
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attention on potential competitors within the military.  Subverting his own commanders, 
he thus began limiting their political authority through coup-proofing measures.  As a 
result, three factions formed within the Marcos inner circle—General Ver, General 
Ramos, and Defense Minister Enrile—in order of proximity to the first family.  Marcos, a 
master of factional maneuvering, divided military authority among his three trusted 
subordinates and then played one against the other.  The origins of the rivalry between 
Generals Ramos and Ver began prior to the declaration of martial law in 1972, when 
Marcos promised his senior officers that they would be appointed as chief of staff of the 
AFP in order of seniority—General Romeo Espino first, General Rafael Ileto next, and 
finally, the youngest, Brigadier General Fidel Ramos.  When General Illeto refused to 
support Marcos’s plans for martial law, the president pushed him out and appointed the 
next in line, General Espino, a former Marcos classmate. (Lee 2014, 87) Once General 
Espino’s term was over, the next in line to succeed as chief of staff would fall to General 
Ramos.  However, rather than alienating either Ramos or Ver, General Romeo Espino 
served as chief of staff from 1971–1981, typically a three-year appointment extended to 
ten years. (McCoy 1999; Lee 2011) When Marcos weakened physically, he lost the 
capacity to balance the factions and the competition between his courtiers intensified.  As 
Marcos health began to fail, the once virile commander-in-chief, left the day-to-day 
administration to his wife, Imelda Marcos.  By her side was General Ver.   
General Fabian Ver had the closest proximity to the Marcos inner circle.  Often 
described as Marcos’s former driver and bodyguard, Ver was commissioned through the 
Reserve Officer Training program through a civilian university and had no field 
experience.  Winning the confidence of Marcos during his 1965 presidential bid, then 
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Captain Ver, performed intelligence work for the campaign. (McCoy 1999, 225) 
Following the coup-proofing playbook, Marcos entrusted Ver with the most sensitive task 
of protecting the first family.  Ver would go on to build a formidable palace guard and 
intelligence apparatus to spy on the President’s enemies inside and outside the armed 
forces. (Thompson 1998, McCoy 1999) After Marcos’s inauguration, Ver commanded 
the Presidential Security Unit, a small detachment at the fringe of the military hierarchy.  
By 1971, Ver skyrocketed from captain to general expanding his portfolio from a small 
ceremonial guard unit into the elite combined-arms Presidential Security Command 
(PSC).  He transformed the PSC into a multiservice force of seven thousand men, with 
tanks, helicopters, and patrol ships.  He also headed the National Intelligence and 
Security Agency (NISA), again converting a small analysis unit into a formidable secret 
police apparatus designed to surveil Marcos’s opponents.  As the courtier closest to the 
palace, he made himself indispensable to both Marcos and Imelda.  As Marcos’s health 
deteriorated from the onset of lupus, the first family became increasingly dependent on 
Ver to oversee Imelda’s succession to the throne.  Incidentally, Ver would be implicated 
in the alleged military-cover up of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino’s assassination, a potential 
competitor to Imelda.26 
Next in proximity was General Fidel Ramos, a United States Military Academy, 
West Point, graduate.  Considered a highly respected professional officer among his men 
and American counterparts, Ramos was an impediment to Ver’s ambitions.  (Thompson 
                                               
26 There is evidence that Imelda Marcos and General Ver had Benigno S. Aquino Jr. assassinated to get 
another potential competitor out of the way while Marcos was undergoing a kidney operation that it looked 
as if he might not survive.  Running the government as de facto president for much of 1984 - 1985 while 
Marcos was convalescing. (Thompson 1998, 222) 
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1998; McCoy 1999; Schock 2005; Lee 2011) As the chief of the constabulary, Ramos 
controlled all the country’s police forces down to the municipal level giving him a near 
monopoly over law enforcement and overwhelming political authority.  Despite the poor 
public image of the police, he succeeded in keeping his personal reputation and integrity 
intact.  However, his professionalism and moral authority made Ramos politically suspect 
to Marcos.  Although Ramos was next in line for AFP chief of staff following Espino’s 
retirement, Marcos passed him over in favor of Ver in 1981.  Ver’s appointment to the 
position of chief of staff did not sit well with the AFP rank and file, the United States, 
and especially General Ramos.  (McCoy 1999; Lee 2011) As the chief of staff, Ver 
controlled the three main instruments of state coercion—the AFP, the PSC, and the 
NISA—making him the second most powerful man in the Philippines.  Marcos’s decision 
to position Ver as his number two upset the delicate balance between the rivals.  
As one of the original architects of martial law, Defense Minister Enrile had 
previously been the second most powerful man in the Philippines with aspirations to 
ascend to the presidency.  Contributing to factional competition, the problem of 
succession loomed in the background, magnifying the rivalry between the Imelda and 
Enrile camps.  Because of his ambitions, Imelda increasingly viewed Enrile as a threat to 
her throne.  Consequently, in 1983, Marcos began another major reorganization of the 
AFP which would transfer political authority from Enrile and Ramos to Ver.  On July 31, 
1983, Marcos clarified the civilian chain of authority over the AFP stressing the chief of 
staff (Ver) was his direct link to the military and the minister of defense (Enrile) could 
only act upon the delegation by the President. (Hernandez 1985, 911) In short, Marcos 
removed Enrile from the AFP chain of command, making him the first defense secretary 
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to be unable to order troop movements.  Next, Marcos directed the reorganization of the 
AFP into twelve Regional Unified Commands (RUCs) with the commanding officer of 
each RUC reporting directly to Ver, as the chief of staff.  Notably, the constabulary 
regional commands were incorporated (subsumed) under the RUC.  The upshot, the 
reorganization and command shuffling left Ramos with only one protégé among the 
twelve new area commanders.  Marcos then removed operational control of the 
Integrated National Police (INP) from the constabulary (Ramos) and transferred it 
directly under the AFP chief of staff (Ver); the PC only had administrative supervision, 
not operational control, over the INP. (McCoy 1999, 228) In essence, Marcos stripped 
Ramos of his last operational units and put them under the command of Ver.  Finally, 
Marcos centralized the armed forces’ budget under the chief of staff, denying all the 
service branches, including the constabulary, control over their own finances. (McCoy 
1999, 228) As a result, Marcos transferred all manager rights previously held by Enrile 
and Ramos (and the other service chiefs) to the more “reliable” Ver. 
While Ramos continued to be a loyal subordinate, Enrile was openly hostile. 
Following Ver’s promotion to chief of staff, Enrile began building his own armed faction 
exploiting rising resentment among the AFP’s middle-ranking officers.  These officers 
felt disaffected by the widespread corruption and promotions based on favoritism.  
(Thompson 1998; McCoy 1999; Lee 2011) For example, Marcos permitted officers to 
“overstay” past mandatory retirement through the repeated application of six-month 
extensions.  This practice allowed Marcos to more easily command the obedience of top 
officers, as “overstaying” officers were easier to control than those whose tenures had no 
yet expired.  According to Thompson (1998), the pervasiveness of this practice is 
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demonstrated by the sixteen-month average tenure of top officers under the democratic 
regime as opposed to over one hundred months during Marcos’s dictatorship. (216)  
Moreover, “overstaying” officers delayed, once predictable, promotion cycles of younger 
year groups.  The manipulation of the personnel system removed any predictability to 
project career paths and frustrated junior and mid-level officers on the frontlines who had 
performed the dirty tasks of enforcing the martial law edicts.  With the encouragement of 
the now defunct defense minister, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) was 
started in 1982 nominally headed by Enrile’s chief security officer Lt. Colonel Gregorio 
Honasan. (Snyder 1998; Hernandez and Ubarra 1999; McCoy 1999; Lee 2011) By 1986, 
approximately 1,500 of the military’s 13,500 officers were members of the RAM. 
(Snyder 1998, 75) On 22 February 1986, in the context of widespread public outrage over 
Marcos’s use of violence and fraud during the presidential election, officers affiliated 
with RAM launched a coup against Marcos.  Events would transform their abortive coup 
plot into a mass uprising.   
As the cycle of repression predicts, opportunism will impact ex post enforcement 
of the political bargaining between the dictator and the military.  AFP opportunism 
necessitated the assumption of more political property rights and greater autonomy from 
Marcos.  For Marcos, opportunism entailed withdrawing political property rights 
promised in the political bargain.  The application of violence granted the AFP 
unprecedented powers over the daily lives of Filipinos.  With civilian political opponents 
cowed, Marcos began to worry about potential rivals within the AFP.  To curb military 
opportunism, Marcos began restructuring the relationship by applying integration coup-
proofing strategies designed to bind the officer corps to his regime.  The classic tactics he 
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employed included kinship recruitment, individual opportunities of self-enrichment, 
reshuffling of officers at critical junctures (or in some cases delaying), and establishment 
of a special parallel armed forces.  Consequently, the political property rights the military 
widely received during the early onset of martial law were slowly curtailed and 
redistributed to a smaller subset of loyalists.  The combination of opportunistic coup-
proofing and the selective narrowing of political property rights to Marcos’s inner circle 
sullied his reputation and credibility to commit in future bargains.   
 
1986 People Power Movement 
 
During the 1986 People Power Revolution, also known as EDSA Revolution, 27 
over a million Filipinos took to the streets to overthrow the corrupt and brutal regime of 
President Ferdinand Marcos.  The trigger of popular resentment toward the regime of 
President Marcos can be traced to the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in 
August 1983.28  A long-time political rival of Marcos, Ninoy Aquino was assassinated, 
while in the custody of the AFP, upon his return to the Philippines from self-imposed 
exile in the United States.  Aquino’s assassination shifted public sentiment from passive 
acceptance of the Marcos regime to active opposition from across society to include the 
traditional elites, the business community, and the Catholic Church.  A wave of 
                                               
27 Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos defected from the Marcos regime and 
seized Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, two military bases located across each other midway along 
Epifanio de los Santo Avenue (EDSA). 
 
28 With presidential succession in question due to Marcos’s failing health, opposition leader Benigno 
“Ninoy” Aquino, who was living in the United States following his exile in 1980, decided to return to the 
Philippines in 1983. Aquino had spent his years in exile lobbying the U.S. government to withdraw support 
from the Marcos regime. (Schock 2005, 69)   
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antigovernment protests ensued in the subsequent months destabilizing the Marcos 
regime.  Concerned with political stability, the United States pressured Marcos to call 
early elections.  In November 1985, Marcos called for snap elections to be held the 
following February.  In response, the opposition united under the banner of United 
Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), with Corazon “Cory” Aquino, Ninoy Aquino’s widow, 
as its candidate.  Aquino and UNIDO received crucial backing from the Catholic Church.  
Engaging in massive electoral fraud, on February 15, 1986, Marcos had himself declared 
the winner with 53.8 percent of the vote. (Shock 2005, 77) The following day, Cory 
Aquino led a rally of approximately two million people, proclaiming victory for herself 
and “the people.” To upend the Marcos regime, Aquino and her supporters called for a 
general strike to start on Marcos’s inauguration day on February 26.  
The beginning of the end of the regime, however, played out when Marcos lost 
the vital support of the military.  Before the planned campaign of civil disobedience by 
Aquino’s followers, Defense Minister Enrile and members of the RAM had planned an 
attack on the Malacañang Palace.  After the coup plot was discovered, Enrile led two 
battalions of soldiers in a mutiny on February 22, 1986, barricading themselves in Camp 
Crame and Aquinlado.  The mutineers were later joined by General Ramos, who 
commanded the loyalty of the police forces securing the capital.  Enrile and Ramos then 
announced their withdrawal of support for President Marcos.  In the late hours of 
February 22, Cardinal Jaime Sin made an appeal over the Catholic station Radio Veritas 
to the people to support the mutineers.  Crowds converged on Epifanio de los Santos 
Avenue (EDSA), the thoroughfare in front of the gates of Camps Crame and Aguinaldo.  
Troops still under the control of pro-Marcos officers responded swiftly to quell the 
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rebellion.  However, once in place, the troops refused to fire on the crowds forming a 
human barrier in front of the camps.  After four days of mass protests, the United States 
formerly pulled its support of the regime and offered Marcos exile in Hawaii.  His flight 
from Clark Air Base unceremoniously ended President Marcos’s reign. 
 
Defend, Defect, or Coup: Decision to Defect 
 
In making the determination to defect from Marcos and support the opposition, 
various factions of the AFP weighed Marcos’s reputation and the opposition’s credibility 
in securing the military’s political property rights, see Figure 10, decision point (1) and 
decision point (3).  Finding the regime no longer a credible partner in a political pact and 
the opposition credible, the majority of the AFP decided to defect from the regime.  The 
abortive coup by officers in the RAM could have led to a drastically different outcome if 
one man, General Ramos, had not defected.29  General Ramos’s game-changing decision 
to defect had a cascading effect inspiring more defections, mass popular support, and the 
end of the regime.  Why did General Ramos, a cousin of Marcos and loyal military man, 




                                               
29 Upon joining the mutiny, Ramos made the public statement urging “the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
and the Integrated National Police to disobey all illegal orders of whoever is giving them. I consider any 
assault on the people, the firing upon unarmed and unprotected civilians as partaking of illegal orders.” 
(Lee 2014, 62-63) 
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Figure 10. AFP Decision Tree 
 
 
Decision point (1): Marcos’s Reputation in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
The first consideration is the dictator’s reputation in fulfilling previous contractual 
obligations. Did the dictator follow-though on the contractual commitment?  Or did the 
dictator cheat the military of previously negotiated political property rights?  As the 
previous discussion revealed, Marcos defaulted on the civil-military bargain established 
during the martial law period.  To curb the opportunism of the AFP, Marcos began 
restructuring the relationship to limit the manager rights of his military men.  What 
mattered most in gaining and maintaining political property rights in the regime was the 
proximity to the first family.  As Thompson (1998) suggested, “the [Marcos] government 
was little more than a ‘protection racket’ run by the first family, their relatives, and their 
friends.” (208) Consequently, the political property rights the military widely received 
during the early onset of martial law were slowly curtailed and redistributed to a smaller 
* Credible political actors own the political property rights in the exchange and are able to commit to 
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subset of loyalists.  While Marcos continued to subvert the military hierarchy to ensure 
its loyalty to him, those benefiting from the “protection racket” became narrower and 
narrower.  The combination of opportunistic coup-proofing and the selective narrowing 
of political property rights to Marcos’s inner circle sullied his reputation and credibility 
in future bargains.   
Marcos’s machinations and lack of commitment were most evident in his 
treatment of his cousin, General Ramos.  If Marcos had kept his promise and followed 
the norms of military appointments, Ramos would have filled the office of Chief of Staff 
in 1981 instead of Ver.  When General Ver was indicted for Ninoy Aquino’s 
assassination in late 1984, Marcos put Ver on extended leave and temporarily appointed 
Ramos acting chief of staff.  As acting chief of staff, Ramos tried to institute reforms, but 
found that General Ver would reverse his orders.  Although on administrative leave, Ver 
held informal authority inside the palace walls.  To add insult to injury, throughout Ver’s 
long trial, Marcos curtailed Ramos’s ambitions by constant reminders of his culpability in 
human rights violations committed under his command.30  In the months leading up to the 
EDSA movement, Enrile and RAM officers had made overtures to General Ramos to join 
their rebellion, but each time he rebuffed their request to join in their plot.  When the 
courts found Ver not guilty in Aquino’s murder in December 1985, Marcos immediately 
reinstated him as chief of staff.  Ramos bitterly stated, “It became clear that there was no 
intention of removing General Ver from his office.” (McCoy 1999, 228-229) By mid-
                                               
30 A commission of inquiry cleared Ramos of any wrongdoing in PC and Civilian Home Defense Forces 
militia massacre of demonstrators in the southern town of Escalante, Negros Occidental, in September 
1985.  Ramos commented, “He [Marcos] kept saying that I could not be assigned as chief of staff because I 
had this case against me.” (McCoy 1999, 228)  
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February 1986, General Ramos, a lifelong Marcos loyalist was ready to break with his 
cousin.  Just days before the EDSA revolution, Ramos went to Malacañang Palace to 
request Marcos clarify his status within the regime—Marcos had originally announced 
Ramos’s appointment as chief of staff, then waffled, and finally withdrew the promotion.  
Ramos left the palace exasperated and disillusioned, doubting he had any future in the 
regime as Ver’s subordinate.  When Enrile phoned Ramos on February 22, 1986, the first 
day of the revolt, entreating him to join the mutiny, Ramos replied, “I am with you all the 
way.” (McCoy 1999, 243) Ramos had concluded Marcos would never uphold his end of 
the bargain. 
 
Decision point (3): Opposition’s Credibility in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
Finding that Marcos’s regime had not upheld previous bargains, the military next 
considered the credibility of the opposition, decision point (3).  First and foremost, does 
the opposition own the political property rights in the exchange?  Although Marcos 
encountered some resistance, most political rivals were largely silenced and opposition 
political parties were in disarray.  The martial law period made moderate opposition 
forces impotent, as most opposition leaders were imprisoned, in exile, or co-opted. 
(McCoy 1999; Thompson 1998; Snyder 1998; Shock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011) Over time, disillusionment with Marcos’s rule had produced division between 
those who had benefited from Marcos’s rule and those who had not.  Consequently, elite 
cleavages had emerged between Marcos’s cronies and the traditional elite.  With the 
assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983, the opposition was finally coalesced and spurred 
into action.  For example, an estimated two million people from all socioeconomic 
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classes showed up to witness Aquino’s funeral procession. (Schock 2005, 73) As an 
aftermath of Aquino’s assassination, the anti-Marcos opponents redoubled their efforts to 
mobilize.  The middle class, the business class, and traditional politicians were finally 
beginning to oppose Marcos overtly. (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) A 
wave of antigovernment protests ensued in the following months destabilizing the 
Marcos regime.  Concerned with political stability, the U.S. government pressured 
Marcos to call early elections. Bending to American pressure, Marcos called for snap 
presidential elections for February 1986. The moderate opposition, to include the 
traditional elites, responded by rallying behind Aquino’s widow, Cory Aquino, to run 
against Marcos’s patronage machine.  On election day, Marcos responded to the popular 
support for Cory Aquino by engaging in massive electoral fraud.  In contravention of the 
popular will of the people, Marcos had himself declared the winner.  Not permitting 
Marcos to steal the election, the Aquino camp mobilized her millions of supporters to 
launch a civil disobedience campaign.  Bolstering the credibility and legitimacy of 
Aquino’s presidency were two influential supporters, the Catholic Church and the United 
States government. 
With more than 85 percent of the Filipino population fillings its pews, the 
Catholic Church played a crucial role in the People Power campaign. (Lee 2014, 93) The 
Church clergy opposed martial law denouncing the regime’s use of torture and other 
human rights abuses.  Because the Marcos regime had decimated or subverted the formal 
and informal institutions of power, the only institution that had maintained its 
independence and coherence during his dictatorship was the Church.  Consequently, the 
Church became an important channel for the political opposition.  For instance, frequent 
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denial of government permits for assembly led many in the opposition to hold their 
protests in churches.  An important figure in the Church hierarchy, Archbishop Cardinal 
Jaime Sin, played a pivotal role in promoting the convergence of members of the 
reformist opposition and their contact with anti-Marcos military officers. (McCoy 1999; 
Schock 2005; Lee 2011) On Jan 19, 1986, Sin issued a pastoral letter calling on the 
population to vote for candidates who were “honest and respected human rights.” 
(Schock 2005, 77) The Church also urged Catholic voters to “combat the conspiracy that 
threatened to thwart the peoples’ will during the election.” (Schock 2005, 77)   
From the inception of Marcos’s presidency, the American government had been a 
strong supporter of the regime.  Entangled in the Vietnam War, Washington viewed 
Marcos as a reliable partner in the fight against communist extremism.  Following the 
declaration of martial law, Marcos reassured Washington it could keep the two strategic 
American military installations in the Philippines (Clark Air Base and Subic Naval 
Station). Accepting Marcos’s argument that “emergency rule” was necessary to defeat the 
communist threat and achieve political stability, Washington turned a blind-eye to 
Marcos’s naked power-grab and increased its assistance to the regime. (Thompson 1998, 
224) In the first four years of martial law, the Washington doubled military aid to $45 
million annually, providing ample resources for the expanded military mission. (McCoy 
1999, 192) After 1983, Washington policy makers began to question their continued 
support of Marcos’s dictatorship.  Marcos’s failing health, the Aquino assassination, 
rising public resentment, divisions within the AFP, and the growing communist 
insurgency,31 raised warning flags for the Reagan administration regarding the viability 
                                               
31 Notably, the communists’ rural-based insurgency grew from several hundred troops before martial law to 
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of the Marcos regime.  Washington strategists determined the most likely beneficiaries of 
the popular discontent would be the communist extremists.  Changing policy, 
Washington began pressuring Marcos to hold fairer elections. (Thompson 1998, 228) 
After Marcos’s fraudulent election triggered a popular revolt, the United States found it 
had only one option—to withdraw its support of Marcos and back the “moderate” Aquino 
coalition.  According to Snyder (1998),  
the Aquino coalition was a viable successor to Marcos because of its 
organizational coherence and broad popular support. The presence of an 
acceptable and viable civilian alternative enabled the United States to influence 
the transition in the Philippines by using it leverage over Marcos to usher him out 
of power and to ease in the moderates.” (76)  
 
Action point (4):  Defect  
As Enrile deduced years early, Ramos finally came to the realization Marcos 
would never uphold his end of the bargain.  Marcos was a cheater and the AFP would be 
better off breaking from the regime.  Furthermore, with an electoral mandate, the moral 
support of the Catholic Church, and the backing of the United States, Cory Aquino could 
legitimately form a government once the crisis ended.  Moreover, just as Washington had 
assessed, the military determine the “moderate” Aquino coalition would be an 
“ideologically” reliable partner in fighting extremists.  Thus, Enrile and Ramos 
concluded that the opposition could credibly commit to a political bargain and guarantee 
the military’s political property rights.  The two men decided to defect from Marcos and 
support the new Aquino government bringing the majority of the AFP with them.  By the 
end of the EDSA movement, nearly 90 percent of the AFP had defected and joined the 
                                               
eight thousand soldiers by 1980, reaching twenty thousand strong by 1983. (Thompson 1998, 227) 
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mutineers, no doubt, because of the example General Ramos had set. (Lee 2014, 66) 
 
Exiting the Cycle of Repression  
 
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon “Cory” Aquino took the oath of office 
at Club Filipino and in her first official act, appointed Ramos chief of staff of the AFP 
and Enrile minister of defense.  When asked why she appointed Enrile, she replied that 
“there was no one in the opposition who would have been accepted and respected by the 
military.  Also, I wanted to show my gratitude.” (McCoy 1999, 254)  Held up in Camp 
Crame, protected by a layer of Aquino supporters, his strategic disadvantage forced 
Enrile to reassess his plans for a junta and acknowledge Aquino as the revolution’s 
“moral leader.” (McCoy 1999, 254) With Marcos effectively removed, Enrile and Ramos 
began brokering a deal with Aquino’s advisors over the division power.  One point of 
contention during the negotiation was the location of Aquino’s inauguration—both Enrile 
and Ramos were insistent on having the swearing in ceremony at Camp Crame.  Aquino 
held firm, “No way am I going to be installed in a military camp for my proclamation 
because that would just give everyone the wrong impression…to be sponsored into office 
by a military coup.” (McCoy 1999, 254) Instead, she insisted on taking the oath at Club 
Filipino, the historic home of party politics, to symbolize the mandate she had won in the 
election. (McCoy 1999, 254) Despite the symbolism of her inauguration, Aquino’s 
coronation was due in part to the military backing she had received from Enrile and 
Ramos.  Without their endorsement, her presidency would have struggled to survive.  
While Aquino needed military support, the military defectors were equally beholden to 
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Aquino and her civilian followers to legitimate their mutiny.  Entering an alliance with 
Aquino was the mutineers’ best option, at least temporarily. (Snyder 1998, 76-77) 
Entering an uncomfortable pact, these political rivals formed an administration with 
contradictory goals for the fledgling democracy. 
Although the People Power Movement ended Marcos’s dictatorship, Cory 
Aquino’s presidency did not mollify the dangerous divisions and armed factions created 
by her predecessor.  She had to simultaneously confront, reverse, and prevent the effects 
repression.  This meant, paradoxically, controlling an institution she was indebted to for 
propelling her into political office.  Challenging civil-military relations, President Aquino 
took office determined to restrain a military that had grown unruly during Marcos’s 
dictatorship.  Aquino moved to aggressively pursue transitional justice in her first months 
appointing several human-rights lawyers to her cabinet and appeared resolute to the issue.  
She established the Committee on Human Rights, signed the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture, abolished Marcos’s martial law decrees, and drafted a new constitution.  
The Human Rights committee began documenting thousands of past violations and filed 
hundreds of cases, largely against serving military officers. (McCoy 1999, 261).  
After years of large military budgets, unaccountability, and impunity, many in the 
military resented Aquino’s civilian administration.  The Aquino government survived 
seven coup attempts in a three-year period, some by the members of RAM.  According to 
a Fact-Finding Commission tasked to investigate the December 1989 coup, military 
dissatisfaction stemmed from several factors.  (Hernandez and Ubarra 1999, 12-13) Some 
were internal to military operations such as inadequate pay and benefits, favoritism in 
promotions and assignments, and discriminatory treatment in the case of Marcos 
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loyalists.  Some grievances, however, stemmed from the military’s overall impression of 
the “civilian” administration’s lenient strategy in solving the communist insurgency 
problem and the unequal treatment of human rights violations among soldiers.  
(Hernandez and Ubarra 1999, 12-13) One military analyst argued that the coups against 
Aquino were caused, ultimately, by a Human Rights Commission that “only concerned 
itself with…violations by soldiers.” (McCoy 1999, 261) Arguably, the unrelenting series 
of coup attempts were a coercive means to renegotiate the political bargain as some 
military factions did not like the initial terms of the deal.32  One political concession the 
military establishment greatly desired was impunity—they wanted their human rights 
violations under the Marcos regime to go unpunished.  Plagued by multiple military 
coups attempts, Aquino’s government conceded and abandoned any attempt to prosecute 
the military for past crimes of torture and murder.  Subsequent administrations 
transformed this impunity from de facto to de jure status both legally and symbolically 
absolving the military of crimes committed under the Marcos dictatorship.  
 In conjunction with the challenges of transitional justice, President Aquino faced 
the monumental task of rebuilding democratic institutions that were either destroyed or 
weakened by Marcos.  Drafting a new constitution was essential to laying a democratic 
foundation for state-building.  She appointed a Constitutional Commission of 50 
distinguished citizens to draft a new constitution that would be ratified through a national 
plebiscite.  The 1987 constitution codified the norms of democratic governance: 
affirming the Bill of Rights, setting limits on emergency powers of the president, 
                                               
32 There is evidence that the plots by RAM against the Aquino government were supported by leading 
opposition politicians, particularly Enrile.  (McCoy 1999; Hernandez and Ubarra 1999) 
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prohibiting political dynasties by setting term limits, and reasserting civilian supremacy 
over the military.  On February 2, 1987, an overwhelming 90 percent of the voting 
population participated in the nationwide plebiscite, 76.30 percent voted to ratify the 
Constitution. (Hernandez and Ubarra 1999, 8) According to Hernandez and Ubarra 
(1999), the plebiscite became a referendum on the Aquino presidency—”A vote for the 
constitution was a vote for Cory.” (8) Up until the plebiscite, Aquino’s assumption to 
power had been highly contested by Marcos loyalists and rogue military factions that had 
been sidelined after the EDSA movement.  Consequently, the overwhelming vote to 
ratify the Constitution was a legitimizing function for the Aquino presidency.   
Several provisions in the 1987 constitutions directly addressed the reassertion of 
civilian supremacy over the military—these new rules would clarify both owner and 
manager rights.   In clarifying owner rights the constitution created explicit rules for the 
presidency.  First, it prohibited the formation of political dynasties by setting rules on 
term limits and reelection.  The presidency would be limited to one six-year term.  In 
short, owner rights would pass to another civilian authority after one term.  This norm 
would constrain the president from transforming a national army into a personal army 
since the military would not be invested in a single person to secure its political property 
rights.  Additionally, the constitution set limits on the president’s emergency powers.  
Specifically, the emergency provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution 
which ensured the president cannot declare martial law and suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus without checks and balances from the Congress and Supreme Court. (Hernandez 
1988, 155) The addition of legislative and judicial participation in determining the 
emergency would be a major safeguard against abuse of presidential powers since no 
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single institution could unilaterally suspend civil and political rights.  The upshot, unlike 
1972, the commander-in-chief would find it difficult to collude with military elites to 
monopolize political authority. 
Next, the new constitution clarified the military’s roles and responsibilities—these 
measures were attended to assert civilian owner rights and over the AFP. These new 
provisions bifurcated owner and manager roles by creating a constitutional barrier for 
military elites to participate in non-defense matters which properly belonged in the 
civilian sphere.  These constitutional provisions included prohibiting military 
participation in politics (with the exception of voting) and barring active duty officers 
from serving in a civilian position in government. (Hernandez 1988, 156) Next, the new 
constitution reaffirmed the role of the AFP in securing the sovereignty of the national 
territory and shifted the responsibility of domestic security to a civilian agency.  
Specifically, Article XVI, Section 6 separated the police and constabulary forces from the 
AFP and placed them under the control of the department of interior and local 
governments. (Hernandez 1988, 156) This also had the salubrious effect of diffusing 
owner rights, or political authority over the country’s various police forces—in essence 
balancing forces between the military and civilian sectors.  Finally, codifying the rules 




During his tenure, Marcos initiated a cycle of repression that would transform a 
constitutional-controlled army into a patron army.  After coming to power in 1965, 
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Marcos had little intention of giving up office.  His initial acts as president were to install 
his own men into key positions in the AFP, creating a “parallel command” of loyalist.  
President Marcos involved the military in every aspect of authoritarian rule—censorship, 
repression, and governance.  After serving his first term, Marcos expanded his power by 
declaring a state of martial law in 1972.  Backed by his generals, Marcos wiped out local 
armies, closed congress, and confiscated corporations.  His military loyalist became 
corporate managers, civil servants, local officials, and judges.  While martial law 
bolstered Marcos’ presidency—it also sowed the seeds of his eventual demise—giving 
the military establishment new found powers and ownership.  Realizing his vulnerability, 
Marcos began to undercut the military’s political property rights to check the power and 
independence of the military.  He actively created rivalries among his top generals and 
publicly chastened officers that were a threat.  These actions created a dangerous split 
among the officer corps.  Military officers that perceived they were next to be purged 
were more willing to risk “rocking the boat” and attempt a coup d’état. These factions 
found willing supporters, benefactors, and allies in their coup plots.  This is the situation 
Marcos found himself in 1986 when the People Power Movement left his regime 
vulnerable to opposition political forces, mass military defection, and his removal from 
office.  The demise of Marcos’s regime was due to the confluence of several factors—the 
coalescing of the traditional elites behind Cory Aquino’s candidacy, the Catholic 
Church’s ability to mobilize its flock against the regime, the American government’s loss 
of confidence in the regime, and finally the defection of the AFP.   
The administration of repression had a profound impact upon the military—
inserting it into every aspect of Philippine life.  Before the cycle of repression, the 
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military was not considered a significant power broker in Filipino politics. After gaining 
unrestrained political authority, checked only by the mercurial favoritism of Marcos, the 
officer corps attained their membership among the political elite.  The legacy of Marco’s 
cycle of repression continued to shape democratic politics during the transition and 
beyond.  Aquino’s fledgling administration faced several coups attempts from disgruntled 
military soldiers, ultimately, impacting her policy agenda.  Moreover, General Fidel 
Ramos became President Aquino’s successor signifying the ascent of the military elite 
into politics.  As president, Ramos appointed five retired officers to his cabinet and a 
hundred more to senior positions in his government.  According to McCoy (1999), “many 
had been implicated in Marcos-era repression, and their influence over time, reversed 
Aquino’s commitment to human rights and redress for the victims.” (301)   
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CHAPTER 5 
ENTREPRENEUR ARMY: SUKARNO AND THE INDONESIAN ARMY  
 
Entrepreneur Army (Military Superiority) 
 
In some authoritarian systems, neither civilian leaders or military elites have a 
clear monopoly of power or owner political property rights—that is political authority is 
heavily contested.  Contributing to political uncertainty there are influential segments 
within society such as business and landed elites, as well as politically salient identity 
groups (ethnic or religious) that are contesting, sometimes violently, political property 
rights.  In political environments that are deeply polarized, co-optation via party or 
patronage systems may be difficult to employ or ineffective.  Consequently, the dictator 
must rely on repression to maintain hold of political authority tipping the bargaining 
scales toward the military.  Svolik (2012) noted “Regimes that frequently face mass, 
organized, and violent opposition must integrate their militaries within their repressive 
apparatus by granting them corresponding material and institutional resources.” (125) 
Due in part to the internal threat environment and other historical junctures, the armed 
forces have gained a large share of ownership, and thereby, have a strong bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the civilian political leader.  Overreliance on the military leads to the 
military establishment expecting an unequal share of ownership of the political property 
rights.  Eventually the civil-military arrangement transitions to an entrepreneur army.  
Like other political entrepreneurs (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011, 552), the military 
designs civil-military institutional arrangements to exploit opportunities to profit from the 
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political system.  Extending this definition, an entrepreneur army seeks to exercises 
control and ownership of the governance rents of the state through civilian 
intermediaries. 
 
Figure 11. Entrepreneur Army Type 
 
 
The hierarchy between ruler and army is contingent upon maintaining the 
asymmetric relationship.  The hierarchical order becomes compromised when actors in 
the relationship are no longer mutually dependent and contractual enforcement 
breakdowns.  As a result of the breakdown, the master-servant paradigm can become 
inverted, in such cases, the military has the position of privilege and becomes the master.  
The subordination of the military to civilian authorities is near impossible with 
entrepreneur army institutional arrangements.  The military elite have secured their 
manager rights controlling all aspects of military affairs from budget, promotions, 
appointments, and military indoctrination.  Additionally, they have gained a 
preponderance of owner rights.  The upshot, they have an inordinate amount of input over 
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administrative aspects of the state beyond the purview of the military.  Consequently, 
civilian authorities have minimal say in security activities and rely on military support or 
acquiescence to govern the state. This creates a situation in which civilian preferences are 
subordinate to the preferences of the military establishment—there is military superiority. 
Several scholars have observed civil-military relationships in which militaries 
influence politics or govern from behind the scenes— Perlmutter’s (1969) “arbitrator 
army,” and Cook’s (2007) “military-dominated state.” In other words, they present a 
façade of civilian governance while often governing from out of sight from the public.  
Perlmutter’s (1969) “arbitrator-type army” rule in cooperation with civilians.  If the 
arbitrator army rules, it is temporary and arranges to handover the government to an 
“acceptable” civilian regime.  Moreover, “the arbitrator-type army does not necessarily 
relinquish its political influence when it returns to the barracks; in fact, in many cases, it 
acts as guardian of civilian authority and political stability.” (Perlmutter 1969, 393) 
Similarly, as Cook (2007) explained in his examination of several military-dominated 
states such as Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria.  These militaries are “ruling but not 
governing,” intending to insulate themselves from the vicissitudes of governance.  As 
underscored by the thoughts of Algerian commanders: 
This was not merely a matter of preference, as the officer corps devoted its 
energies to developing a modern, professional fighting force, but a matter of 
survival.  Exposure to the vicissitudes of politics, the Algerian commanders 
believed, would unnecessarily jeopardize their coherence—a crucial component 
of their power.  As long as the public face of the government was not specifically 
that of the military, opposition would be directed toward other political actors, 
notably the FLN [National Liberation Front].  The benefit of Algeria’s political 
façade is thus obvious: the officers need not govern, though they retain their 
position as society’s undisputed power brokers. (Cook 2007, 42) 
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Although these militaries relinquished everyday governance to civilian leaders, they 
remained military-dominated states.  These generals were content to return to the 
barracks because they oversaw a system that ensured the predominance of the military 
establishment.  As such, the institutional arrangements would allow the military elite to 
share ownership with civilian authorities, as an entrepreneur army.  “Institutions are not 
necessarily designed for efficiency, but rather to preserve the power, prestige, privileges, 
and importantly distributional advantage of the dominant elite and its allies at the expense 
of society.” (Cook 2007, 6) Thus, the institutional framework preserved the military’s 
core interests regarding the economy, security policy, state apparatus, and nationalism. 
Cook concluded establishing effective civilian control is much more than a “return to the 
barracks” if the military remains the nexus of state power.  These deliberate civil-military 
designs are not limited to states in the Middle East.  O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also 
noted that the authoritarian transitions in Latin American involved negotiated pacts 
between political and military elites to return the military to the barracks.  Others also 
recognized the tremendous political influence Latin American militaries retained during 
and after authoritarian transitions which subsequently impacted democratic consolidation. 
(Pion-Berlin 2001; Trinkunas 2001)   
 
The Sukarno Regime and the Indonesian Army 
 
Over its history, the Indonesian military has gone by two names—Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI) and later Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) to 
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reflect the integration of the national police force.33  To avoid confusion, neither acronym 
will be used in this study.  Since the formation of the Indonesian armed forces in 1945 
during the revolution against Dutch rule, it has been oriented towards political 
participation.  According to Crouch (1978), the military withdrew to the barracks briefing 
following the revolution but reappeared on the political stage when military officers 
became an important partner in President Sukarno’s Guided Democracy government. 
(161) According to military mythology, the Indonesia armed forces was not just another 
institution of the nation—it was responsible for the nation’s creation. From the 
revolutionary period onward, the military conceived of itself as the “people’s army.” 
(Crouch 1978, Honna 1999, Mietzner 2009, Croissant and Kuehn 2009) During the 
revolutionary period, unlike their civilian counterparts, the military had not compromised 
in the fight against Dutch colonial forces winning Indonesia’s independence.  This 
mythology has supported the military’s entitlement to participate in government and an 
inherent disdain for civilian politicians. (Mietzner 2009, 37-38) This prerogative became 
doctrine with the concept of the “Middle Way,” formulated by General Nasution, the 
army chief of staff.  Blurring the distinction between military and political functions, 
according to the “Middle Way” the military would “neither seek to take over the 
government nor remain politically inactive.” (Crouch 1978, 24) 
After officially gaining independence in 1949, the nascent Indonesian democracy 
struggled to govern one of the most socially diverse countries in the world.   Reflecting 
                                               
33 In June 1947, the Indonesian Armed Forces was officially name Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
National Armed Forces), or TNI.  It was renamed Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Republic of 
Indonesia Armed Forces), or ABRI, in June 1962 when the Indonesian National Police was integrated 
organizationally under the Armed Forces.  After Suharto’s New Order regime fell, the Indonesian National 
Police was separated from the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces reverted back to TNI. 
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this diversity, four major political and social organizations emerged from Dutch rule—the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and two 
Islamic organizations——the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Masyumi with 
memberships in the millions.  Moreover, Japan’s wartime occupation and the subsequent 
war for independence against the Dutch brought a fifth critical player—the Indonesian 
national armed forces.  Following independence, a parliamentary system of government 
was put into practice with the Provisional Constitution of 1950.  However, a proliferation 
of political parties challenged the functioning of the parliamentary system with civilian 
politicians unable to broker stable coalition governments which was evident by the rapid 
turnover with 17 cabinets forming between 1945-1958.  The inability of coalition 
governments to overcome party differences led to widespread disillusionment with 
democracy, to include figurehead president, Sukarno.  An important critic of democratic 
politics was the Indonesian military which worried divisive party politics would destroy 
the new nation it had just fought to create.  In order to deal with national challenges, such 
as regional rebellions, Sukarno in partnership with the Indonesian military disbanded the 
parliamentary system, introduced “Guided Democracy,” and established martial law in 
1957.   
 
Entrepreneur Army Institutional Arrangements 
  Sukarno’s dictatorship was due in part to his partnership with the Indonesian 
military.  The political instability of the liberal period (1945-1957) convinced the two 
political actors that forming a partnership was the best assurance against political 
uncertainty and protecting their political property rights.  This partnership or pact began a 
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cycle of repression in which the military eventually gained the upper hand in bargaining 
power.  After forming their alliance, the civil-military institutional arrangement fell 
within the entrepreneur army type as the military held substantial owner rights.  
Additionally, the guarantee of those rights was violently contested by other actors and 
enforced through military repression. 
 
Figure 12. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements 
 
Horizontal Dimension.  This dimension measures the degree political property 
rights will be secured ex post and consists of two components:  1) the level of 
contestation of political property rights, and 2) the level of credible commitment to the 
agreement by the actors in the exchange.  
 Firstly, political authority and the attached political property rights were highly 
contested in the newly independent Indonesia.  Emerging from Dutch rule, there were 
five major political and social organizations that jockeyed for power during the liberal 
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period (1949-1957).  Elections under the parliamentary system produced four major 
parties—two secular and two Islamic parties—garnering relatively equal support.  The 
structure of society, electoral rules, combined with the parliamentary system yielded a 
string of shaky coalition governments.  Above this unstable arrangement sat President 
Sukarno who was relegated to a figurehead status under the 1950 Parliamentary 
constitution.  Fearing parliamentary (party) politics would tear the new republic apart, 
Sukarno and the military brokered a deal to dispense with democratic politics and govern 
together.  The partnership only served to artificially suppress the contestation of political 
authority as it did not eliminate the highly polarized structure of Indonesian society. 
Next, Sukarno and his military partners did not credibly guarantee political 
property rights or follow through on their pact since the partnership was not reinforced by 
credible commitments or mutually binding enforcement.  Neither actor invested 
completely in the longevity of the relationship.  On one hand, unsure about the long-term 
viability of the Sukarno relationship, the military sought to limit its dependency on 
Sukarno by increasing its sphere of autonomy.  On the other hand, Sukarno was always 
aware he was vulnerable to a threat of a military takeover.  Consequently, he sought to 
balance the power of the military by elevating another political actor—the communist 
party.  The act of counterbalancing would infringe upon the political property rights of 
the military and the political pact.  Beginning a precarious period of political balancing in 
1960, Sukarno invited the PKI back into government as a counterweight to the military.  
Vertical dimension.  This dimension delineates the institutional arrangements, or 
agreed upon political property rights, negotiated by the regime and the armed forces over 
time.  Negotiated political property rights consist of two types of political property rights: 
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1) owner rights and 2) manager rights.   
Firstly, the pact with Sukarno formed a co-equal partnership with the military.  
However, over time the military would amass the preponderance of owner rights.  With 
this partnership, the military had political authority in various aspects of governance—
administration, policy, and economics. (Crouch 1978; Mietzner 2009, 2011; Croissant 
and Kuehn 2009) The partnership began in full earnest when General Nasution, the army 
chief staff, advised Sukarno to declare martial law in March 1957.  Consequently, 
military commanders obtained extra-constitutional powers and many officers held 
leadership positions of local administrations, particularly in West Java and the Outer 
Islands.  Additionally, as members of the National Council chartered in May 1957, the 
Indonesian military actively participated in finding a new format for the post-democratic 
regime.  Contributing to the military’s owner rights, the military was also given direct 
access to the economic resources of the state.  For example, in December 1957, Nasution 
commandeered control over a large number of Dutch businesses that had been occupied 
by protesting workers. (Mietzner 2009, 47-48) Accepted as the new norm, the military’s 
assumption of civilian powers and participation in policy making did not end with the 
lifting of martial law.   
Secondly, as head of state and government, Sukarno had limited authority over 
the military.  Because of the organizational structure and financial autonomy of the 
military, he was unable to relegate the military elite’s political authority to only manager 
rights, or establish owner rights over the military hierarchy.  During the revolutionary 
period, the military’s leadership put in place a decentralized territorial command system.  
Because of Indonesia’s geography, financial condition, and insufficient modern 
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equipment, the Indonesian military relied on a network of micro-units with roots in the 
local population.  These micro-units were placed alongside the hierarchy of the civilian 
administrations, so that every military command had a civilian counterpart. (Mietzner 
2009, 2011; Croissant and Kuehn 2009) The most crucial aspect of the territorial 
command system, was the principle of self-financing.  Although the government was 
supposed to provide the armed forces with a regular defense budget, the limited 
availability of state monies and the ongoing political conflicts with the party elites 
convinced the armed forces to continue with their own fundraising efforts.  Mietzner 
(2009) noted the unintended effect of insufficient state funding, drove regional 
commanders into “sensitive areas of smuggling, rent-seeking, extortion, and business 
alliances with local entrepreneurs.” (48) The military’s decentralized organizational 
structure and off-budget funding made it difficult for President Sukarno and even the 
military’s top echelon to control these autonomous units.   
 
Entering the Cycle of Repression  
 
After the declaration of independence in August 1945, the great majority of 
Indonesian political leaders were outwardly dedicated to the creation of a parliamentary 
democracy; however, the struggle over ideology would prove to be divisive.  Various 
groups fought over the ideological foundations of the new nation—divided by ethnicity, 
region, and faith—the larger debate fell between secular nationalism and Islam. Despite 
the fact that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians profess Islam as their faith, 
Indonesia is a nation of Muslims divided in their understanding of what it means to be an 
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adherent of the faith.34  Devout adherents of the faith wanted to declare Islam the basis of 
the new republic.  Nominal Muslims, however, preferred the new nation remain secular.  
Four major parties formed around this division:  two mass secular political parties—the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) – and two 
Islamic parties—the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Masyumi. Sukarno, the founding 
member of the PNI, sought a compromise, introducing the ideology of Pancasila as an 
alternative to an Islamic state.35  In June 1, 1945, speech “Birth of Pancasila,” Sukarno 
advocated a state that would appeal to all Indonesians, regardless of their religion 
ethnicity or regional origins. (Ramage 1995, 2) Pancasila entailed “a vague statement of 
five principles encompassing religiosity, nationalism, humanism, consensus, and social 
justice.” (Slater 2010, 142)   
The debate whether Indonesia should become an Islamic state or remain a secular 
state with freedom of religion produced a polarization of attitudes.  Elections during the 
parliamentary era (1949-1957) saw the four major parties gain relative equal support, 
yielding a rapid succession of coalition governments preventing a resolution of the 
problem.  By the late 1950s, Sukarno and the secular nationalists found it increasingly 
more difficult to dampen the highly divisive and mobilized social forces confronting the 
                                               
34 Indonesians are divided into several major aliran (literally “streams”).  “The most important distinctions 
in aliran are santri and abangan.  Santri refers to devout adherents of Islam, closely attuned to daily 
spiritual and social behavior based on diligent reading of the Quran.  Abangan are nominal Muslims, 
primarily rural Javanese, for whom Islam is the latest, symbolic overlay on pre-existing Hindu, Buddhist, 
and Javanese religious beliefs.  In terms of political affiliation, santri tended to follow either of the leading 
Muslim political parties, Masyumi or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), while abangan generally identified with the 
Nationalist Party (PNI) or the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).” (Ramage 1995, 16) 
 
35 In 1953, Sukarno candidly voiced his fears of the negative implication for national unity if Muslim 
Indonesians pressed their demand for an Islamic state, for constitutional or other legal provisions formally 
recognizing Islam by the state. (Ramage 1995, 17) 
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central government.  Challenging the fragile parliamentary system, Pancasila no longer 
represented a compromise for adherents of the faith but served as an ideological tool to 
delegitimize their demands for state recognition of Islam. (Ramage 1995, 17) The 
fragility of democracy was further exacerbated by regional rebellions and revolts 
supported by Islamic groups.  The inability of coalition governments to overcome party 
differences in order to deal with regional rebellions and other challenges had led to 
widespread disillusionment with democracy.  Amongst this unstable political 
arrangement stood Indonesia’s fifth main political player, the Indonesian armed forces.  
As various groups were no longer willing or able to compromise, the “people’s army” 
intervened to keep the new nation intact. 
Darul Islam and PRRI-Permesta Rebellion were the two most serious revolts and 
regional uprisings.  First, Darul Islam was a series of Islamic-inspired armed uprisings 
between 1948 and 1962 in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh, which embodied the 
danger of the “Islamic threat” to the central government. (Ramage 1995, 17) Next, in 
1957 and 1958, a series of territorial rebellions led by regional military commanders from 
Outer Islands sponsored by politicians in the Masyumi Party, one of the standard-bearers 
of doctrinaire Islam, presented the gravest challenge to the new nation.  The factional 
military commanders declared themselves the Revolutionary Government of the Republic 
of Indonesian (PRRI).  The PRRI-Permesta Rebellions ultimately gave Sukarno a pretext 
for dispensing parliamentary politics and declaring martial law in 1957.  (Crouch 1978; 
Mietzner 2009) With the active encouragement and partnership of the military’s top 
brass, Sukarno’s initiated the era of “Guided Democracy,” a euphemism for a presidential 
form of limited dictatorship.   
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After declaring martial law, Sukarno moved to consolidated his authority and 
assumed his previous presidential powers.  With the 1955 Constitution establishing a 
parliamentary system, Sukarno found himself relegated to a figurehead position. (Slater 
2010) He came to resent his lack of political authority and inability to break the gridlock 
of democratic politics.  Once the PRRI-Permesta was quelled and he successfully 
nationalized Dutch companies that had dominated the Indonesian economy, Sukarno 
found himself in a position to seize full executive power.  In 1959, Sukarno returned 
Indonesia to its presidentialist 1945 Constitution believing it would make it easier to 
implement the principles of Guided Democracy. (Slater 2010) After the reversion, he 
replaced the elected parliament with a fully appointed one and indefinitely postponed 
general elections.  Next, he turned his attention to solving the threat of troublesome 
parties by outlawing several parties, including Masyumi and the Socialist Party (PSI). 
(Hindley 1967, 241) Further enervating the party system, Sukarno replaced parties with a 
set of government-linked “functional groups” or golkar (golongan karya) to represent 
economic and social groups such as workers, farmers, teachers, civil servants, and 
soldiers.  Indicative of the military’s elevated position in Indonesian politics during 
Guided Democracy, military officers were recognized as a functional group and given 42 
seats in the appointed Consultative Assembly the same year.  (Federspiel 1973, 407) 
With these measures in place during Guided Democracy, only two political actors 
wielded significant institutional power—President Sukarno and the army leadership (the 
army was the dominant branch of the armed forces and it leaders filled the highest 
political posts).  Later, the Communist Party would emerge as the army’s only rival. 
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The revolts and rebellions gave General Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Army, a 
golden opportunity to purge rebellious factions within the army ranks and assert the 
military’s political interests. The defeat of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion, not only 
increased the army’s prestige, it also eliminated much of the regional insubordination 
allowing Nasution and other senior leaders to consolidate control over the entire armed 
forces. (Hindley 1967, 243) The military had previously been too fragmented to enter 
politics as a coherent actor.  Successful military operations against threats to the state had 
a profound effect on the military’s entitlement to political power, i.e. a share of owner 
rights.  According to Crouch (1978), by proving its indispensability in the national crisis, 
the army leadership bolstered its claim to a more permanent role in the government:   
The army’s political role came initially from its martial law powers, but soon 
officers were given substantial representation in the formal institutions of 
government, such as in cabinet and parliament, and were appointed as provisional 
governors and other regional officials. (34)   
 
In November 1958, Nasution finalized the concept of the “Middle Way,” which blurred 
the distinction between military and political functions, offering the armed forces a 
doctrine to normalize power sharing with Sukarno’s civilian government. (Crouch 1978; 
Mietzner 2009) As a result of the co-ownership with Sukarno, the military gained 
political authority in various aspects of governance—participating in national policy 
development, overseeing local administration, and managing business enterprises. 
While martial law was in force from 1957 to 1963, the military operated the State 
of Emergency Administration. (Federspiel 1973, 407) During this period, the Indonesian 
armed forces obtained extra-constitutional powers—many officers assumed civilian 
leadership positions at the local level, particularly in West Java and the Outer Islands.  
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Moreover, the officer corps filled administrative positions throughout the governmental 
hierarchy, thereby, giving the military another means of influencing the government and 
the political system.  A remnant of the revolutionary period and subsequently expanded 
during the martial law period, Indonesia’s military maintained a vast network of 
territorial units that reached from the center to the village level forming the basis of its 
power.  (Mietzner 2011, 274) This territorial system allowed the armed forces, 
specifically the army, to control civilian administration at the regional and local level.  
More importantly, the ability to raise off-budget funds with the support of regional 
enterprises and local entrepreneurs reinforced the army’s autonomy. (Mietzner 2011, 
274) This financial autonomy from the central government made it difficult for Sukarno 
to establish bilateral dependency with the army.  While Sukarno depended on military 
repression, the military did not equally depend on Sukarno for sustainment.  
Consequently, self-funded commanders had little reason to concede control to the civilian 
government.  Even after the repeal of martial law, the territorial army commands 
frequently retained control of political life in many areas.  The upshot, the army’s 
assumption of political authority, owner rights, did not end with the lifting of martial law.   
The ascendancy of the armed forces to direct political rule led to growing tension 
between Sukarno and the military elite, specifically the army leadership.  Acquiring 
significant owner rights while reinforcing its manager rights, the central army command 
of the mid-1960s became far stronger than a decade earlier.  With “Islamic” groups 
silenced, the ambitions of the army’s top brass became the chief political threat to 
Sukarno’s legacy.  Unable to limit the military’s autonomy or make significant changes 
to the armed forces organizational structure, Sukarno pursued a counterbalancing 
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strategy.  Counterbalancing is a coup-proofing tactic employed by leaders to proliferate 
rivalrous units within the military and security sector to prevent coups. (Belkin and 
Schofer 2003; Powell 2012; Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; Brooks 2019) Expanding upon 
this definition, counterbalancing also includes the creation or strengthening of competing 
civilian institutions to provide checks and balances to existing institutions.  Beginning a 
precarious period of political maneuvering, Sukarno invited the PKI back into the 
government in 1960, as a counterweight to the military.  According to Brand (1989), the 
CIA characterized Sukarno’s relationship with the communists as one of mutual 
exploitation: “Sukarno needed the PKI because he lacked a mass political organization of 
his own; the PKI relied on Sukarno for protection against the army.” (792)   
With an estimated three million members prior to the 1965, the leaders of the PKI 
controlled the largest communist organization in any non-communist state.  (Hindley 
1967, 237) The fountain of the PKI’s political power was its ability to marshal a vast 
network of mass organizations claiming 15 million members comprising specific 
segments of society such as workers, peasants, youth, women, students, university 
teachers, and village officials. (Hindley 1967, 237) One of the most serious points of 
contention among the army brass was the PKI’s desire to establish a “fifth force” of 
armed peasants and workers.36  Sukarno approved the PKI’s request to form the “fifth 
force,” which, if implemented, would have gravely weakened the army’s position relative 
to the Communists in a succession struggle. (Palmier 1971, 18) Many officers were 
bitterly hostile to the idea, especially after the Chinese offered to supply the “fifth force” 
                                               
36 It was called the “fifth force” because it would supplement the four branches of the regular armed forces.   
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with arms.37  Consolidating its grassroots support, enjoying the political protection from 
Sukarno, and plans to build its own militia, the PKI emerged as a serious political 
challenger to the military.  
In addition to Sukarno’s efforts to elevate the PKI, the military found their policy 
interests were increasingly diverging from their civilian counterpart.  During the Cold 
War, Sukarno positioned himself and Indonesia with the non-alignment movement which 
principally rejected the alignment with or against any major power.  Deftly playing the 
Cold War blocs against each other, Sukarno accepted aided from the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  While he professed non-alignment, Sukarno, however, nurtured his 
relationship with Asian communist states while escalating his confrontation with Western 
powers.  In the Fall of 1963, Sukarno launched a campaign against the British over the 
formation of Malaysia.  On the economic front, he nationalized British firms in the 
country. (White 2012) On the military front, the Indonesian army provided training to 
infiltrators and saboteurs dispatched to disrupt Malaysia and guarded the Borneo frontier. 
(Federspiel 1973, 407) While the military brass publicly supported the Malaysia 
campaign, behind the scenes they attempted to deescalate the campaign as it threatened to 
become a regular war. (Brand 1989; Mietzner 2011) Further isolating Indonesia 
internationally, Sukarno withdrew from the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund in 1965.  The right-wing of the Indonesian armed forces, specifically the 
senior army leadership, disapproved of the Sukarno’s radical economic policies and 
                                               
37 During trials following the October 1965 Coup, former Foreign Minister Subandrio confirmed he had 
negotiated the import from China of some 100,000 small arms without the knowledge of Nasution or the 
regular armed forces. Apparently, they entered Indonesia as building materials, free of customs inspection, 
and were intended for the Fifth Force. (Palmier 1971, 18) 
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dangerous foreign ventures which had exacerbated the country’s chronic economic 
problems bringing it to the precipice of bankruptcy. (Brand 1989; Federspiel 1973) 
However, the army generals withheld publicly criticizing Sukarno recognizing he 
remained very popular in and outside the armed forces and preferred to wait him out 
since he was advancing in age. 
By mid-1960s, the partnership between Sukarno and the military began to 
unravel.  In his sixties and questionable health, Sukarno’s succession weighed heavily 
upon the political landscape. (Hindley 1967; Crouch 1978; Brand 1989) In a milieu of 
suspicion, Jakarta bubbled over with tales of conspiracy and intrigue.  Political 
uncertainty drove the actions of the three dominant political actors with each seeking to 
protect their claims to political property rights.  For one, the increasingly left-leaning 
Sukarno outwardly appeared to be preparing for a communist succession.  Sukarno 
doubled efforts to recruit a network of loyalist and PKI sympathizers within the military.  
(Slater 2010) By 1965, the armed forces were split into two factions—those supporting 
Sukarno and the PKI and those opposed.  His divisive tactics invariably created a sharp 
left- and right-wing division within the ranks of the armed forces.  In general, the army 
leadership formed the right-wing division while the other service leaders populated the 
left-wing.  Secondly, the PKI revitalized efforts to mobilize supporters and increased its 
militancy—organizing demonstrations and other forms of popular pressure. (Hindley 
1967, 244) Moreover, Sukarno’s approval of the PKI’s “fifth force” did not ease the 
right-wing’s concern.  Finally, Sukarno’s coup-proofing measures and succession plans 
did not go unnoticed by the military’s right-wing.  It was rumored that a “Council of 
Generals” were planning to seize power in order to strike the first blow. (Palmier 1971) 
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The scene was set for the deadly 1965 confrontation—the abortive coup, the purge of the 
Communists, and the rise of Suharto’s military dictatorship. 
 
30 September Movement 
 
On the night of September 30, 1965, and into the early morning hours of October 
1st, a coup d’état was attempted in Jakarta which would dramatically alter the political 
landscape of Indonesia.  The coup was conducted by the 30 September Movement, a pro-
communist organization comprised of leftist officers in the presidential palace guard in 
association with leaders of the communist party.  The dissident officers supported by 
2,000 members of PKI women’s and youth groups kidnapped and killed six of the 
highest-ranking officers in the armed forces—with a wounded General Nasution 
narrowly escaping during the coup attempt. (Van der Kroef 1976) Later that morning, the 
rogue officers declared they were in control of media and communication outlets and that 
they had taken President Sukarno under their protective custody.  Widely suspected as 
having foreknowledge of the plot, President Sukarno neither endorsed nor condemned his 
“protectors.” (Van der Kroef 1976) Palmier (1971) speculated the abortive coup was 
precipitated by the onset of the President’s illness months earlier and the rising concern 
over political succession. (2) Two diametrically opposed organizations were vying for 
succession, the Indonesian military and the PKI.  In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion, 
the military and the communists wanted to best position itself for the political 
confrontation.  As a preventive strike, the 30 September movement claimed to be acting 
to save Sukarno from the “Council of Generals,” a group of generals rumored to be 
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planning the seizure of power on Armed Forces Day on 5 October. (Palmier 1971) 
Within 72-hours of the group’s declaration, loyal army units commanded by then-Major 
General Suharto, one of the few senior officers not detained and killed in the abortive 
coup, crushed the dissident officer movement and communist supporters. 
General Suharto, as the most senior surviving army officer on active military 
duty, took charge of the army and continued to consolidate his power following the coup.  
Suharto and the army moved quickly to eliminate the PKI challenge leading to the 
slaughter of an estimated 500,000 communists, communist sympathizers, and targets of 
opportunity. (Hindley 1967) Sukarno suspected of involvement in—or at least knowledge 
of—the alleged coup attempt, never regained control.  As the principal protector and 
supporter of the PKI, left-leaning President Sukarno was relegated to a minor political 
role thereafter.  In March 1966, he was forced to handover government authority to 
Suharto through the “Letter of 11 March.”  In what Crouch (1978) called a “disguised” 
coup, began Suharto’s military dictatorship under the banner of the “New Order.”  In 
March 1968, appointed by the provisional Peoples’ Consultative Assembly, or Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), Suharto officially became the second president of 
Indonesia. (Crouch 1988; Honna 1999; Mietzner 2009; Lee 2014)   
 
Defend, Defect, or Coup: Decision to Coup 
 
The 30 September Movement’s abortive coup attempt provided the surviving 
military elite the opportunity and cover to dramatically change the civil-military contract.  
In making the determination to usurp the civilian government through a “disguised” coup 
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d’état, the Indonesian army weighed Sukarno’s reputation and the opposition’s credibility 
in securing the military’s political property rights, see Figure 13, decision point (1) and 
decision point (3).  Finding the regime no longer a credible partner in a political pact and 
the opposition not credible, the Indonesian army decided to eliminate competitors, 
gradually remove Sukarno from office, and take over the government.  In this case, 
military officers initiated a coup to prevent the replacement of the government by another 
group of civilians.  As Hindley (1967) suggested, both the right-wing military officers 
and the PKI were aware that upon Sukarno’s demise, they would have to fight for 
survival—with the loser probably being annihilated.   
 
Figure 13. Indonesian Army Decision Tree 
 
 
Decision point (1): Sukarno’s Reputation in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
 
Indonesian Army Decision Tree:  30 September Movement
* Credible political actors own the political property rights in the exchange and are able to commit to 

















not credible (4) Coup
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The first consideration is the dictator’s reputation in fulfilling previous contractual 
obligations.  Did the dictator follow-though on contractual commitments?  Or did the 
dictator cheat the military of previously negotiated political property rights?  As the 
previous discussion revealed, Sukarno defaulted on the civil-military bargain established 
at the beginning of Guided Democracy.  Sukarno and the army’s senior leaders had 
created a mutually beneficial pact to govern together, thereby, sharing owner rights.  As 
Sukarno began to fear the military’s encroachment on his owner rights, he employed 
coup-proofing measures available to him.  To curb the opportunism of the Indonesian 
military, Sukarno used counterbalancing tactics by introducing a third “co-owner” into 
the contract.  By inviting the PKI to join his government, Sukarno changed the political 
bargain by redistributing political property rights among the three political actors; thus, 
diminishing the military’s share of owner rights.  Further alienating the military brass, 
Sukarno succession plans appeared to favor the communists.  Consequently, the political 
property rights the military received during the early onset of Guided Democracy were 
not only redistributed, but risked being appropriated entirely by the PKI.  The 
combination of opportunistic coup-proofing and the measures to curtail the military’s 
owner rights permanently damaged Sukarno’s reputation and future credibility with the 
military.   
Sukarno’s duplicity and weak commitment to the military partnership were 
evident during and after the 1965 coup.  In an act of cowardice and betrayal, six general 
officers were kidnapped and murdered in the early morning hours of October 1, 1965.  
While Sukarno’s complicity in the abortive coup attempt is debatable, his relationship 
with the surviving senior officers was irreparably harmed. (Hindley 1967; Federspiel 
  155 
1973) Although Sukarno attempted to replace the murder generals with loyalist, the right-
wing survivors were in full control of the military and the government after the coup.  
The morning of the coup, Sukarno appointed a loyalist, General Pranoto Reksosamudro 
as caretaker army chief, to replace the murdered army chief, General Ahmad Yani, but 
was forced two weeks later to give the position to Suharto.38  Continuing to shield his 
communist partners, Sukarno refused to lay blame on the PKI for the failed coup.  In 
defiance, Sukarno’s would not back down on the question of the PKI’s legality, but chose 
to double-down on his defense of the PKI, alienating his own supporters in the armed 
forces.  Deliberately slighting the armed forces, he began to introduce a new theme in his 
speeches touting the PKI’s heroic actions during the revolution specifically proclaiming 
PKI “sacrifices in Indonesia’s struggle for freedom were greater than the sacrifices of 
other parties and groups.” (Crouch 1978, 164) In February 1966, Sukarno’s intransigence 
persisted with his decision to release one to two hundred thousand supporters of the PKI 
from detention which would undoubtedly assist in a face-off with military leadership.  
Finally, his confrontation with the Indonesian military culminated with his decision to 
reshuffle his cabinet and sideline those who resisted his leadership. (Crouch 1978, 174) 
Demonstrating Sukarno’s impotency, however, the military rejected his maneuvers and 
increased its pressure to have the President step aside.  Despite his machinations and 
plotting, the army leadership had already decided Sukarno was no longer a credible 
political partner. 
 
                                               
38 Pranoto was arrested in 1967 on suspicion of alleged involvement in the 1965 coup attempt. (Crouch 
1978, 129) 
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Decision point (3): Opposition’s Credibility in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
Finding Sukarno had not upheld the political bargain, the military leadership next 
considered the credibility of the opposition, decision point (3).  First and foremost, does 
the opposition own the political property rights in the exchange?  During Guided 
Democracy, only three institutional actors retained significant political property rights—
Sukarno, the military, and the PKI.  All other groups, specifically the Islamic 
organizations, were largely suppressed and their political organizations legally barred and 
disbanded.  During Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, political parties, with the exception of 
the Communist Party, lost much of their influence.  In particular, the Masyumi and PSI 
had been banned in 1960 after a number of party leaders were involved in the PRRI 
revolt of 1958. (Hindley 1967; Crouch 1978) Additionally, the Golkar functional-group 
system, weakened the remaining parties.  Enjoying political protection from Sukarno, the 
PKI was the only party able to consolidate its grassroots support throughout the 1960s 
and emerged as a serious political challenger to the military.  Realistically, the only 
civilian opposition organized to succeed Sukarno was the PKI.  However, the animosity 
and ideological differences between the PKI and right-wing army leaders were a bridge 
to far in creating a mutually binding agreement.  The PKI could never credibly secure the 
political property rights the military believed it was entitled to. 
At this juncture, military leaders concluded they were the only credible alternative 
to succeed Sukarno.  From its inception, the Indonesian armed forces believed it was 
entitled to a role in politics and more so now that the country was on the precipice of a 
communist coup and economic collapse.  Additionally, the generals received 
encouragement from the United States that their ambitions would be viewed favorably on 
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the world stage.  During this period, Washington viewed foreign policy through the lens 
of the Cold War and the need to contain the spread of communism.  As such, in the mid-
1960s, Indonesia was strategically significant to the United States.  (Brand 1989) 
Geographically, the sprawling archipelago spanned the critical sea lanes connecting the 
Indian Ocean to the Pacific—flanking Vietnam and the American bases in the 
Philippines.  Economically, the Indonesia possessed an abundance of natural resources, in 
particular petroleum which American oil companies were heavily invested.  Politically, 
Sukarno’s radicalization and courtship with communist elements were disconcerting to 
policy makers in Washington. (Brand 1989) Further raising alarms in Washington was 
Sukarno’s Malaysia campaign and nationalization of British firms.  Sukarno was 
increasingly becoming an unpredictable and unreliable political actor.  Of grave concern 
to Washington policy makers was the prospect of Sukarno’s succession to the 
communists.  If Indonesia fell to the communists, that would be one more domino to fall 
in the Communist Bloc’s favor.  With this in mind, the American administration pursued 
a policy promoting the ascension of the Indonesian army.  As Brand (1989) noted, 
“American officials believed that sooner or later the feud between the army and the 
Communists would break into the open.  Therefore, the Johnson administration sought to 
ensure that when the break occurred the army knew it had friends in Washington.” (793) 
 
Action point (4):  The “Disguised” Coup d’état  
With a lack of oppositional choices to take on the mantle of political authority, the 
military saw itself as the only choice.  General Suharto, who played a critical role in 
crushing the 1965 coup, moved deliberately to pressure Sukarno to relinquish his office.  
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Following the abortive coup in October 1965, as described earlier President Sukarno did 
not willing accept the military’s claim to a dominant role in the government.  From the 
onset, Sukarno made attempts to shore up his political position with little success.  First, 
he used his office to resurrect the reputation of the PKI and his supporters with little 
effect.  Misreading the limitations of his political authority, he then attempted to reshuffle 
his cabinet to install loyalist.  These measures, however, only served to further alienate 
himself from supporters within the military ranks.  Worsening Sukarno’s political hand 
sharp price increases and rampant inflation catalyzed student demonstrators to take to the 
streets to criticize the mismanagement of the economy.  Starting in January 1966, 
Sukarno’s “administration” confronted months of student demonstrations demanding the 
disbandment of the PKI and the control of inflation. (Crouch 1978; Lee 2014) Following 
Sukarno’s announcement of cabinet changes in February, army leaders began to indicate 
their dissatisfaction by expressing sympathy for the students and implicitly backing the 
demonstrations.  Fanning the crisis, the military leadership did little to quell the student 
protestors.  Succumbing to the mounting pressure to mollify the students, Sukarno 
formally handed the government over to Suharto to bring order to Jakarta.  Through the 
“Letter of 11 March” (Supersemar), President Sukarno formally tasked General Suharto, 
“to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm and stability of the 
government and the revolution and to guarantee the personal safety and authority of 
Sukarno.” (Lee 2014, 110) A year after the Supersemar, the Peoples’ Consultative 
Assembly installed Suharto as acting president, and later appointed him as president in 
1968.  Sukarno was kept thereafter under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970.  The 
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“disguised” coup of 11 March brought Suharto and the generals to power establishing the 
“New Order” and replacing Sukarno’s “Old Order.”  
 
Continuing the Cycle of Repression Under the “New Order” 
 
Figure 14. Suharto’s New Order Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements 
 
The failed 1965 coup plot provided army leaders a pretext to eliminate the 
greatest threat to securing the military’s political property rights, the PKI.  Although it 
refuted its complicity in the plot, the PKI and communist sympathizers bore the blame for 
the coup attempt.  Perhaps one of the most devastating human tragedies of the Cold War 
era was the precipitous large-scale killings that occurred following the failed coup 
attempt.  Hundreds of thousands of suspected PKI followers were murdered or arrested in 
the following months, with the army using paramilitary groups affiliated with Muslim 
organizations to carry out most of the killings.  Fanned and condoned by the Indonesian 
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Army, the coup attempt by suspected communists released pent-up communal hatred.  
The extrajudicial killings spread beyond suspected communists to target ethnic Chinese, 
students, union members and anyone who might have personal feud with the attacker.  
The massacre continued into the early months of 1966—ending with the bloody 
decimation of the PKI organization and an estimated 500,000 dead, although the number 
is still contested. (Hindley 1967; Roosa 2006; Robinson 2018) In March 1966, the PKI 
and its mass organization were formally banned, and in July the People’s Consultative 
Congress proposed the prohibition of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.  Those with 
suspected communist sympathies were also purged from government ministries, 
representative councils, and other state enterprises. (Hindley 1967, 237) 
With the elimination of the PKI, there was very little resistance from other 
societal groups to praetorian control.  To begin with, many non-communist political 
groups supported the military’s campaign against the PKI and in fact, assisted in creating 
the legal framework for institutionalized military rule.  The generals had promised to 
repair the political-economic catastrophes of Sukarno’s Guided Democracies.  After 
decades of political instability and declining living standards, many Indonesians, as well 
as Western supporters, were willing to accept a limited period of military dictatorship. 
(Mietzner 2009, 51) Viewed as modernizing force, according to Honna (1999), the 
military, however had a longer outlook: 
Developmentalism, or modernization ideology, provided the military with a 
rationale that identified political stability as the precondition for development, and 
this logic encouraged the officers to think that the “long-term” military control of 
politics was justifiable since modernization was a decades-long national project. 
(79)  
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The officer corps sought ideological confirmation of its new dominance by 
adjusting military doctrine—the core elements included the military’s role in economic 
development, guardians of the state Pancasila ideology, and the preservation of the 
presidentialist 1945 constitution.  In 1966, the officer corps formalized the doctrine of 
dwifungsi (dual function), according to which the armed forces were responsible for not 
only defending the country, but serving as a sociopolitical force with the right to 
participate in government. (Crouch 1978; Said 2006; Meitzner 2011; Lee 2014) 
Moreover, through the policy of kekaryaan—the practice of military officers serving in 
civilian bureaucratic posts—the Indonesian military penetrated all levels and spheres of 
political life at the national, regional, and local levels. (Mietzner 2009; Lee 2014) By the 
early 1970s, the armed forces had established dominance over internal security, domestic 
politics, economics, and foreign relations.   
In the political field, the armed forces were especially well entrenched in the 
executive, legislative, and local governments.  According to Mietzner (2009), Suharto 
controlled the administration as both head of state and government, and military officers 
occupied key cabinet appointments, including the ministries of defense and security, 
home affairs, and the state secretariat. (52)  Of the twenty-seven members appointed to 
the cabinet in July 1966, twelve of the most important cabinet posts went to the armed 
forces. (Lee 2014, 112) In the provinces, officers held eighty percent of governorships, 
and an equally high percentage filled positions as district heads.  On the legislative side, 
seventy-five officers served as delegates of parliament and more were appointed to the 
People’s Consultative Congress.  Finally, through the central role the officer corps played 
in the government’s electoral machine Golkar, the military also dominated the national 
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and regional legislatures.  Incidentally, with the help of massive military intervention and 
intimidation, the Golkar won the 1971 elections. (Mietzner 2009, 52-53)  
Next, the military’s increased its participation in the economy as the doctrine of 
dual function called upon the armed forces to provide the necessary condition for 
economic growth.  Military officers had held senior management positions in several 
state enterprises since the late 1950s, however, under the New Order their numbers grew 
rapidly.  Since the allocation for defense in the national budget was insufficient to sustain 
the armed forces, state enterprises supplied the military with extra funds while also lining 
the pockets of its military CEOs.  A quintessential example of dual function the national 
oil company Pertamina, headed by General Ibnu Sutowo, provided substantial 
contributions to the budget of the armed forces. (Crouch 1978; Mietzner 2009; Lee 2014) 
Continuing the practices of the territorial command system, regional commanders forged 
business partnerships with local magnates.  The unprecedented flow of off-budget funds 
into the military allowed it to exercise a high degree of managerial autonomy with unit 
commanders now functioning as heads of rent-seeking foundations and cooperatives.  
According to Mietzner (2009), Suharto encouraged this practice, despite obvious fears 
that senior officers would grow too independent, believing that the granting of access to 
additional sources of funding would strengthen their loyalty toward him as the patron that 
made “self-service” possible. (55)   
Finally, in the sphere of foreign diplomacy, the military elite were able to 
establish and prioritize their policy preferences.  Previously frustrating the military 
establishment, Sukarno’s radicalized and left-leaning policies had isolated the Indonesian 
archipelago economically and politically.  Upon assuming power, Suharto adopted a 
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policy of neutrality in the Cold War.  While theoretically a continuation of the non-
alignment policy of his predecessor, he discreetly aligned himself with the West.  
Characterized by pragmatism, the New Order’s geopolitical strategy focused on securing 
foreign aid. (Sukma 1995) In turn, this objective naturally brought Indonesia closer to the 
more prosperous Western countries, who were ready to offer their support.  Furthermore, 
after Supersemar, Suharto and the general’s distanced Indonesia from the communist 
movement—straining relations with the Chinese and the Soviet Union. (Crouch 1978) In 
one of the military junta’s first foreign policy acts, it ended the Malaysia campaign in 
August 1966.  Incidentally, the British-owned companies expropriated by Sukarno during 
the Malaysia confrontation were returned to British ownership after 1967. (White 2012) 
In August 1967, Indonesia became a founding member of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization originally created to deter the spread of 
communism in the region.  Finally, Indonesia suspended relations with China in 1967 due 




The overreliance on the Indonesian army for repression led to the rise of the 
entrepreneur army and the eventual downfall of President Sukarno in 1965.  After the 
introduction of martial law in 1957, the military proved its indispensability and 
reinforced its claim to a more permanent role in the government. (Crouch 1978, 33) The 
emergency condition led to a sudden expansion of the military’s political property rights 
and increased its political authority in general administration and economic management.  
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Consequently, the military brass became invested in preserving the existing social order 
and political arrangement of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy during the initial years.  The 
officer corps largely acknowledged and understood Sukarno’s role in providing 
legitimacy and popular support for the system.  As long as the president and his civilian 
allies did not restrict the military elite’s owner rights and privileges, the military preferred 
to cooperate with Sukarno in preserving the mutually advantageous arrangements.  
However, disrupting the equilibrium, Sukarno opportunistically aligned himself with the 
PKI to counterbalance the power of the Indonesian army.  The army leadership found 
Sukarno’s rapprochement with the PKI unsettling and was adamantly opposed to sharing 
any owner rights with the communist party.  The power struggle eventually led to the 
army removing Sukarno from office and establishing military supremacy under a cartel 
army.  As the demise of the Sukarno’s regime highlights, when an army gains a majority 
share in ownership, they become too powerful to easily undermine.  As Svolik (2012) 
suggested, when bargaining between a government and a politically pivotal military 
breaks down over core policy differences, the threat of a military coup d’état increases.  
Brinkmanship bargaining ensues, “the military has an incentive to exaggerate it demands, 
while the government has an incentive to test the military’s resolve to intervene by 
defying those demands.” (Svolik 2012, 136) In this example, Sukarno tested the 
Indonesian armed forces resolve and his Guided Democracy regime was eventually 
deposed when the army leadership called his bluff in a “disguised” coup.  
General Suharto along with his fellow officers then instituted a military 
dictatorship under the “New Order.”  Initially Suharto was considered the “first among 
equals” governing the junta. (Lee 2014) Key policy decisions were the product of a 
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military-technocrat oligarchy composed of a small coterie of senior army officers and 
economic technocrats. (Crouch 1978; Lee 2014) A decade into the New Order regime, 
however, Suharto felt secure in his consolidation of power and began asserting control 
over the previously autonomous military.  Over three decades, he succeeded in 
transforming the military dictatorship to a sultanistic regime. (Honna 1999; Slater 2010; 
Lee 2014) Slater (2010) noted, “what started as a system of oligarchic military rule 
evolved into a highly personalized regime.” (133) Changing his relationship with the 
armed forces, Suharto employed several coup-proofing strategies to decrease the 
military’s political property rights.  He created parallel civilian and security institutions to 
redistribute the military’s owner rights.  Additionally, he limited the military’s manager 
rights through organizational reform.  For instance, in order to forestall any challenges to 
his personal rule from inside the ranks, Suharto introduced a wide-range of reforms and 
changes to the command system. (Mietzner 2009) At the core of his reforms was the 
integration of the service branches under the Indonesian armed forces headquarters and 
the department of defense and security.  Additionally, Suharto downgraded all the service 
commanders to chief of staff, thereby, removing their cabinet status and more importantly 
their direct command over troops.  He also reduced the power and autonomy of the 
regional commanders by creating a system of coordinating commands overseeing several 
military territories.  Later in his regime, Suharto manipulated the personnel system, 
appointing officers with familial ties or close loyalties to his inner circle.  These 
maneuvers gradually altered the civil-military institutional arrangements from cartel to 
patron army.  Interestingly, when Suharto’s personalistic regime faced a mass uprising in 
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1998, much like Marco’s regime in the Philippines, the military also defected leading to 
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CHAPTER 6 
CARTEL ARMY: THE JUNTA AND THE TATMADAW 
 
Cartel Army (Military Supremacy) 
 
Authoritarian systems dominated by the military, at times, convert into direct 
praetorian rule as military regimes or juntas. (Perlmutter 1969; Nordlinger 1977; Linz 
and Stepan 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Stepan 1988, Geddes 1999; Geddes et 
al. 2014) Geddes et al. (2014) defined a military regime “as the rule by a group of high-
ranking officers who can limit the dictator’s discretion.” (148)  Because the military has 
the preponderance of owner rights and guarantees these rights through violence, military 
regimes’ civil-military arrangements often fall within the cartel army type.  In cartel army 
civil-military arrangements, the military establishment has a monopoly of political 
property rights and guarantees those rights through coercion.  As a consequence, any 
opposition to praetorian rule is effectively repressed and silenced.  Because of the 
overwhelming coercive power of the regime, there is no bargaining space to negotiate or 
contest political property rights.  Similar to an economic cartel, the military establishment 
seeks to maximize and protect their collective interests by restricting political 
competition.  Extending this definition, a cartel army exercises unprecedented control and 
ownership of the institutions of the state.  Military men hold the highest state offices, 
thereby, controlling critical appointments to executive, legislative, and bureaucratic 
positions at all levels of government.  Accordingly, civilian politicians and other political 
groups have minimal input in governing the state.  This creates a situation in which 
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civilian preferences are generally subordinate to the preferences of the military; thereby, 
the armed forces have achieved military supremacy.   
 
Figure 15. Cartel Army Type 
 
 
While military elites have achieved supremacy over their civilian counterpart, 
there remains the problem of controlling the “military-as-institution.”  Any regime 
depending on repression, even military ones, are susceptible to threats from its own 
coercive agents.  As Stepan (1988) suggested, no complex organization should be seen as 
a monolith—a highly repressive regime, where the military is in control of the state 
apparatus, consists of various components and various configurations. (30) Stepan (1988) 
outlined three primary components: 
 
• the military-as-government—refers to those military figures constituting the core 
leadership directing the government of the polity;  
 
• the security-community—elements of the regime most directly involved in the 
planning and execution of repression, intelligence gathering, interrogation, 
torture, and internal clandestine armed operations; and 
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• the military-as-institution—the bulk of the organization that carries out the day-
to-day work of the military bureaucracy. (30) 
 
Depending on their relative power and their actions, these three components can form 
various configurations—from highly fused to loosely aligned.  In cartel army civil-
military arrangements, the military regime has achieved a high degree of vertical 
integration hierarchical among the various components—elements of the military-as-
government, security-community, and military-as-institution have all credibly committed 
to the contractual relationship.  Using Stepan’s (1988) configuration, in cartel army 
arrangements, the three components interact in a highly fused manner in what is 
described as “apparent fusion.” In other words, “all components of the regime share a 
common threat perception and are acting in harmony.” (Stepan 1988, 31) However, the 
maintenance of harmony among the three requires a balancing act and the continuous 
investment in the relationship.  In addition to “apparent fusion,” Stepan (1988) also 
conceptualized situations where the three components are not in harmony and other 
components decide to remove the military-as-government in order to either replace the 
regime with its own military-as-government or completely transition the military out of 
office. (31) 
 
The Junta and the Tatmadaw 
 
The military has dominated Burmese politics since independence in 1948.  From 
its inception, the Burmese army, also known as the Tatmadaw, has been a politically 
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oriented army refusing to accept subordination to any civilian authority or government.  
The Tatmadaw’s predecessor owes its lineage to the Burman Independence Army (BIA), 
originally formed as a pro-Japanese invasion force trained to fight the British in the 
struggle for independence.  Japanese agents selected thirty ethnic Burmans, later dubbed 
the Thirty Comrades, to secretly train as the BIA’s initial cadre.  Incidentally, the Thirty 
Comrades included famed national hero Aung San and future military strongman, Ne 
Win. (Myoe 2014) After gaining independence from the British, civil war jeopardized the 
survival of the new nation.  Although the country’s first constitution established a 
democratic system of government, the eruption of countrywide insurgency upon the 
departure of the British threatened to tear the country apart.  Democratic politics could 
not solve the problem of ethnic groups and nations seeking self-determination.  Unable or 
unwilling to compromise, the Burman majority and multiple minority groups answered 
the question of self-determination through violence.  By 1949, 75 percent of the towns in 
Burma had fallen to one insurgent group or another—just as the state became 
independent it collapsed. (Callahan 2003, 114-115) 
Picking up the pieces of the failed state, the Tatmadaw stepped in and suppressed 
the separatist insurgencies and secessionist movements which threaten their vision of a 
unified Burmese state.  Magnifying the crisis was the newly defeated Chinese Nationalist 
forces (KMT) occupying the territory along the border of Burma and China.  Preparing 
for its incursion of China proper, the KMT’s unwanted presence contributed to the 
prospect of Communist China invading Burma.  (Callahan 2003) The early onset of 
insurgencies and the threat of foreign invasion served as a crucible to unify the Tatmadaw 
and justify its subsequent and continuous praetorian rule.  The intractability of separatist 
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insurgencies and the external threat between 1948 and 1962 had long-term consequences 
for the political development of the new nation.  The military’s war footing absorbed the 
resources of the state at the cost to other government functions.  As a result, the military 
dominated politics, economics, and society, leaving little room for other institutions or 
civil society to grow.  Over the next five decades, the weak state would be overcome by 
the Tatmadaw and successive military regimes.  The dominance of the military 
manifested itself in three military coups d’état—1958, 1962 and 1988—and long periods 
of direct military rule.  After protests erupted in 1988, the Tatmadaw once again took 
control and established direct military rule lasting until early 2011.  Following the events 
of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the ruling junta began a process of liberalization that 
would allow the Tatmadaw to “return to the barracks” and transition the government back 
to civilian rule. 
 
Cartel Army Institutional Arrangements 
From 1988 to 2011, the military directly governed Burma as a junta forming the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later renamed the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997.  During this time frame, the civil-military 
institutional arrangements fell within the cartel army type.  Following the 1998 uprising, 
the Tatmadaw decided to directly administer the state, dispensing with constitutional 
provisions and administration through civilian institutions.  In short, the military shed the 
veneer of a civilian governance, effectively guaranteeing the military the totality of 
political authority.  Direct military rule permitted little political space for other groups to 
contest political property rights. 
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Figure 16. The Junta’s Civil-Military Institutional Arrangements from 1988 to 2011 
 
Horizontal Dimension.  This dimension measures the degree political property 
rights will be secured ex post and consists of two components:  1) the level of 
contestation of political property rights, and 2) the level of credible commitment to the 
agreement by the actors in the exchange.  
Firstly, during direct military rule from 1988 and 2011, political authority and 
political property rights were not credibly contested by other political groups.  Emerging 
from British rule, many ethnic and political groups vied for political control of Burma 
fearing the Burman ethnic majority would not recognize minority rights.  In other words, 
political contestation was not about the division of political authority under a unified state 
but the right to self-governance by various groups.  Because of the high political stakes, 
the political actors were unwilling to compromise.  Above this politically unstable reality, 
sat the Tatmadaw ready to enforce the sovereignty of a unitary state.  To minimize 
political uncertainty, over the years, the military repeatedly intervened in politics by 
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directly ruling the Burmese state through coercive violence, functioning as the sovereign, 
making and enforcing the rules.  The Tatmadaw had no confidence in civilian institutions 
or civilian groups ability to unify the country and secure the military’s political property 
rights.  Over five decades of military repression, other political actors and civilian 
institutions atrophied, severely weakening their ability to contest the political authority of 
the Tatmadaw.   
Next, by forming a military council, the Tatmadaw was able to credibly commit 
to guaranteeing the political property rights of the military.  Through control of state 
institutions, the military brass codified, routinized, and normalized the role the military in 
all aspects of governance.  The council also ensured the political, social, and economic 
standing of the officer corps through investment in military modernization and promotion 
of asset specificity.  In an effort to increase asset specificity, the military leadership 
focused their efforts on transforming the military to a modern fighting force.  
Furthermore, by endorsing technical proficiency and expertise-based promotions, the 
military regime gave officers reason to invest in asset specificity and the perpetuation of 
the regime.  In addition to modernization, the regime also improved the benefits of 
military service—continuing to treat the officer corps as a separate privileged class in 
society.   
Vertical dimension.  This dimension delineates the institutional arrangements, or 
agreed upon political property rights, negotiated by the regime and the armed forces over 
time. Negotiated political property rights consist of two types of political property rights: 
1) owner rights and 2) manager rights.   
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Firstly, the military positioned itself early to hold the preponderance of owner 
rights.  Through successful military campaigns and multiple cycles of repression, the 
Tatmadaw succeeded in obtaining full owner rights.  It did not have to share political 
authority with any other political actor or group after forming the SLORC in 1988.  
Consisting of 19 to 21 officers, drawn from the Defense Headquarters in Rangoon and 
nine regional commanders and chaired by General Saw Maung, the SLORC administered 
the state. (Myoe 2009, 215) Through the council and regional commands, the military 
succeeded in controlling all aspects of Burmese political life. 
Secondly, the Tatmadaw was surprising able to limit the breakdown of the 
military hierarchy and preserved robust manager rights.  The military regime deliberately 
focused on maintaining a strong hierarchy with clear lines of owner rights and manager 
rights to minimize the risk of insubordination.  Following the 1988 uprising, the ruling 
junta sought to recommit to a hierarchical governance through mutual interdependence 
between the “military-as-government” and the “military-as-institution.”  To this end, the 
junta as “military-as-government” implemented reforms to promote bilateral dependency 
between the regime and the officer corps.  As a result, the Tatmadaw as “military-as-
institution” retained decision authority over budgets, arms procurement, personnel 
actions, doctrine, and training. 
 
Entering the Cycle of Repression  
 
As Dr. Maung Muang (1999), the president of the Union of Burma during the 
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height of civil unrest from August 18, 1988 to September 19, 1988,39 noted in his book 
documenting the events surrounding the 1988 uprising,  
Change happens in cycles, patterns and rhythms, sometime seemingly regular and 
obeying some law of nature, sometime seeming erratic, unshackled by any law, 
entirely wild and free…Cycles of political change in Myanmar since 
independence that was recovered from Britain in 1948 seem to have run in cycles 
lasting from ten to fifteen years. (9) 
 
While cycles of change explain government transitions, cycles of repression explain the 
continuity of Tatmadaw political dominance.  The first cycle began in 1947 with the 
tenuous democratic period ending with the 1962 military coup.  The 1962 coup began the 
second cycle installing a military junta led by General Ne Win—eventually transitioning 
to a “civilian” government when Ne Win retired his uniform.  The third cycle 
commenced with the 1988 student uprising ending with Ne Win’s resignation and the 
military taking over government once again under the SLORC.  Finally, like clockwork, 
popular discontent percolated again manifesting in Buddhist monk’s protesting the 
increase in gas prices in the 2007 Saffron Revolution.  Each cycle of repression served to 
unify the officers of the Tatmadaw and reinforced their entitlement to rule. 
The birth of the nation began with ethnic insurgencies threatening to tear apart the 
new nation.  Burma had inherited a major problem from the British, the question of how 
to deal with a large number of ethnic minorities.  At the time, the Burman ethnic group 
constituted around 60 percent of the total population with the remaining 40 percent of the 
population split among more than a hundred minority groups and mountain tribes.  
(Fredholm 1993, 10) The largest nations, or minority groups, included the Shan, Karen, 
                                               
39  As the only civilian politician in the inner circle of the BSPP, Dr. Muang was elected president during 
the 1998 civil uprising and deposed a month later by military coup. (Shock 2005, 95) 
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Mon, Rakhine, and Chin.  The struggle to form a new nation was due in part to “Burman 
Chauvinism”—Burmans were implacable about the right to rule over all of Burma and 
rebuffed minority groups demands to form their own independent states as a federation 
within Burma. (Fredholm 1993) The British solution to the minority question was the 
formation of a union, thereby, granting the minority nations a certain formal autonomy.  
However, overwhelmed by efforts to disengage from other colonial possession such as 
India and Pakistan, the British took the path of least resistance, giving into demands of 
the Burman majority. (Fredholm 1993, 38) As a constitutional compromise was unlikely, 
a deeply flawed constitution was adopted on September 24, 1947, forming the Union of 
Burma.40  The British departed the scene without adequately addressing the nationality 
problem and civil war ensued.  
The first cycle of repression began at the onset of independence from the British.  
Combating multiple insurgencies throughout the country and a Chinese civil war within 
its borders, the new Burma government faced numerous insurmountable challenges.  Like 
the country, the Tatmadaw was not a unified heterogeneous force.  It was a collection of 
various ethnic groups hastily brought together by colonial administrators, forming right- 
and left-wing lines of command.  Within three months of independence, the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB) launched an armed rebellion against the government with many 
left-wing soldiers and officers deserting the Tatmadaw in 1948. (Callahan 2003) 
Compounding the problem, Karen separatists began an armed campaign for an 
independent “Karenstan.”  By early 1949, Karen soldiers, comprising half the 
                                               
40 A major point of contentions in the new constitution, the Shan and Karenni State reserved the right of 
secession after a ten-year trial period.  Other minority groups received no concessions at all; not even the 
large nations of the Karen, Mon, Chin, and Arakaneses.  (Fredholm 1993, 40)   
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government troops, mutinied joined the right-wing Karen National Defense Organization 
(KNDO). (Callahan 2003, 114) The first appointed armed forces commander of the 
Tatmadaw, a Karen, later resigned.  By the time his predecessor, General New Win, a 
Burman, assumed the position in February 1949, there were fewer than two thousand 
troops remaining on the roster. (Callahan 2003, 114) In the late 1940s and 1950s, the 
right- and left-wing insurgency groups were so strong that the government admitted that 
“large sections of the countryside were under complete domination of the insurgents.” 
(Myoe 2009, 16) Worsening the security crisis, the Chinese KMT occupation of Burma’s 
border frontier invited the Communist Chinese to invade.  The possibility of Communist 
China attacking Burma elevated national security concerns within the Tatmadaw and 
spurred a massive army reorganization to defend Burma’s sovereignty.  With the goal of 
ejecting the KMT from Burma, the government prioritized the resources of the state to 
transform the loosely organized militia-like force into a professional standing army.  By 
1962, the Tatmadaw had grown to more than 100,000 soldiers, a significant difference 
from the 5,000 soldiers at independence and the anemic 2,000 soldiers during the low-
point of the civil war. (Callahan 2003, 173) The internal threat served to eradicate the 
Tatmadaw of “subversives,” while the external threat forged it into a bigger, stronger, and 
more unified fighting force. 
The rapid growth and unchecked autonomy of the military contributed to rising 
civil-military tensions as civilian administrators pressed for military oversight and the 
prioritization of other projects over building the Tatmadaw.  By October 1958, the 
relationship between Rangoon’s politicians and field commanders had deteriorated 
beyond repair.  Fearing mutiny, senior Tatmadaw leaders persuaded Prime Minister U Nu 
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to hand over governmental control to the military. (Callahan 2003; Myoe 2009; Croissant 
and Kamerling 2013) The military caretaker government headed by General Ne Win 
ruled for 18 months successfully averting civil war and for the first time brought a 
semblance of law and order.  However, military intervention came at a cost—
strengthening the Tatmadaw’s position in social, economic, and political influence.  The 
same year, the Tatmadaw redefined it role in the doctrine known as the National Ideology 
and the Role of Defence Services (NIRDS), which gave the military the ideological basis 
for political involvement by assigning the military the dual functions of handling internal 
security and economic development. (Myoe 2014, 10) Moreover, the Tatmadaw’s brief 
success at praetorian administration for the interregnum only invited and further justified 
future military intervention in politics.  After the general elections in 1960, the military 
returned to the barracks and Prime Minister U Nu resumed as head of government 
following his re-election. 
With another political crisis looming, the next cycle of repression began when the 
Tatmadaw again intervened, staging a military coup d’état on March 2, 1962.  When non-
Burman ethnic groups demanded constitutional concessions for increased autonomy, 
Prime Minister U Nu agreed to meet with these groups.41 (Callahan 2003, 203) 
Portraying these meetings as an act of betrayal to the nationalist vision for a unified 
Burma, the Tatmadaw used U Nu’s conciliatory stance as a pretext to launch a takeover.  
The military plotters established the Revolutionary Council (RC), suspended the 
                                               
41 During the Federal Seminar in mid-February 1962, U Nu met with Shan and Karenni state 
representatives. Incidentally, these two states had the constitutional right to secede from the Union.  Ethnic 
minority representatives discussed proposals ranging from moderate constitutional amendments to more 
radical secessionist demands.  (Callahan 2003, 203) 
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constitution and placed all legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the hands of its 
chairman, General Ne Win.  Heading off communist forces sweeping neighboring 
countries, the RC then appropriated leftist policies and formed their military junta under 
the banner of the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) and subsequently founded the 
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) to institutionalize their military rule. (Myoe 
2009) All military officers were then required to join the ruling party; thereby, instituting 
a Soviet-style nomenklatura system to ensure obedience and investment in the regime. 42 
(Myoe 2009, 62) Discarding their military uniforms, direct praetorian rule came to an end 
with the promulgation of a new constitution and general elections legally installing the 
BSPP and Ne Win into power in 1974.  While taking on a civilian veneer, Ne Win’s 
regime, was unquestionably backed by the Tatmadaw. (Callahan 2003; Myoe 2009; 
Pedersen 2011; Croissant and Kamerling 2013) During the twenty-six years of socialist 
rule, the Tatmadaw engaged in brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in the frontier areas, 
while the BSPP developed nationalist projects to transform the “apathetic” public into a 
new “socialist citizenry.” (Callahan 2003, 210-211)  
By the late 1980s, Ne Win and the BSPP’s faced the consequences of an 
economic crisis which launched another cycle of repression.  Starting in March 1988, 
popular protests erupted across the country precipitating a bloody crackdown on 
demonstrators.  By June 1988, large demonstrations of students and sympathizers were 
                                               
42 “Many junior officers in the 1980s felt uneasy about the ‘revolution.’  But they refrained from open 
criticism, as their career advancement would then be in jeopardy.  For senior officers, such as those with 
the rank of colonel and above, the BSPP had developed a system of opportunities through patronage, which 
created an avenue to prominent positions with the Tatmadaw and the government, and allowed access to 
scarce resources.  Gaining access to this Soviet-style Nomenklatura, or what Djilas would call a “new 
class,” ensured the loyalty of the Tatmadaw personnel to the ruling party and prevented splits with the 
Tatmadaw.  As a result, the officer corps was united behind its Chief of Staff and was loyal to the BSPP to 
the very last moment in the political chaos of 1988.”  (Myoe 2009, 62-63) 
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demanding multi-party democracy.  The BSPP try to head-off trouble by accepting the 
resignation of Ne Win.  The symbolic leadership change did little to appease the swelling 
crowds.  Between August and September, the Tatmadaw for the first time turned their 
guns on ethnic Burmans, putting an end to the pro-democracy demonstrations, killing 
thousands of unarmed civilians. (Callahan 2003, 210) Segments of the Tatmadaw seized 
political power in what Croissant and Kamerling (2013) called an “awkward self-coup” 
in September 1988. (106) The Tatmadaw dissolved the BSPP, formed the SLORC, 
suspended the 1974 constitution, and promised to hold elections.   
At the start, SLORC was chaired by General Saw Maung and consisted of 19 to 
21 members, drawn from the Defense Headquarters in Rangoon and nine regional 
commanders with most council members concurrently filling cabinet positions. (Min 
2008, 1024) Furthermore, the SLORC formed a cabinet appointing minister drawn 
entirely from the military.  In coordination with the members of the SLORC, General 
Than Shwe replaced General Saw Maung as head of state and commander-in-chief of the 
Tatmadaw in 1992. (Min 2008, 1024) Incidentally, Than Shwe served as head of state 
from 1992 to 2011.  The size of the SLORC remained constant until 1997 when the 
cabinet swelled to thirty-eight members, with an additional thirty-two deputy ministers. 
(Lee 2014, 164) In November 1997, the junta gave itself a new political face, 
discontinuing the SLORC and rebranding itself as the SPDC.  With the name change, 
Senior General Than Shwe infused new leadership into the inner circle and eased older 
members out, appointing them into an “advisory” position.  Former members of the 
SLORC, except the chairman, vice-chairman secretary 1 and secretary 2, and two deputy 
prime ministers, were made members of the “Advisory Group” of the SPDC.  Thus, the 
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most senior personnel in the SPDC remained the same. (Lee 2014, 164) The advisory 
group was later abolished on June 5, 1998, and all its members forced to resign their 
commissions on June 1, 1998. (Myoe 2009, 70).  
Under heavy restrictions the elections took place in 1990, but the results were 
nullified when the opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by 
Aung San Suu Kyi, achieved a landslide victory winning 392 of the 425 seats. The 
military backed National Unity Party (NUP) received an abysmal 10 seats. (Fredholm 
1993) Instead of recognizing the will of the people, the military junta doubled down on 
direct military rule distrusting the NLD or any other civilian group could keep the 
country unified and secure its political property rights.  Feigning political reforms, in 
2003, the regime declared a seven-point road map for political transition to “disciplined 
democracy” which would encompass the redrafting of the constitution. (Selth 2008; 
Pedersen 2011; Croissant and Kamerling 2013) The declaration, however, lacked a time 
frame and the initiative was eventually suspended until popular discontent again erupted 
in 2007 which again forced the junta to respond with deadly force.   
 With the collapse of the socialist system following the 1988 uprising and coup, 
the SLORC set out to rebuild the state.  Although the regime moved away from 
socialism, continuity prevailed with the military prioritizing stability and order above all 
else.  Confronting the task of creating a new political and economic system from scratch, 
the SLORC relied on the tool it knew best—the Tatmadaw.  Launching the ultimate 
military-industrial complex undertaking, it rebuilt the state by transforming the 
Tatmadaw into a modern force.  This rebuilding entailed a massive expansion of the 
armed forces.  From 1988 until 1996, the Tatmadaw doubled in size going from 186,000 
  182 
to more than 370,000 troops. (Callahan 2003, 211) The junta spent over $1 billion on 140 
new combat aircraft, 30 naval vessels, 170 tanks, 250 armored personnel carriers, rocket 
launch systems, as well as other advanced equipment and hardware. (Callahan 2003, 211) 
Additionally, it erected new army garrisons, naval and air force bases in towns and 
villages across the country.  Expanding the military industrial base and putting the 
country back to work, the regime also launched an import substitution program in the 
critical areas of arms and manufacturing. Between 40 and 60 percent of the national 
budget funded the military expansion. (Callahan 2003, 211)  
During the socialist era, the military was not permitted to engage in commercial 
activity.  After 1988, the regime lifted these restrictions and the military energized its 
commercial interests providing an off-budget source of revenue and lucrative 
opportunities for self-enrichment.  The two prominent military-owned enterprises 
included the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd (UMEH), which controls 
Burma’s gem market, and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) with holdings in 
banking, gem, tourism, real estate, food stuff, and etc. (Callahan 2003; Myoe 2009) In 
addition to off-budget revenue from commercial enterprises, the government’s 
“whitening tax” on foreign exchange profits from the opium and methamphetamine trade 
funded the military’s modernization and arms procurement projects. (Callahan 2003, 211) 
As it rebuilt the state and transformed the Tatmadaw, the junta also reinforced the 
hierarchical relationship between senior leaders and the officer corps.  Never far from the 
minds of the military leadership was the prospect of opportunistic shirking among the 
ranks.  The Tatmadaw had experienced several cycles of repression and with each 
iteration it renegotiated and readjusted the contract to reinforce the credible commitment 
  183 
between senior leaders and the officer rank and file.  The transformation and 
reorganization of the Tatmadaw provided a convenient outlet to make institutional 
adjustments.  Tweaks to the institutional arrangement bolstered credible commitment up 
and down the chain of command by reinforcing horizontal investment between senior 
officers (owners) and vertical investment between senior and junior officers (owner and 
managers).  In short, institutions were gradually put in place to ensure the perpetuation of 
military rule in Burma and reinforce the hierarchy and subordination of the military by 
creating mutual sunk investment from the top down.   
The 1988 uprising and subsequent electoral defeat of the army-backed National 
Unity Party (NUP) in the 1990 greatly undermined the junta and central authorities.  With 
the center weakened, the SLORC devolved power to regional commanders to stabilize 
the country.  Acting on behalf of the junta, regional commanders eliminated political 
dissent at the local level, dismantled the old political party system, and created new 
administrative and economic arrangements. (Myoe 2009; Lee 2014) While solving the 
problem of pacifying the country, decentralization was a potential threat to the junta.  
Regional commanders enjoyed enormous political and economic power, ruling with de 
facto autonomy over their regions for several years.  During the socialist period, regional 
commanders were subject to discipline from state party organs and their political 
authority constrained by the party rank hierarchy. (Myoe 2009; Lee 2014) The collapse of 
the party system removed these institutional checks and balances on party members.  To 
ensure the regional and local commanders were invested in the junta, their command 
positions were raised to the level of major general and they were automatically made 
members of the SLORC.  Moreover, these officers were appointed chairmen of state- and 
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division-level Law and Order Restoration Councils (LORCs). (Lee 2014, 169) With these 
responsibilities, military commanders were formally vested with both military and 
administrative responsibility for their command areas.  
By 1992, the center reconstituted its power and began the process of 
recentralization when all the regional commanders, except one, were reassigned to 
Rangoon as cabinet minister.  Since 1992, there have been regular appointments and 
rotation of regional military commanders. (Myoe 2009, 70) Placed in command for about 
five to six years, regional commanders were unable to build up an autonomous power 
base to challenge the center.  The reshuffling of senior military officers became a 
common occurrence throughout the more than two-decade rule of the SLORC/SPDC. 
(Lee 2014, 186) As Myoe (2009) argues, the Tatmadaw leadership will take “all 
necessary measures to prevent the Tatmadaw being subjected to open split and 
disintegration. (71) Prompting regularized rotation, the junta employed coup-proofing 
strategies to insulate military commanders from domestic politics. 
The junta regime sought to reinforce mutual interdependence between the ruling 
junta and the Tatmadaw and recommit to a hierarchical governance—i.e. reaffirming the 
master-servant relationship.  Throughout the 1990s, the military leadership regularly 
reminded its commanders that the Tatmadaw had to be rebuilt through four means: 
training, administration, welfare, and morale. (Myoe 2009, 175) From the owner side, the 
regime demonstrated its commitment to the hierarchal relationship through investment in 
military modernization and improvements in morale and welfare.  As discussed earlier, 
the junta invested heavily in the Tatmadaw’s infrastructure, buying advanced weapons, 
and investing in new technologies.  This expansion and modernization of the military was 
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accompanied by the establishment of an array of welfare, health, and educational 
facilities that insulated members of the Tatmadaw, creating an “exclusive social order” of 
privilege for active-duty and retired soldiers.  (Callahan 2003, 211-212) Lee (2014) 
described these special dispensations for the military class: 
Membership in the armed forces provides officers and even those in the lower 
ranks, such as noncommissioned officers, a chance to buy valuable land at cheap 
prices; receive low-interest loans to launch businesses; and channel privileges, 
contracts, and resources toward private business people in exchange for 
substantial financial rewards.  Being in the Tatmadaw promises a career, an 
education, social status, and access to services denied to the general population. 
There are special schools and hospitals for those in the military and their 
dependents. Military personnel live in secluded, subsidized housing and have 
access to goods and services not available in typical stores. The holder of an army 
pass is assured a seat on a train or an airplane, and a policeman would never dare 
to report him or her for violating traffic rules. (74) 
 
The investment in the military’s morale and welfare were made possible, for one, because 
the junta had sanctioned the Tatmadaw’s control over the country’s natural resources as 
cabinet ministers, regional commanders, and CEOs of commercial enterprises.  To further 
increase the officer corps dependence on the largess of the state, the SLORC opened up 
new sources of funding to build the Tatmadaw. (Myoe 2009, 176) Jettisoning the 
autarchic policies of the prior socialist regime, the SLORC reenergized commercial 
activities created a new class of military entrepreneurs.  Consequently, these positions 
provided the holders access to vast rent-seeking opportunities through licenses. “These 
licenses include those for the exploitation of natural resources, for the import and export 
trade, and government construction projects, including the construction of hotels, tourist 
resorts, and the new airport in the new capital Naypyidaw.” (Lee 2014, 74)  
From the manager side, the regime encouraged the officer corps to invest in 
technical proficiency and increased asset specificity.  To further this goal, between 1989 
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and 1996, the SLORC obtained seventeen cease-fire agreements with minority 
insurgents. (Callahan 2003, 220) With shifting policy towards ethnic minorities, the 
Tatmadaw changed operational objectives and doctrine to deemphasize 
counterinsurgency and focus on conventional warfare.  However, this redirection in 
policy created an experiential gap between generations of officers.  With significantly 
less experience fighting wars, the Tatmadaw needed other means to measure an officer’s 
potential from promotion.  Consequently, promotions and advancement were increasingly 
tied to technical expertise, training, and higher education.  For one, a commissioned 
officer required a university degree and promotion to midlevel ranks required the 
completion of a master’s degree at the National Defense College. (Myoe 2009; Lee 2014) 
In short, the Tatmadaw established routine practices through which midlevel officers 
could be promoted to senior positions either within the military or the government.  
These measures introduced a degree of merit into the personnel system, as such, a junior 
ranking officer could not be promoted based solely on his personal connections with 
senior officers.  According to Lee (2014),  
The common belief or expectation among midlevel officers was that if they 
worked hard and carried out their assigned duties diligently, the officer would 
eventually get to know his senior officers well and earn the chance to win their 
trust. He then would be able to convince the officer’s superiors that he was both 
trustworthy and capable of completing their assigned duties. (173)  
 
Thus, the military regime gave officers reason to invest in asset specificity by codifying 
the requirements for advancement.  Because promotion requirements were explicitly 
established, junior officers were able to plan and predict career paths giving them more 
reason to invest in organizational success and the perpetuation of the regime. 
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2007 Saffron Revolution 
 
In August 2007, a sudden increase in the government-controlled price of diesel 
fuel and petrol sparked demonstrations.  The ruling SPDC, formerly the SLORC, 
permitted these small demonstrations to proceed, but the protesters were monitored and 
contained by police and other security personnel.  By early September, Buddhist monks 
or sangha, staged a demonstration protesting the high cost of living.  During the course of 
the demonstration, members of the security forces attacked a small number of monks. 
Outraged by the mistreatment of the country’s highly revered Buddhist monks, some 
young monks formed the All Burma Monks Alliance and began to organize their own 
country-wide protest movement. Inspired by the saffron-colored robes worn by the 
Buddhist monks, the media labeled the civil resistance campaign, the Saffron Revolution. 
(Selth 2008, 282) What began as a religious protest, quickly gained momentum, with 
people from all walks of life joining the thousands of monks.  Demands for limited 
political and economic reforms turned into more strident calls for the overthrow of the 
military regime and the restoration of democratic rule.  By the end of September, crowds 
on the streets of Rangoon grew as large as 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands of 
Buddhist monks and other protesters marching in cities across the country. (Global 
Nonviolent Action Database 2010) 
As defenders of the Burmese culture, the participation of Buddhist monks 
threatened the legitimacy and moral authority of the military regime.  Compared with the 
Tatmadaw’s reaction to the uprising in 1988, the predominantly Buddhist armed forces 
initially exercised restraint and caution.  As the demonstrations became larger and more 
  188 
widespread, the regime launched a deliberate propaganda campaign, challenging the 
sincerity and authenticity of the demonstrating monks labeling the protestors terrorists 
and agents of hostile foreign powers.  Losing patience as the crisis threatened to spiral out 
of control, on 26 September, soldiers and police opened fire on unarmed protestors in 
Rangoon.  Later that day, the Tatmadaw raided Rangoon’s Buddhist monasteries and 
forcibly detained hundreds of monks. (Global Nonviolent Action Database 2010) Within 
days, the bloody crackdown had quelled the movement and silenced the dissident monks. 
The number of protesters killed during the crisis ranged from thirteen by the government, 
to thirty-one according to the UN Human Rights Council, to estimates as high as several 
hundred by pro-democracy groups. (Chowdhury 2008) 
 
Defend, Defect, or Coup:  Decision to Defend 
 
In making the determination to defend the junta during the 2007 Saffron 
Revolution, the Tatmadaw weighed the regime’s reputation and future credibility in 
securing the military’s political property rights, see Figure 17, decision point (1) and 
decision point (2).  Finding the junta credible before and after the crisis, the Tatmadaw 
decided to defend the status quo despite the distasteful use of violence against Buddhist 
monks.  Commanders and officers displayed overwhelming supported for the military 
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Figure 17. Tatmadaw Decision Tree 
 
 
Decision point (1): Junta’s Reputation in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
The first consideration is the regime’s reputation in fulfilling previous contractual 
obligations.  Did the regime follow-though on contractual commitments or did the regime 
cheat the military of previously negotiated political property rights?  As the previous 
discussion detailed, the military has ruled Burma in various forms since 1962.  
Repression has been consistently and ruthlessly applied to silence past protests and other 
threats to the military regime.  Over several cycles of repression, military leaders have 
proven their reputation and commitment to the hierarchical order which keeps the 
Tatmadaw unified.  In an iterative process, the military regime has consistently secured 
the political property rights of the officer corps and expanded on those rights.  In fact, at 
each crisis point, the military elite adjusted the institutional arrangements and forms of 
government to maintain the dominance of the Tatmadaw in politics.  Following the 1989 
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uprising and the demise of the socialist party system, the junta developed new 
mechanisms to reinforce credible commitment between the “military-as-government” and 
“military-as-institution.”  The junta demonstrated a commitment to the Tatmadaw 
through investment in military modernization and improvements in morale and welfare. 
These acts gave the officer corps reason to invest in organizational outcomes and the 
perpetuation of the regime.  In short, the two actors demonstrated credible commitments 
through irreversible specialized investments—the junta’s investment in the military’s 
infrastructure and the officer corps investment in asset specificity.    
 
Decision point (2): Junta’s Future Credibility in Securing the Military’s Property Rights 
Finding, the junta upheld it contractual obligations to the military, the Tatmadaw 
next considered the credibility of the regime following the crisis.  What are the future 
prospects of the junta maintaining its owner rights and ability to commit to obligations of 
the new contractual agreement?  In short, if the Tatmadaw defends the regime, will the 
junta be able to secure the political property rights of the military to include protection 
from prosecution for human rights abuses.  While succession is typically a concern in 
assessing the ex post credibility of the regime, succession was not a focal point during 
this crisis.  In past emergencies, the head of the government typically stepped down and 
another leader was installed through consensus to facilitate reforms and the survival of 
the regime.  The military elite understood the need to present a unified front to avoid 
visible expressions of dissent or displays of division.  The Saffron Revolution, however, 
did not spur a leadership change with General Than Shwe maintaining his chair. (Lee 
2014) With no apparent power struggles within the inner circle, General Than Shwe 
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remained firmly in charge.  Consequently, the officer corps had little doubt about their 
chain of command and the proper lines of political authority.  When commanders 
followed orders to suppress the uprising, they had confidence the regime would continue 
to guarantee the Tatmadaw’s political property rights. 
Despite the widespread popular protests, the junta’s hegemony was never in 
question.  Similar to the 1988 uprising, the 2007 Saffron Revolution revealed the 
weakness of the opposition.  Due in part to decades-long brutal suppression of dissident 
activity, opposition groups failed to combine forces, severely hindering their ability to 
extract major concessions from the regime.  Moreover, the regime’s past policies 
concentrated economic control in the hands of the military, limiting the development of 
private centers of wealth. (Schock 1999, 359) In short, because of the Tatmadaw’s 
ubiquity in Burma’s economy, there was not an independent business class to support 
dissidents.  Along with business elites, religious organizations can potentially offer 
support to the oppositions.  While approximately 85 to 88 percent of Burma’s population 
profess Buddhism as their religion to include a predominant number of the armed forces, 
Buddhism was a weak organizational force. (Fredholm 1993, 14) Despite the large 
majority of practicing Buddhist in Burma, the Buddhist sangha (monks) have normally 
refrained from organizing the faithful or political activism. Although the Saffron 
Revolution was catalyzed by young Buddhist monks, their participation was not enough 
to coalesce a coherent opposition force against the regime.  Finally, the international 
community provided nominal financial, organizational, and moral support to dissident 
groups.  Pursuing autarchic economic practices during the socialist era, the military 
dictatorship had virtually isolated Burma from the outside world for decades. (Schock 
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1999, 359) Gradually opening up Burma after1988, foreign governments, NGOs, and 
international companies had not developed strong networks with Burma’s emerging civil 
society. (Selth 2008)   Consequently, the regime and the Tatmadaw was confident it 
could weather any international opprobrium or punitive sanctions.  In short, the regime 
was in a strong political position to crush the opposition and retain political authority 
following the crisis.    
 
Action point (4):  Defend  
During the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the junta was firmly in power.  No elite 
divisions manifested within the military before or during the 2007 Saffron Revolution.  
The opposition remained deeply divided with little financial, organizational, or moral 
backing from domestic or international sources.  Finding the junta credible before and 
after the crisis, the Tatmadaw decided to defend the status quo.  Despite easily crushing 
the disturbance, the possibility of future uprisings and once again being called to use 
violence against the revered sangha was an alarming prospect.  The Saffron Revolution 
served as forewarning that the junta needed to find a better strategy to handle and 
dissipate popular discontent. 
 
Continuing the Cycle of Repression Under a “Roadmap to Democracy” 
 
A wake-up call for the Junta, the 2007 Saffron Revolution triggered a series of 
“democratic” reforms.  The consequences of the bloody crackdown reverberated across 
Burma and the ruling junta took note. The military may have prevailed in retaining 
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control of Burma, but crushing dissident Buddhist monks came with a heavy cost 
introducing a divisive element between the military and Burmese society.  The ostracism 
of the military from the sangha and the community at large, combined with misgivings 
amongst the devout rank and file within the Tatmadaw weakened the military’s claim to 
political authority.  The upshot, the crisis introduced political uncertainty regarding the 
durability of the Tatmadaw’s hold on power under the current institutional arrangements.  
As with each cycle of repression, the crisis event gave the political actors reason and 
opportunity to restructure the civil-military arrangements to best protect their future 
access to political authority and the attached political property rights.  To ensure the 
military retained a majority of owner rights, the ruling military elite made the strategic 
decision to implement the plan for the “Roadmap to Democracy” introduced in 2003.  
Rather than be subjected to the unpredictability of transitional justice, the conversion to 
“civilian” government would be introduced under the terms set by the military.  Ideally, 
the military would establish constitutional safeguards to protect its long-term political 
property rights without the need to rely or trust civilian authorities.  Instead of negotiating 
their way back to the barracks, the junta designed “formal civilian rule without 
relinquishing de facto military control of the government.” (Pedersen 2011, 52) In short, 
the military constructed institutions to insulate itself from the political uncertainty that 
comes with electoral politics.  
In August 2003, spurred by the military’s failure to gain seats in the 1990 
election, the SPDC introduced its “Seven-Point Roadmap to Democracy” to ease the 
military out of government and return civilian “constitutional” rule. (Pedersen 2011; 
Myoe 2014) As the “Roadmap to Democracy met various stumbling blocks and the 
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military lost interest, the initiative fell by the wayside only to be resuscitated following 
the 2007 crisis.  The seven-step process included convening the National Convention, 
finalizing constitutional principles, drafting the constitution, holding a national 
referendum to approve the constitution, holding general elections, convening 
parliamentary sessions, and finally constructing a new democratic state. (Pedersen 2011, 
53) When the SPDC began the Roadmap in earnest following the 2007 crisis, it tightly 
controlled the process.  Consequently, groups outside the ruling military class found they 
had limited negotiating power or room for compromise in the drafting of the constitution.  
In May 2008, the constitution was formally approved in a national referendum with a 
highly suspect—94 percent approval rate with a 98 percent nationwide voter turnout. 
(Pedersen 2011, 54) The first general elections were held in 2010 with the military-
backed Union Solidary and Development Party (USDP) winning a majority.  Soon 
thereafter, the SPDC military junta dissolved in March 2011.   
The constitution that emerged from this top-down process reflected the junta’s 
objective to institutionalize its owner rights within the confines of multi-party democracy 
and protect its manager rights from civilian intrusion.  The new constitution established a 
set of institutions including: an elected president, a bicameral national parliament, regular 
multiparty elections, and for the first time, fourteen regional governments.  Although the 
2008 constitution formally established a multiparty democracy with regular elections and 
the associated civil and political rights, Pedersen (2011) highlighted several elements 
precluding the establishment of a meaningful democratic system:  
• the separation of powers is circumvented by the extensive authority provided 
the president to appoint, dismiss, or otherwise control legislative and judicial 
officials; 
  195 
 
• the military maintains a dominant role in politics, including control of all 
security-related ministries and committees, as well as 25 percent of the 
members of the national and regional parliaments; 
 
• the military itself remains fully autonomous, subject to neither executive nor 
legislative or judicial civilian authority; and 
 
• all democratic rights are subject to “laws enacted for national security” and 
“the prevalence of law and order.”  (54) 
 
 
Pedersen (2011) further observed these shortcomings are compounded by the rules for 
amending the constitution, which effectively gives the military veto power. (54)  
The military elite ensured the maintenance of significant owner rights under the 
2008 Constitution.  Firstly, in standard constitutional civil-military arrangements the 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the armed forces is typically the head of state (president 
or prime minister).  Under the 2008 constitution, the C-in-C of the Tatmadaw is not a 
civilian head of state, but a senior military officer in the Tatmadaw.  Although the C-in-C 
is formally appointed by the president, for all practical purposes, it is the incumbent C-in-
C who decides his successor.  Because of this provision, the C-in-C of the Tatmadaw, 
according to Myoe (2014), is the single most important power broker in Burma. (6) The 
power held by the C-in-C include, but not all inclusive. 
• nominates 25% of the representation in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union 
Parliament), and one-third in the state and regional assemblies;  
 
• nominates three ministerial portfolios—for defense, home affairs and border 
area affairs; 
 
• selects one of the three vice-presidential candidates, of which the Presidential 
Electoral Colleges elects one as president;  
 
• serves as supreme commander of all armed forces, including the police, 
paramilitary organizations and even the civil defense forces; and 
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Beyond the powers of the C-in-C, the Tatmadaw maintains considerable constitutional 
provisions to allow it to intervene in politics in the pretense of national defense.  While 
the Tatmadaw does not have the constitutional right to intercede directly in the process of 
making or breaking a government, the Constitution details procedures for the Tatmadaw 
to assume state powers during a declaration of a state of emergency. “The President may, 
if necessary, declare a military administrative order.  In the said order, the executive 
powers and duties and the judicial powers and duties concerning community peace and 
tranquility and prevalence of law and order shall be conferred on the Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Services.” (Union of Myanmar 2008, Section 413) Moreover, Myoe 
(2014) suggested military leadership can indirectly exercise its influence through the 
National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), in which the C-in-C controls at least six 
out of 11 members and commands a majority.  
In the event of any major political and security issue and in any state of 
emergency, the president needs to consult with and seek approval from the 
NDSC. Under the declaration of a state of emergency, if not all the members of 
the NDSC are able to attend the meeting, the president needs to consult with the 
C-in-C, the Deputy C-in-C and ministers for defense and home affairs before any 
announcement can be made.  This indicates that the C-in-C is in a position to 
exercise considerable influence on the administrative functions of the 
government. (7) 
 
Moreover, the Tatmadaw holds the exclusive right to make and implement defense, 
internal security and border affairs policies.  “The Defence Services shall lead in 
safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers.” (Union of Myanmar 
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2008, Section 339) In short, the military added fail-safe provisions into the constitution if 
multi-party democratic politics proved to be a misadventure.   
Under the new constitution, the military also maintained strong manager rights.  
The Tatmadaw ensured it remained an autonomous institution within the state with little 
to no civilian oversight. (Pederson 2011; Myoe 2014) According to the Constitution, the 
Tatmadaw has the right to administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces 
independently.  In terms of national defense policy making and implementation, the 
Tatmadaw enjoys the exclusive right to set its own agenda and there is no mechanism for 
civilian oversight.  In other words, civilian authorities and other institutions of the state 
are not in a position to oversee any aspect of military affairs or suggest reforms to the 
Tatmadaw’s command structure, doctrine, military education and doctrine, budget 
allocations, and arms procurement.  Furthermore, civilian authorities are given minimal 
constitutional provisions to effect high-level Tatmadaw personnel appointments and 
promotions, which include police and military personnel seated in other ministries. 
(Myoe 2014, 8) Of note, in an act of self-preservation the military leadership ensured it 
would not be subject to transitional justice.  For example, in matters before military 
tribunals, “the decision of the Commander-in-Chief is final and conclusive.” (Union of 
Myanmar 2008, Section 343) Interestingly, the Tatmadaw also codified the preservation 
of political property rights for its most vulnerable members adding rules regarding the 
welfare of military personnel and families.  “A law shall be enacted to provide assistance 
and care for disabled Defence Services personnel and the families of deceased or fallen 
Defence Services personnel.” (Union of Myanmar 2008, Section 344)  
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Conclusion 
 
Entering post-colonial independence as a war-torn country, Burma’s new 
government faced challenges by various sectors of society—with armed separatist, 
communist agitators, and communal violence barring any political compromise.  State 
formation, in turn, was a bloody process with decades of civil strife resulting in an 
estimated 500,000 people killed. (Callahan 2003, 210) The only political actor able to 
bring law and order to Burma was the Tatmadaw.  The explosive security environment 
and extended duration of political instability led to the military taking a dominant role in 
politics and reaffirmed the Tatmadaw’s self-image as guardian of the state.  The early 
period of growth and operational autonomy of the military also created institutional 
arrangements beyond the realm of civilian control and oversight.  As a consequence of 
the relative weakness of civilian institutions, the Tatmadaw has controlled politics, 
directly or indirectly, in successive authoritarian governments since 1962. Thus, the 
ceaseless cycles of repression explained the persistence of the military’s political 
dominance.  Each cycle of repression served to unify the military enclave and reinforced 
their entitlement to rule.  As its self-image is tied to upholding the unified and sovereign 
state of Burma, the Tatmadaw began to equate challenges to its political authority as 
threats to the state.  Without equivocation, the junta has demonstrated the “willingness to 
use overwhelming coercive force against anyone who takes to the streets or takes up arms 
to challenge its rule.” (Slater 2014, 172)   
With the bloody suppression of dissident Buddhist monks in 2007, the military 
concluded that their hold on political authority required a new strategy. The military 
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regime initiated a number of measures aimed at political and economic liberalization—
drafting a multiparty constitution, holding elections, and allowing the growth of civilian 
institutions.  However, the establishment of nominally democratic institutions reflects the 
military’s efforts to institutionalize its owner rights and protect its manager rights from 
civilian intrusion.  Rather than have the masses determine the fate of the regime in a 
bottom-up revolution, the military decided to control the transition process from the top-
down.  Since the military remains the central figure in Burma, it has overwhelming veto 
power on the structure and pace of reforms.  Barany (2015) best summarizes the 
obstacles faced in reforming politics in Burma: 
The 2008 Constitution protects the military from being held accountable for past 
wrongdoings, disqualifies opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from running for 
president, and reserves 25 percent of parliamentary seats for Tatmadaw 
appointees. Given that 75 percent of parliament is needed to approve 
constitutional amendments, this creates a veritable “constitutional bunker” for the 
military. The constitution not only ensures the military’s continuing dominance, 
but especially the influence of senior members of the military junta. (98)   
 
As discussed in the entrepreneur army chapter, when cartel armies transition back to the 
barracks, they do so under their own terms. (Linz and Stepan 1978; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Geddes 1999) Notably, when cartel armies step aside, to allow civilians 
to run day-to-day governance of the state, the military leadership have designed a system 
that ensures the predominance of the officer corps. 
Since the initiation of the liberalization process in Burma, scholars have debated 
the prospect of democratization in Burma. (Nyein 2009; Pedersen 2011; Englehart 2012; 
Farrelly 2013; Myoe 2014; Slater 2014; Barany 2015) Taking a cautionary perspective, 
Myoe (2014) expressed concern that insufficient trust between the Tatmadaw and 
emerging political stakeholders will provoke a backlash against the ongoing liberalization 
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process. (2) Pedersen (2011) held a more optimistic view, asserting the liberalization 
process is a confidence building exercise between the Tatmadaw and civilians. (65)  
Describing Burma’s political reforms as a complex confidence game, Slater (2014) 
viewed the top-down reform process as one of double-edged détente between the ruling 
Tatmadaw and its internal rivals.  As such, the détente is “inherently fragile because it 
rests on the current regime’s confidence that democratization will produce neither serious 
instability nor even its own decisive defeat.” (171) If the building of democratic 
institutions is a negotiation between civilian and military stakeholders, civilian actors 
must prove their credibility to secure the political property rights of the military.  It is yet 
to be seen, if the Tatmadaw will have the confidence to allow civilian authorities to gain 
an equal or predominant share of owner rights.  As Burma showcases, in the politics of 
democratic reforms, civil-military institutional arrangements matter.  Since institutional 
arrangements favor the military, it will be difficult for civilians to reassert control over 
the Tatmadaw.  Military supremacy, or the lack of civil control of the military, is 
therefore, the largest obstacle to liberalization and democratization in Burma.    
 




This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces 
using the economic theory of the firm.  Civilian control over the military in an 
authoritarian system is a delicate balancing act.  To establish a “master-servant” 
relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement 
to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency.  The 
bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is 
assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible 
guarantee of those rights.  These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional 
arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an 
authoritarian system.  This typology also captures the bargaining environment informing 
the military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup when a regime is in crisis.   
Because authoritarian systems lack an independent authority to enforce 
compliance with institutionalized “rules of the game,” the ultimate arbiter of conflict is 
violence.  In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for 
repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the 
military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control.  Once the 
military gains superiority and later supremacy, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
civilians to undercut the political power of the military establishment and apply control 
over the armed forces.  In other words, the dependence on coercive violence entails a 
paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered 
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to act against the regime.  To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on 
the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s 
credibility and reputation.  The dictator’s reputation and credibility in turn impacts a 
military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis.     
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The theoretical model and typology generated in this project further our 
understanding of the strategic bargaining between political and military elites in the 
design of civil-military institutions in authoritarian systems.  The balance of power 
between civilian authorities and the armed forces determines the contractually agreed 
upon institutional framework and ultimately the level political property rights gained and 
maintained by each actor.  The cycle of repression provides insights into the arrangement 
of civil-military institutions before and after a crisis event.  A crisis event requiring the 
application of military repression provides each actor an opportunity to reevaluate and 
restructure the governing arrangements of the contractual relationship.  Consequently, 
when regimes require the military to intervene in politics for regime maintenance the 
distribution of political property rights are negotiated impacting the structure of civil-
military institutions.  The case studies in this dissertation illustrated the importance of 
regime reputation and credibility in preserving the contractual relationship between the 
ruling and military elite. 
In the China case, the Chinese Communist Party retained the preponderance of 
owner rights in the civil-military political bargain by leveraging party mechanisms to 
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control the military.  The PLA had consistently recognized the Party’s legitimate right to 
control the army.  Moreover, the CCP had demonstrated it was firmly in power and 
clarified the succession question.  When the Chinese Communist Party ordered the PLA 
to quell protestors during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement, the Party had proven 
its reputation and future credibility to commit to contractual obligations.  Finding the 
CCP credible before and after the crisis, the PLA decided to defend the status quo.  In 
agreeing to defend the regime, the PLA also received compensation from the Party.  To 
advance the PLA’s goal to limit its exposure to political uncertainty—it negotiated for 
stronger manager rights thereby increasing its professional autonomy.  The military 
establishment also received a long-desired increase in military spending to further their 
modernization goals.  Although the PLA received budgetary benefits and secured its 
manager rights, the application of repression did not cost the Party the disbursement of 
owner rights.  Because the Party and the PLA had credibly committed to the relationship 
through reciprocal acts, the cost of repression was significantly lower for the Party.  As a 
result, the civil-military arrangement did not transition and the Party remained in the 
position of supremacy. 
In the Philippine case, Marcos retained the preponderance of owner rights in the 
civil-military political bargain controlling the military through patron army arrangements.  
As such, the regime sustained the civil-military contractual obligation through direct 
transfers, or clientelistic exchanges between Marcos and the military establishment.  As a 
consequence, the military’s political property rights were not institutionally guaranteed 
but singularly dependent on the patronage of Marcos.  After coming to power in 1965, 
Marcos involved the military in every aspect of authoritarian rule—censorship, 
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repression, and governance.  All the while bolstered by the coercive power of the army, 
Marcos became increasing vulnerable to the threat from his own generals.  Realizing his 
vulnerability, Marcos began to undercut the military’s political property rights to check 
the power and independence of the military elite.  When Marcos required the support of 
the military to suppress the 1986 People Power Movement, his poor reputation and lack 
of credible commitment to the civil-military agreement led to the defection of his 
generals and the end of his regime.  Deeply divided and lacking legitimate political 
authority, the military elite brokered a deal with the civilian opposition to take part in the 
new government and democratic transition.  Before Marcos’s cycle of repression, the 
military was not considered a significant power broker in politics.   However, after 
gaining unprecedented political authority under martial law, the officer corps had 
obtained their membership among the political establishment.   
In the Indonesian case, the overreliance on the Indonesian army for repression led 
to the rise of entrepreneur institutional arrangements.  After the introduction of martial 
law in 1957, the emergency condition expanded the military’s political property rights 
and increased its political authority in general administration and economic management 
of the country.  Consequently, in the distribution of political property rights President 
Sukarno and the military elite shared ownership.  During the initial years, the military 
brass was invested in preserving the existing social order and the political arrangement of 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.  However, disrupting the equilibrium, Sukarno 
opportunistically aligned himself with the communist party, PKI, to counterbalance the 
power of the Indonesian army.  Sukarno’s action had the effect of limiting the 
contractually agreed upon owner political property rights of the military.  The army found 
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Sukarno’s rapprochement with the PKI unsettling and was adamantly opposed to sharing 
any ownership with the communist party.  The break in the contract ultimately led to the 
army removing Sukarno from office in 1965 and establishing a military dictatorship.  
After edging Sukarno out of power in a “disguised” coup, the Indonesian military moved 
quickly to secure full owner political property rights and remove any remaining political 
competitors.  With “Letter of 11 March” and the purge of the PKI, Suharto and the 
generals had achieved military supremacy transitioning the civil-military arrangements 
from an entrepreneur to cartel army.  
In the Burma case, the predominance of the Burmese army, Tatmadaw, was due 
in part to the bloody process of state building following independence from the British.  
Burma entered post-colonial independence as a war-torn country with the new 
government facing challenges from armed separatist, communist agitators, and 
communal violence.  As a result of the relative weakness of civilian institutions, the 
Tatmadaw was the only political actor able to bring law and order to Burma.  The 
ceaseless cycles of repression experienced in Burma explains the persistence of the 
Tatmadaw’s dominance over civilian counterparts in a cartel army civil-military 
arrangement.  Each cycle of repression served to unify the Tatmadaw officers and 
reinforced their entitlement to rule.  Contributing to the military’s monopoly, the junta 
instituted measures to credibly secure the vast political property rights the military 
enclave had gained over time.  When protesting monks and other demonstrators in the  
2007 Saffron Revolution challenged the Junta, the Tatmadaw did not hesitate to defend 
the status quo viewing the uprising as another iteration of the cycle.  As a result, the civil-
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military arrangement did not transition and the generals remained in a position of 
supremacy. 
Civil-military institutional arrangements prior to crisis events are a large 
determinant in whether the post-crisis transition is dominated by military or civilian 
political actors.  Accordingly, the political actor’s level of ownership impacts the 
structure of the regime following a crisis.  Based on the army type, or bargaining position 
of civilian and military actors, we can make some cursory projections about political 
transitions.  For instance, if the military has majority ownership of political property 
rights after the crisis, the new regime will most likely be institutionally designed by 
military elites.  As the Asian case studies from the previous chapters illustrated, in 
entrepreneur and cartel army arrangements (Indonesia and Burma), the military was able 
to design post-crisis political institutions in their favor.  As Cook (2007) observed, during 
periods of regime crisis, the military elite in military-dominated states shed the veneer of 
apolitical servant—revealing themselves as the locus of power—to reestablish political 
order.  Alternatively, in countries with less dominant militaries (patron army 
arrangements), such as the Philippines, democratic transitions, while fraught, are more 
likely.  Military and civilian actors in the Philippines had parity in bargaining power—as 
reflected in the post-crisis drafting of the constitution and democratic trajectory of 
reforms.  The upshot, the bargaining power of actors and the structure of civil-military 
institutional arrangements have an impact on regime maintenance, regime transitions, and 
democratization post crisis.   
 
Implications for Future Research 
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The goal of this project was to expand our understanding of the organizational 
behavior of the military and the institutions that condition its obedience to civilian 
masters.  In the cases examined in this dissertation, the central role military actors have 
on the survival of regimes in crisis was undeniable.  The military’s decision to defend, 
defect, or coup had a profound impact on a regime’s trajectory—whether the regime 
survived, crumbled, or reconstituted.  The cycle of repression and typology of civil-
military relations appear to explain the military’s behavior in these four Asian cases.  But 
how well does the model apply to another region and alternative set of cases?  In other 
words, how generalizable is my theory?   
The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests and popular uprisings 
that spread across the Middle East in late 2010 into early 2011 which led to the biggest 
political transformation in the region since decolonization.  The defection of several 
armies during the Arab Spring, came as a surprise to some scholars because it was long 
assumed that the “robustness of authoritarianism” was due in part to the state’s coercive 
apparatus willingness to “crush reform initiatives from below.” (Bellin 2004, 144) 
Moreover, the military is often seen as the promoter of the status quo.  More 
confounding, dictators that were troubled by mass defection from their armed forces had 
successfully employed coup-proofing measures which by all appearances kept the 
military in the barracks.  While these measures may have kept the military from 
threatening the status quo, it was not enough to compel the generals to defend the regime.  
Mass defection of the armed forces during the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated the 
dictator’s dilemma in gaining and maintaining positive control of the armed forces.   
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The theoretical framework established in this dissertation may be able to assist in 
understanding the different regime trajectories during the Arab Spring.  Much like the 
Asian case studies examined in previous chapters, I argue civil-military institutional 
arrangements would impact the armed forces response to the uprisings across the Arab 
world.  The Arab Spring provides an interesting set of cases studies to peripherally test 
the generalizability of my theoretical model.  As Brooks (2019) observed the uprisings 
offered scholars a natural experiment: 
Faced with large protests in late 2010 and early 2011 across the Arab world, 
militaries reacted differently.  Some defected from the political leaders and 
refused to fire on protesters to disperse them (Tunisia and Egypt); some remained 
loyal and repressed protesters (Syria and Bahrain); other fractured, with some 
units defending the leaders and other refusing to repress demonstrations (Libya 
and Yemen). (6) 
 
These countries—Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen—all experienced 
mass popular uprisings during the same time period; they also had similar political, 
economic, and cultural backgrounds.  More importantly, these cases offered variation in 
three respects—civil-military institutional arrangements, the military’s reaction to the 
crisis event, and post-crisis outcomes.   
Based on the scholarship and conclusions drawn by Lutterbeck (2013), Albrecht 
(2015a), Barany (2016), and Brooks (2017) on military behavior during the Arab Spring, 
I am able to provide a cursory application of this project’s typology and model to these 
six cases (Table 4).  While not a definitive application of the cycle of repression, it 
illustrates how my typology and theoretical model may be leveraged in alternative cases.  
More research should be pursued to test the model applying cases from the Arab Spring 
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and other popular movements.  A large-n study could also be conducted to further test the 
external validity of my theory. 
 
Table 4. Arab Spring Case Studies: Defend, Defect, or Coup 
 












Egypt  Entrepreneur Yes No No Coup 
(delayed) 
Syria Cadre Yes (officers) Yes (officers)  Defend  
(civil war) 
Bahrain  Patron Yes Yes  Defend 
 
Tunisia Patron No  Yes Defect 
 
Yemen Patron No  Yes/No Split  
(civil war) 
Libya Patron No  Yes/No Split  
(civil war) 
 
(1) Regime’s past reputation: did the dictator commit to the civil-military contract before 
the crisis? 
(2) Regime’s future credibility: can the dictator commit to the renegotiated civil-military 
contract after the crisis? 
(3) Opposition’s credibility: can the opposition commit to the negotiated civil-military 
contract after the crisis? 
(4) Military’s action: military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup. 
 
Civil-military institutions may be deliberately designed, or they can be inherited 
from previous regimes, or even former colonizers.  However, these institutional 
arrangements are not static, but continue to evolve as circumstances and actors change. 
North (1990) noted, “Incremental change comes from the perceptions of the 
entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering 
the existing institutional framework at some margin.” (8)  Consequently, opportunistic 
behavior at the margins may gradually alter institutions, however, these changes are often 
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imperceptible.  The choice to select cases with notable crisis moments requiring military 
repression for regime maintenance limits this study.  Unfortunately, this selection bias 
gives the appearance that military actors are always making gains vis-à-vis civilian 
actors.  As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) noted despite the scholarly work produced that 
would indicate otherwise most institutional change occurs incrementally and register as 
change long after measures have set change in motion.  Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also 
observed that the bulk of research on institutional change focused on rapid often dramatic 
change such as revolutions or regime change.  Given the propensity to study dramatic 
breaks from the past, more research should be done to examine incremental change in 
civil-military arrangements using the conceptual tools development in this project.  I 
speculate that incremental change would probably favor civilian leaders if they are vested 
with the authority to make new institutional rules.   
As illustrated throughout this dissertation, civil-military governing arrangements 
have a profound impact on regime maintenance, regime transitions, and democratization.  
Few works have examined the institutional arrangements that constitute the authoritarian 
civil-military relationship.  Scholars have inconsistently conceptualized, operationalized, 
and measured the variations in civil-military institutions and their impact on authoritarian 
civil control.  The typology introduced in this project sought to define and conceptualize 
civil-military institutions in authoritarian regimes.  Moreover, Brooks (2019) identified 
the unwarranted divide across the civil-military relations subfield which treated topics 
such as civil control, coup-prevention, repression, and military effectiveness as separate 
phenomenon of study.  This project provides a means to integrate these four competing 
imperatives for the dictator into a coherent analytical framework.   The cycle of 
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repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between 
the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing 
the relationship before and after a crisis event.  As such, this project furthers our 
understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes 
conceptual tools for future studies.  This project has never meant to be the final authority 
on defining and conceptualizing civil-military relations in authoritarian systems but a 
start of a conversation on the variation and how those variations condition the bargaining 
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